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The aim of this study is to examine the relation between Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power and to show that 
perspectivism is almost a direct and natural consequence of the doctrine of the 
will to power. Without exploring the doctrine, it is not possible to understand 
what Nietzsche’s perspectivism is and what he trying to do by proposing it as an 
alternative to traditional epistemology. To this aim, firstly, Nietzsche’s doctrine 
of the will to power is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper 
understanding of the doctrine, its relation with Darwinism and the claims which 
say that it is a metaphysical principle are analyzed. Afterwards, Nietzsche’s 
construction of the world as becoming out of will to power is investigated. 
Nietzsche’s conception of interpretation as power struggle and its role in 
perspectivism explained. Then, how Nietzsche’s construction of the world as 
becoming and his concept of interpretation as power struggle emerge as 
perspectivism is explained. After that, in order to present the differences between 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and traditional understanding of epistemology, 
Nietzsche’s critiques of some of the fundamental assumptions of traditional 
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epistemology, i.e., causality, logic, and subject-object and apparent-real world 
distinctions, are investigated. Finally, Nietzsche’s understanding of truth based 
on his perspectivism is inquired. Its relation with correspondence, pragmatic and 
coherence theories of truth is explored to show that Nietzsche’s understanding of 
truth could not be comprehended through these theories. Consequently, it is 
claimed that the tendency to attribute a truth theory to Nietzsche’s perspectivism, 
which is prevalent in the current Nietzsche studies, stems from commentator’s, 
consciously or unconsciously, ignoring of the relation between his perspectivism 
and his doctrine of the will to power.  
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Bu çalışmanın amacı Nietzsche’nin perspektivizmi ile güç istenci öğretisi 
arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemek ve perspektivizmin neredeyse güç istenci 
öğretisinin dolaysız ve doğal bir sonucu olduğunu göstermektir. Öğretiyi 
incelemeden, Nietzsche’nin perspektivizminin ne olduğunu ve bunu geleneksel 
epistemolojiye bir alternatif olarak ileri sürerken ne yapmaya çalıştığını anlamak 
olanaklı değildir. Bu amaçla, ilk olarak, Nietzsche’nin güç istenci öğretisi 
ayrıntılı olarak açıklanmıştır. Devamında, öğretinin daha iyi anlaşılmasını 
sağlamak için, Darwinizm ile olan ilişkisi ve öğretinin metafizik bir ilke 
olduğunu ileri süren iddialar incelenmiştir. Sonra, Nietzsche’nin güç istencinden 
yola çıkarak dünyayı oluş şeklinde kurması araştırılmıştır. Nietzsche’nin yorumu 
güç mücadelesi şeklinde anlamasının ve bu anlayışın perspektivizm içerisindeki 
rolü açıklanmıştır. Daha sonra, Nietzsche’nin dünyayı oluş şeklinde kurmasının 
ve güç mücadelesi olarak yorum kavramının nasıl perspektivizm olarak ortaya 
çıktığı araştırılmıştır. Devamında ise, Nietzsche’nin perspektivizmi ve geleneksel 
epistemolojik anlayış arasındaki farkı ortaya koyabilmek için, Nietzsche’nin 
geleneksel epistemolojinin bazı temel varsayımlarına (nedensellik, mantık, özne-
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nesne ve görünür-gerçek dünya ayrımları) getirdiği eleştiriler incelenmiştir. Son 
olarak, Nietzsche’nin perspektivizm üzerine temellenmiş doğruluk anlayışı 
araştırılmıştır. Nietzsche’nin doğruluk anlayışının karşılıklılık, pragmacılık, ve 
uygunluk doğruluk kuramları yardımıyla kavranamayacağını göstermek için, 
Nietzsche’nin doğruluk anlayışı ve bu kuramlar arasındaki ilişki incelenmiştir. 
Sonuç olarak, günümüz Nietzsche çalışmalarında yaygın olarak görülen 
Nietzsche’nin perspektivizmine bir doğruluk kuramı atfetme eğiliminin 
yorumcuların perspektivizm ile güç istenci öğretisi arasındaki ilişkiyi bilinçli ya 
da bilinçsiz olarak görmezlikten gelmelerinden kaynaklandığı ileri sürülmüştür. 
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Nietzsche, Güç İstenci, Yorum, Perspektivizm, Perspektif 
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Although Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning truth, knowledge and epistemology 
have remained under the shadow of his thoughts about morality, Christianity, 
nihilism, politics, women, Übermensch, etc., for a long time, they are now 
becoming the recent topics in Nietzsche studies. As it has been seen in the 
studies of the former topics, there are also controversial views concerning the 
latter ones. Some disregard Nietzsche’s thoughts as being mere collection of 
contradictory aphorisms, and as being not clearly expressed ideas, whereas, some 
argue that there is something novel in those aphorisms concerning our 
conceptions of truth and knowledge. This fragmentation among ideas concerning 
the nature and value of Nietzsche’s thoughts about truth and knowledge further 
increases when the investigations are deepened. To illustrate, there appears the 
problem of Nachlaß (unpublished writings), whether Nietzsche’s Nachlaß is to 
be taken into consideration or not. Since most of the aphorisms, in which 
Nietzsche presents his views concerning truth and knowledge, are in the 
Nachlass. Some scholars argue that since Nietzsche did not publish these texts in 
his lifetime, they are not legitimate sources, on the other hand, some other 
scholars, claimed that Nietzsche’s actual philosophy lies in those texts, and thus, 
they are legitimate sources. In addition to the problem of the selection of the 
proper texts, there are also other controversies among Nietzsche scholars 
resulting from philosophical issues; whether the doctrine of the will to power is a 
metaphysical, teleological, or Darwinian principle; whether his perspectivism is 
a kind of relativism; whether his understanding of truth implies a truth theory, 
etc. Hence, although the issue of Nietzsche’s understanding of truth and 
knowledge is a very fresh topic in Nietzsche studies, it has become a very 
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controversial and complicated matter; so that, almost every scholar has his own 
Nietzsche. 
 Moreover, Nietzsche’s style and use of language are other factors that 
make everything even more controversial and more complex. He does not use 
clearly present and step by step proceeding arguments, instead he uses metaphors 
and aphorisms to express his ideas. Furthermore, he does not use the words and 
concepts in the way we are used to; he plays with words, deforms the established 
rules of the language. Because he believes that there is a metaphysics inherent in 
the language, which presupposes an ordered and stable world view, and that this 
language is not capable of expressing his ideas, which are based on a world view 
in which everything is in flux resulting from the struggle for power. However, 
most of the contemporary Nietzsche scholars do not take differences in his use of 
the language into consideration; thus, they misunderstand, or misinterpret, what 
he tries to say. In other words, since most of the present day Nietzsche scholars, 
if not all of them, are from the analytical tradition, and they try to understand 
what Nietzsche says by linguistic and logical analysis, they fail to appreciate the 
meaning and importance of the nuances and subtleties of Nietzsche’s style and 
use of language for his philosophy. This failure further leads these scholars to 
attribute the very things that Nietzsche ceaselessly rejected, e.g., metaphysics, 
teleology and correspondence theory of truth.  
 This controversial and complex situation of the contemporary Nietzsche 
studies concerning his thoughts on the issues of truth and knowledge is 
important. Further, it was very interesting to see that analytic scholars were 
trying to understand a philosopher’s thought, which was evidently the most un-
(or anti-) analytical one that has ever existed in the history of philosophy. Hence, 
hoping that I could contribute to the solution of above mentioned controversies 
and complexities, I offer this dissertation about Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning 
truth and knowledge. However, I am aware of the difficulty of the task.  
 Before going into the details of what is presented throughout this 
dissertation, I want to mention some of my strategic choices. First of all, since I 
believe that will to power is the key concept in understanding Nietzsche’s 
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thoughts concerning truth and knowledge, and since most of Nietzsche’s 
thoughts concerning the concept of the will to power are presented in the 
Nachlaß, I choose those part of these writings, which was published under the 
title of The Will to Power as the main reference. Secondly, rather than going into 
details of the discussions concerning the roots of Nietzsche’s thoughts and his 
main concepts, I preferred to present his views and concepts as presented in both 
his published and unpublished works, and then, tried to evaluate the 
interpretations of these thoughts and concepts by Nietzsche scholars. I chose to 
divide my dissertation into three chapters, in which the key concepts of 
Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning truth and knowledge are explored; these are, 
will to power, perspectivism, and truth. 
 In the second chapter, I try to present Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to 
power as it is revealed in his texts. Since, as I have mentioned above, there are 
controversial views concerning the legitimacy of Nachlaß and The Will to Power 
among Nietzsche scholars, I start with a brief presentation of the problem. 
Although the problem of Nachlaß is very important in the sense that if you deny 
the legitimacy of the unpublished texts, then you will miss a very important part 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy concerning truth and knowledge, I will not fully 
engage with the problem. Since the main concern of this dissertation is 
Nietzsche’s views on truth and knowledge, I am compelled to accept the 
legitimacy of those texts. Hence, I only briefly mention the nature of the 
problem, and also present some of the popular Nietzsche scholars’ approaches to 
the unpublished texts.  
 Next, I try to give a thorough explanation of the doctrine of the will to 
power. Throughout my study, I have realized that most Nietzsche scholars either 
did not understand or misunderstand the concept of the will to power and its 
importance for Nietzsche’s philosophy. Without understanding the importance of 
this concept for his philosophy, it is impossible to grasp originalities and nuances 
inherent both in his thought and in his use of language. However, there is no 
clear definition or explanation of the concept neither in the published nor in the 
unpublished texts; yet there are passages and aphorisms that give us some idea 
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about what Nietzsche means by the will to power. In other words, instead of 
giving a brief description of the concept, Nietzsche tries to explain the concept 
through showing how the world is constructed out of the dynamic power quanta, 
which are simply wills to power.  
 For Nietzsche, everything is simply will to power; that is, whatever exists 
is a power center either as a quantum or as a constellation of power quanta. 
Every power center, as a will to power, strives for increasing its power. In order 
to increase its power, a power center continuously struggles with every other; 
since power increase is possible only at the expense of others’ power. That is, an 
increase of power occurs through assimilation, appropriation, and domination of 
the other power center. Hence, there is an ongoing power struggle in the world. 
As a result of this continuous power struggle, according to Nietzsche, the world 
is in a constant flux; the world continuously changes, since through power 
struggle every power center changes; either its power increases or decreases. 
Thus, for him, the world is not of being, but of becoming.  
 Furthermore, willing to, or striving for, power is not something external 
to power centers; that is, will to power is an essential characteristic of a power 
center. Nietzsche rejects the distinction between the doer and the deed; since 
such a distinction leads us to the further distinction between the subject and 
object, which is also rejected by him. As the world is in a flux and everything 
changes continuously, there could not be anything stable and motionless. 
However, dividing an act into a doer and a deed means that there is a subject or 
the agent of deed as something stable apart from its acts. For Nietzsche, such a 
separation is impossible and an entity is just what it does; in other words, apart 
from its acts we cannot feel the existence of the entity. Hence, it is in this sense 
that will to power is an essential characteristic of a power center; that is, a power 
center is what it does, will to power or striving for power. This is another 
essential characteristic of the doctrine of the will to power that should be kept in 
mind. 
 Through their struggle for power, power centers may constitute 
constellations like political federations, in which every individual tries to 
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increase its power by struggling with each other within the constellation while 
trying to increase the power of the constellation as a whole by struggling with 
other power centers; to illustrate, for Nietzsche, a body, or a complex organism, 
is such a constellation. As we will later see in the discussion of the relation 
between the doctrine of the will to power and Darwinism, Nietzsche explains the 
formation of organs through struggles between the individual power centers 
constituting the constellation. Hence, the struggle for power continues 
everywhere and at any moment without any interruption or reaching any 
permanent equilibrium. Further, a power center may risk its preservation for 
increasing its power; that is, for Nietzsche, power increase is more important 
than self-preservation; a further anti-Darwinian theme in the doctrine of the will 
to power. 
 Another important point concerning his doctrine is that there is no 
distinction between the organic and inorganic entities. For Nietzsche, they are 
both wills to power and the only difference among them is the difference 
between quantities of force which they are; in other words, every power center 
differs from each other with the degree of power which it is. Here I want to 
emphasize the nuance that I use the verb to “be” instead of to “have,” since 
power is not something you have, since you are just that power, or you are just 
that quantity or degree of power. This is the most important point from which 
most of the controversies concerning the doctrine arise.  
 After presenting the nature of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power 
through discussing these and other important features of the doctrine, I will 
proceed to evaluation of some important claims, which are the sources of some 
controversies among the Nietzsche scholars, concerning the nature of the 
doctrine.  
 Some scholars regard the doctrine of the will to power as a Darwinian 
principle. However, such an understanding of the doctrine misses the point. 
Since, in spite of the similarities, there are also some fundamental and deep 
differences between the doctrine of the will to power and Darwinism. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche harshly criticizes Darwin and Darwinism; especially, 
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Darwinian concepts of adaptation, survival of the fittest, struggle for existence, 
Darwin’s views concerning morality, and the teleology inherent in Darwin’s 
theory of evolution are the main targets of his attacks. Referring to these 
critiques and the doctrine of the will to power, I will try to show that the doctrine 
could in no way be a Darwinian principle. 
 Next, I concentrate upon the claims that present the doctrine as a 
metaphysical principle. Again, Nietzsche is faced with a claim that is directly 
opposed to what he says. Nietzsche ceaselessly criticizes and rejects every kind 
of metaphysics and metaphysical systems, yet this does not prevent some 
philosophers and scholars to claim that Nietzsche is a metaphysician and his 
doctrine of the will to power is a metaphysical principle. It is very interesting to 
see that this charge of metaphysics comes from two different and opposing 
traditions of philosophy; namely, continental and analytic traditions. Therefore, I 
felt compelled to refer to the views represented by both camps; thus, I choose 
Martin Heidegger as the representative of the continental tradition and John 
Richardson as that of analytic tradition. I know that this decision may not be 
fully legitimate for a philosophical argumentation, since there may be 
fundamental differences among philosophers belonging to the same tradition, but 
still, I believe that exploring both interpretations of Nietzsche as a metaphysician 
would contribute our understanding of the notion of will to power. In 
investigating both commentator’ claims, I first try to present their arguments in 
some detail, then to show that their arguments are not strong and persuasive 
enough to make Nietzsche a metaphysician. 
 In the third chapter, I deal with Nietzsche’s perspectivism, which is based 
on his doctrine of the will to power. The most important point in Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is the concept of interpretation. Perspectivism could be 
summarized as the view which claims that our truths are nothing but perspectival 
interpretations. The term interpretation, in its ordinary use, implies an intellectual 
activity. However, for Nietzsche, it is the way through which a power center 
exerts and increases its power. Through interpretation, a power center arranges, 
shapes, assimilates, and determines its environment and the world so as to 
 
7 
increase its power; that is, every power center interprets or structures the world 
and its environment from the perspective of power increase. Hence, the world is 
nothing but the totality of the interpretations made from the perspective of power 
increase by the power centers.  
 Every interpretation brings a change in the powers of the parties 
involved; that is, since interpretation is made from the perspective of power 
increase, and a power increase is only possible at the expense of a decrease in 
others’ power; hence, through interpretation some power centers’ power 
decrease, while some others’ increase. This change in the degree of powers of 
power centers implies a change in the world, which means that the world is not 
in that situation when the interpretation is made; hence, it requires a new 
interpretation. Therefore, interpretation is a continuous process, which gives the 
world character of becoming.  
 This dynamic world conception destroys our traditional cognitive 
paradigm, which regards truth as correspondence to the facts or reality; 
correspondence presupposes a stable and ordered world view, yet, now we have 
a fluxing one. Hence, our truths concerning the nature of the world become 
illusions in the sense that they correspond to nothing. According to Nietzsche, all 
of our truths are just interpretations, nothing more. Thus, designating them as 
absolute and unchanging truths prevents us from increasing our power. For 
Nietzsche, our clinging to such absolute truths is the sign of our cowardice and 
weakness; realizing that our truths maintain our survival, we stick to them at the 
expense of further increase of our power, which requires risking self-
preservation. Hence, Nietzsche, seeing this life castrating effects of our absolute 
truths, tries to destruct our epistemological paradigm that leads to such absolute 
truths through his perspectivism. 
 Nietzsche presents his perspectivism as an innovation and as an 
alternative to epistemology. Although, there is no clear definition of 
perspectivism in his published or unpublished texts, we could understand what 
he means by perspectivism from those passages in which he refers to it. The 
basic claim of perspectivism is that there is no absolute truth, and all of our 
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truths are perspectival interpretations. Actually, perspectivism seems to be the 
direct consequence of Nietzsche’s construction of the world as becoming 
through the doctrine of the will to power and interpretation. Since the world is in 
a constant flux, there is no way to attain absolute truths; hence, our truths 
concerning the world are simply our interpretations of the world from the 
perspective of increasing our power. Moreover, such an understanding of truth, 
as perspectival interpretation, requires a criterion of truth other than 
correspondence. Nietzsche proposes a criterion, which is also fully compatible 
with the doctrine of the will to power, namely, power increase; for him, an 
interpretation is true if it increases the power of the interpreter. Thus, Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is directly opposed to, or undermines our traditional understanding 
of truth.  
 Nietzsche’s perspectivism carries the tone of relativism. However, when 
we take Nietzsche’s construction of the world as will to power into 
consideration, it becomes evident that perspectivism has nothing to do with 
relativism. Relativism accepts the existence of objective reality, and claims that 
this objective reality could only be attained from a viewpoint which is not 
available to man; hence, all beliefs and ideas concerning this objectivity are 
equally true in the sense that all of them are false. Yet, the doctrine of the will to 
power prevents us from speaking of the existence and the attainability of the 
objective reality. Additionally, Nietzsche’s perspectivism has a criterion of truth 
which makes a differentiation between good and bad interpretations possible. I 
discuss the relation between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and relativism by 
referring to Peter Poellner’s accusation of perspectivism as being a kind of 
relativism, in Chapter 3. 
 In the remainder of the third chapter, in order to provide a better 
understanding of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, I try to present Nietzsche’s 
refutations of the fundamental assumptions and components of our traditional 
epistemological paradigm, i.e., causality, subject-object and apparent-real world 
distinctions, and logic, while dealing with perspectivism. 
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 In the fourth chapter, I investigate Nietzsche’s conception of truth, his 
contradictory statements concerning truth, and the relation between his 
conception of truth and other truth theories. I will deal firstly with Nietzsche’s 
contradictory statements about truth, which are other sources of controversies 
that are prevalent in the domain of current Nietzsche studies. There are both 
affirmative and negative statements concerning the existence and the value of 
truth in Nietzsche’s texts. I try to show that the contradiction is only apparent by 
demonstrating that in those affirmative statements Nietzsche uses the concept of 
truth in accordance with his criterion of truth; that is, he refers to provisional 
truths, not to absolute ones. However, in those negative statements, he refers to 
the so-called absolute truths, which require a stable world order.  
 After eliminating this apparent contradiction, I proceed to investigate if 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism implicitly assumes a truth theory, such as, 
correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic theories of truth. Correspondence 
theory of truth is the most popular one among the contemporary Nietzsche 
scholars; therefore it is the main concern of my investigation. I start with a brief 
comparison with Nietzsche’s concept of perspectival truth and the 
correspondence theory in order to emphasize the fundamental differences 
between perspectival truth and the truth that is designated by the correspondence 
theory. Next, I continue to inquire whether Nietzsche has a truth theory inherent 
in his perspectivism through analyzing Maudemarie Clark’s attribution of 
correspondence. I chose Clark’s attribution for several reasons. Firstly, her 
argument is very interesting and shows the tendencies of the analytic scholars 
when dealing with Nietzsche: Clark does not even refer to Nietzsche’s own texts 
throughout her argumentation. Secondly, related with the first, she uses Tarski’s 
Convention T and the equivalence principle derived from this convention to 
subject Nietzsche to correspondence theory. Thirdly, in the course of her 
argumentation, Clark also eliminates coherence and pragmatic theories by 
applying the principle of equivalence. These and other properties make Clark’s 
argumentation a fruitful topic for my investigation. 
 
10 
 Through the principle of equivalence, which claims that a statement is 
true iff that statement is a true statement in the language in which it is uttered, 
Clark tries to compel Nietzsche to use the concepts and words in accordance 
with their ordinary use. To show the inapplicability of her argumentation based 
on linguistic analysis, I present Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of language as 
offered in his TL. In this essay, Nietzsche claims that at the origin of language 
there lies a peace treaty among the individuals, and truth and lie are determined 
through this treaty; a statement is true if it is constructed according to the rules of 
the treaty, otherwise it is a lie. This shows us that through a linguistic analysis 
we could only test if the given statement complies with the rules of the treaty or 
not, and nothing more. There, Nietzsche further shows us that our words and 
concepts had been mere aphorisms, and they could in no way correspond to the 
world in its actual existence. Hence, Clark’s argumentation fails to make 
Nietzsche a correspondence theorist. Subsequently, I analyze Clark’s refutations 
of pragmatic and coherence theory of truths, in which she uses the equivalence 
principle. While investigating her arguments against those alternative theories of 
truth, I try to oppose those theories by referring to Nietzsche’s perspectivism. 
 Lastly, further elaborating Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning the relation 
between language and truth as developed in TL, I conclude Chapter 4 by trying 
to answer the question “Does Nietzsche have a truth theory?” I know this 
question is too difficult and complicated to be answered in a conclusive way, as 
it is evident from the fact that various truth theories have been attributed to 
Nietzsche. However, I believe that Nietzsche’s concern is to show the life-
negating effects of our absolute (human, all too human) truths, rather than to 








DOCTRINE OF THE WILL TO POWER 
 
 
2.1 Preliminary Notes 
The doctrine of the will to power is one of the most elemental doctrines of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. However, in his published works, we cannot find a 
complete or satisfactory explanation of the doctrine. Actually, there are only a 
few occurrences of the will to power in these works.1 Yet, this doctrine occupies 
a great part of his unpublished notes, some of which are compiled as a book 
under the title of The Will to Power by his sister Elizabeth Foster-Nietzsche. 
Because of this fact, there is an ongoing dispute among Nietzsche scholars 
concerning the importance of both The Will to Power, or Nachlaß, and the 
doctrine of the will to power for his philosophy.2 However, I will not involve in 
                                               
1 Some of the occurrences of the phrase ‘will to power,’ where Nietzsche presents it as the 
essence or principle of life, are: “[w]here I found the living, there I found will to power,” (Z, part 
II, “On Self-Overcoming,” p. 226) and “[o]nly where there is life is there also will: not will to 
life but . . . will to power,” (Ibid. p. 226); “life itself is will to power,” (BGE, §13) and “[t]he 
world viewed from inside, the world defined and determined according to its ‘intelligible 
character’—it would be ‘will to power’ and nothing else,” (BGE, §36); “in all events a will to 
power is operating,” (GM, II, §12); “the will to power . . . is the will of life,” (GS, §349); “[l]ife 
itself is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for 
power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline,” (A, 6). There are also other 
occurrences of the phrase, yet only a phrase, which does not present the importance of the 
doctrine for Nietzsche. 
2 According to Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche was, actually, planning to write a book under this 
title, yet he abandoned his plan in 1888. In his notes, Kaufmann says, there are drafts for the title 
page of the book, and in some of those drafts Nietzsche put a subtitle to the book, “Revaluation 
of All Values.” Later, this subtitle becomes the title of another book project. Kaufmann states that 
Nietzsche was planning to write a four volume book, and in relation this project, Nietzsche 
considered The Antichrist, published in 1888, as the first book of the project. Kaufmann claims 
that neither his sister, nor the editors and the publishers of the other editions of The Will to 
Power, took these two important projects into consideration seriously. For example, the book was 
published in 1901, soon after his death, by his sister. However, the aphorisms and notes in this 
edition were arranged according to a four-line draft, which was discarded by Nietzsche. 
According to Kaufmann, this draft was very brief and earliest of all the other drafts (Kaufmann 
mentions the existence of approximately twenty five drafts). There are other editions of the book 
compiled by different editors and publishers in different manners. In all of these editions of the 
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book, Nietzsche and the book were portrayed differently. For example, Alfred Bäumler, who 
published his own edition or rather compilation of The Will to Power in 1930, portrayed the book 
as Nietzsche’s philosophical magnum opus, and being a Nazi, Bäumler used the book as a means 
for propaganda, and associated Nietzsche’s philosophy with Nazism. On the other hand, Karl 
Schlechta, who published his version of The Will to Power in three volumes between 1954 and 
1956, claims that there is nothing new in the book, that the thoughts presented in the book were 
already in the other published books of Nietzsche (See, Walter Kaufmann’s introduction to his 
translation of WP, pp. xvii-xx). As this brief history of the book shows, there were different, if 
not directly conflicting, approaches to the book and to Nietzsche. This diversity still continues. 
There are ongoing disputes on the legitimacy of the book as a reference in understanding the 
doctrine of the will to power. Some claim that because the book was not published by Nietzsche 
in his lifetime, it must not be considered as legitimate as the published ones. For example, Robert 
C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins claim that The Will to Power “is an alternative source of 
juicy one-liners, but hardly a ‘book,’ let alone a masterpiece.” (Robert C. Solomon, Kathleen M. 
Higgins, What Nietzsche Really Said, New York: Random House, 2000, p. 83.) Following 
Solomon and Higgins, Maudemarie Clark claims that “Nietzsche’s published writings . . . are far 
superior sources of his philosophy.” (Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 25.) Schlechta, as mentioned above, claims 
that Nietzsche had “expressed himself with complete clarity, beyond any misunderstanding, in 
the works he published himself or clearly intended for publication. As far as a genuine possibility 
of understanding, nothing remains to be desired.” (Karl Schlechta, Der Fall Nietzsche: Aufsätze 
und Vorträge, Munich, 1959, p. 11, quoted in Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche: his philosophy 
of contradictions and the contradictions of his philosophy, trans. by David J. Parent, Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1999, p. 125.) Similarly, Arthur Danto says that Nietzsche’s 
“message appears over and over again, so much so that from any random sample of his writings 
the entirety of his philosophy can almost be constructed . . .  New writings may be found and old 
ones restored, but it is difficult to suppose they will furnish us with a philosophy different in any 
essential respect from the one we may find by carefully examining what we have.” (Arthur 
Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, expanded edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004, pp. 9-10.) On the other hand, there are some others who claim that The Will to Power, or 
Nietzsche’s Nachlaß, is a very crucial part of his philosophy. Heidegger states that “Nietzsche’s 
philosophy proper, the fundamental position on the basis of which he speaks . . . in all the 
writings he himself published, did not assume a final form and was not itself published in any 
book, neither in the decade between 1879 and 1889 nor during the years preceding. What 
Nietzsche himself published during his creative life was always foreground . . . His philosophy 
proper was left behind as posthumous, unpublished work.” (Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. 
by David Farrell Krell, San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991, vol. I, pp. 8-9.) Adrian 
Delcaro, in his discussion of Heidegger’s influence on the place of Nietzsche in the discussion 
about the technological domination of nature by man, claims that Heidegger’s this approach to 
Nachlaß is “a serious mistake.” (Adrian Delcaro, Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric on Earth, 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004, p. 144.) Müller-Lauter, referring Nietzsche’s notes about 
himself and his writings, agrees with Heidegger. In those notes, Nietzsche presents himself as 
“the most hidden of all persons,” (Nachlaß, Nov. 1882-Feb. 1883, 4[120]; KGW VII 1, p. 151.); 
in another published note from BGE, he says that “one no longer loves one’s insight enough once 
one communicates it,” (BGE, §160, p. 91.); in another note from Nachlaß (Fall 1887, 9[188]; 
KGW VIII 2, p. 114.), Nietzsche writes that “I no longer respect the reader: how could I write for 
readers? . . . But I take notes only for myself.” (Müller-Lauter, p. 125.) Kaufmann seems to be 
between these two camps by saying that “these notes obviously do not represent his final views . 
. . But it is fascinating to look, as it were, into the workshop of a great thinker.” (WP, “Editor’s 
Introduction,” p. xvi.) Richard Schacht, being a bit more in the middle of those two camps of 
interpreters than Kaufmann, claims that Nachlaß “can neither be entirely ignored nor easily 
digested,” and adds that “[o]ne cannot know what use he [Nietzsche] might have made of this 
material [Nachlaß]; but this, in my opinion, is no reason to ignore it.” (Richard Schacht, 
Nietzsche, London: Routledge, 1985, pp. xi-xii.) 
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such an inconclusive and unfruitful dispute. Because, I believe that other than the 
interference of Nietzsche’s sister, there is nothing suspicious about the 
legitimacy of neither The Will to Power nor Nachlaß. After all, they are 
Nietzsche writings. Moreover, in this work, my main concern is to investigate 
Nietzsche’s epistemology based on the doctrine of the will to power; therefore, I 
am already compelled to use his unpublished notes rather than the published 
ones. Yet, this does not mean that I am deliberately ignoring the books he 
himself published in his life time; I am not situating Nachlaß above them, as 
Heidegger did. Consequently, I have to note that when I use the phrases 
“Nietzsche’s philosophy,” “Nietzsche’s thought,” and similar others, I will be 
referring to both Nietzsche’s published books and the Nachlaß. After having 
these remarks, let us return to our actual task; the task of exploring Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of the will to power; the task of answering the question “What is will to 
power?”  
2.2 What does Nietzsche Mean by Will to Power? 
The will to power is the key concept for understanding Nietzsche’s theory of 
knowledge. For him, there is only will to power and nothing else. In WP §1067, 
                                                                                                                               
 In relation with this dispute about the legacy of The Will to Power and Nachlaß, there is 
also another dispute about the place and the role of the doctrine of the will to power in Nietzsche 
philosophy. The interpreters, who accept the importance of Nachlaß for Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
also accept the centrality of the doctrine of the will to power to his thought. For example, 
Heidegger claims that “‘will to power’ is a fundamental term in the fully developed philosophy 
of Nietzsche.” (Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, 
trans. by William Lowitt, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 76.) Müller-Lauter shows the 
importance of the doctrine by refuting Schlechta’s claim, based on Nietzsche’s use of phrases as 
“suppose that,” “one must venture the hypothesis [...],” etc. in BGE §36, that the will to power is 
an hypothesis and “[t]hat does not sound very confident for a thought that is supposed to hold 
up.” (Quoted in Müller-Lauter, p. 127.) There are other interpreters, such as Schacht, Gilles 
Deleuze, Danto, Christoph Cox, even Kaufmann, whose use of the doctrine of the will to power 
together with references to Nachlaß shows their approval of the role of the doctrine. As an 
extreme case, Bernd Magnus, to support his opposition to use of Nachlaß in interpreting 
Nietzsche, reports that in Schacht’s Nietzsche “there are 1,718 quotations from Nietzsche in his 
546 pages of text. 861 out of 1,718 quotations—more than half—are from the nonbook Der Wille 
zur Macht.” (Bernd Magnus, “The Use and Abuse of The Will to Power,” in Robert C. Solomon, 
Kathleen M. Higgins (eds.), Reading Nietzsche, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 
220.) Finally, together with Higgins, Solomon claims that “most of what Nietzsche says about 
the will to power is to be found in his unpublished notes, and it is therefore to be regarded with 




he asks “do you know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show it to you in my 
mirror?”3 Next, in a lengthy paragraph, Nietzsche describes the world as he 
perceived or understood it. The world is a chaos resulting from the struggles of 
power centers for increasing their power in a universe, which is actually a huge, 
yet limited, amount of power. The size of the universe, or the amount of power 
never changes, because it is limited with “nothingness.” While the amount of 
power increases somewhere in this universe, there is a decrease in another place. 
Thus the amount of power always remains constant (it sounds like the “law of 
the conservation of energy”4). In the course of power struggles, these power 
centers reach an equilibrium, but this state of peace does not last forever. It is the 
power struggle that remains constant in this universe, and chaos and peace 
circularly follow each other. This circular process lasts forever (as Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of the “eternal recurrence of the same” suggests).  
This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without 
end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger 
or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms 
itself; as a whole, of unalterable size . . . do you want a name 
for this world? . . . This world is the will to power—and 
nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to 
power—and nothing besides!5  
 From this passage, one may infer that will to power is another 
metaphysical concept in the tradition of Western thought; such as, Hegel’s Geist 
or Spinoza’s God. However, will to power is not a homogenous and changeless 
world-substance from which everything in the world springs. For example, as the 
above quotation shows us, will to power may vary from place to place; it is one 
and the many at the same time, but not the plurality of the identical power 
                                               
3 WP, §1067, p. 550. Nietzsche’s use of the metaphor of the mirror seems to refer to his notion of 
perspectivism. His perspectivism will be discussed in the chapter entitled “Nietzsche’s 
Perspectivism.” Therefore, it is sufficient, for now, to say that perspectivism denies the notion of 
absolute knowledge, and claims that every individual power center sees and knows other power 
centers through its perspective towards the others. Here, the mirror through which Nietzsche 
shows us the world is his perspective through which he sees and knows the world. 
4 Nietzsche, in the context of eternal recurrence, mentions the law of the conservation of energy. 
There he says that “[t]he law of conservation of energy demands eternal recurrence.” WP, 
§1063, p. 547. 
5 WP, §1067, p. 550.  
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centers, that is, every power center is different from each other; these power 
centers always change in the course of power struggle among them. However, 
world-substances of the traditional metaphysics do not and could not change, 
because, for this tradition change is an indication of imperfection and deficiency. 
Other than these differences, there is one more reason for the will to power’s not 
being a metaphysical notion; Nietzsche’s aim was to destruct traditional Western 
Metaphysics. As an opponent of the traditional metaphysics, it would be naïveté 
to expect from Nietzsche to propose another version of the same metaphysics. 
Nietzsche’s wanted to show that in reality there is no such thing as “Being” on 
which this tradition was constructed. Against the construction of reality as Being, 
Nietzsche proposed reality as becoming. As our investigation about the concept 
of the will to power advances, this point will become more clear. 
 What is the will to power then? Actually, in Nietzsche’s works, there is 
no clear definition of it, yet there are passages that open a path for us to 
understand what it is. In one of the those passages, criticizing the mechanistic 
world view, Nietzsche explains: “The victorious concept ‘force,’ by means of 
which our physicists created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an 
inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as ‘will to power.’”6 Will to 
power is something essential to, or inseparable from, force. It is not a predicate 
to be ascribed to the force. It completes the force, not as something external, but 
as an “internal quality”7 of it. Because this internal quality, the will to power, is 
absent in the mechanistic explanations of the world, physicists could not explain 
reality by applying the purely mechanistic concept of force; they could only 
describe the world. Without will to power, concepts and principles applied by 
physicists have no explanatory power. Nietzsche says the following 
“‘[a]ttraction’ and ‘repulsion’ in a purely mechanistic sense are complete 
fictions: a word. We cannot think of an attraction divorced from an intention.”8 
                                               
6 WP, §619, pp. 332-33. 
7 WP, §618, p. 332. 
8 WP, §627, p. 335. In WP §689 (p. 368), Nietzsche writes: “All the presuppositions of 
mechanistic theory—matter, atom, gravity, pressure and stress—are not ‘facts-in-themselves’ but 
interpretations with the aid of physical fictions.” 
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“A force we cannot imagine,” says Nietzsche, “is an empty word and should be 
allowed no rights of citizenship in science; like the so-called purely mechanistic 
forces of attraction and repulsion, which are intended to make it possible for us 
to form an image of the world, no more!”9 and asks “the expressibility of all 
events in formulas—is this really comprehension?”10 Because this inner quality 
is operative everywhere and in every event, the world, as well as the organic life, 
must be understood as the manifestation of the will to power.  
[O]ne is obliged to understand all motion, all “appearances,” 
all “laws,” only as symptoms of an inner event and to employ 
man as an analogy to this end. In the case of animal, it is 
possible to trace all its drives to the will to power; likewise all 
the functions of organic life to this one source.11 
 Thus, the world is composed of such forces or quanta of forces, which 
have an inner will. These forces are related to each other by a tension resulting 
from their essential drive to increase their power. And, the essence of a force 
quantum is this relation; “their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta.”12 
It is this relation that determines a force quantum. Because, “it is only relations 
that constitute an essence.”13 In their struggle for power, every force quantum 
affects the others, and is also affected by them.  
 Here, we are faced with the problem of differentiating the force quanta. 
That is, if it is the force that exists in the world, then how can we be able to 
discern anything from the rest of the world? Or, to put it in another way, how do 
those force quanta appear as distinct entities, which interact with each other? In 
what way, do they appear as separate entities having different qualities? At this 
point, to appeal to Gilles Deleuze’s discussion of the doctrine of the will to 
power, in his Nietzsche and Philosophy, may be very helpful. His analysis, or 
reconstruction, of the will to power is very illuminating to understand 
                                               
9 WP, §621, p. 333. 
10 WP, §624, p. 334. 
11 WP, §619, p. 333. 
12 WP, §635, p. 339. 
13 WP, §625, p. 334. 
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Nietzsche’s conceptions of the will to power, force quantum and its relations 
with other power quanta. Roughly put, according to Deleuze, when two quanta 
of force enter into a relation they constitute a body based on a hierarchical 
structure; one dominates the other. In this hierarchy of the forces, the dominating 
quantum is known as the active and the dominated one as the reactive one. These 
are original qualities of force quanta; this is due to their quantitative differences 
from each other, which become apparent only when they enter into relation. In 
other words, the essence of a force quantum is its quantitative difference from 
the other quantum of force, and this quantitative difference is the quality of that 
quantum of force. This quantitative difference becomes apparent when two 
quanta of force enter into relation. However, this explanation of the qualities of a 
force quantum should not be understood as the reduction of qualities to 
quantities. Because, such a reduction is simply a product of the mechanistic 
world view, which tries to eliminate all differences and wants equality. Deleuze 
emphasizes that, for Nietzsche, quantitative difference and quantity are very 
different and cannot be thought as being equal. Because quantitative difference is 
quality, and it cannot be reduced, or made equal, to any other qualitative 
difference, or quantity.14 
 The only difference among force quanta is quantitative difference related 
to their strength or energy, there is no qualitative difference. As Deleuze points 
out, in his explanation of what separates, or differentiates, a quantum of force 
from every other quantum, quantity is always quantity in difference. That is, “[i]f 
a force is inseparable from its quantity it is no more separable from the other 
forces which it relates to. Quantity itself is therefore inseparable from difference 
in quantity,” and this difference in quantity becomes “the essence of force and of 
the relation of force to force.”15 Deleuze, also, notes that Nietzsche, by quantity, 
does not mean the purely abstract concept of quantity of the mechanistic world 
view, which tries to reduce quality to quantity. Nietzsche rejects such a reduction 
                                               
14 See, Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983, 
pp. 39-42. 
15 Deleuze, p. 43.  
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and claims that “in a purely quantitative world everything would be dead, stiff, 
motionless.—The reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense: what 
appears is that the one accompanies the other, an analogy.”16 The difference in 
quantity is the quality of the force, and it appears only when the force is in 
relation to other force. It is will to power that generates this difference in 
quantity. This inner will, which is “an insatiable desire to manifest power” or 
“the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive,”17 determines the 
relation among force quanta. The essence of a force quantum is its relation with 
others, and this inner will, the will to power is what determines this relation, and 
hence what determines the quantum of force. Therefore, will to power is the 
source of the difference in quantity and the quality of the forces. As Deleuze puts 
it, the will to power is “the genealogical element of force, both differential and 
genetic . . . the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of 
related forces and the quality that devolves into each in this relation.”18 Will to 
power determines a force quantitatively and qualitatively. By this determination 
it also determines itself.  
 Because of this inner will, the will to power, Nietzsche’s force is 
different from that of the mechanistic world view. Because it is dynamic; it is 
essentially dynamic; its dynamism comes from itself, not from outside. When we 
eliminate the “fictions” added by the mechanistic theory, i.e., concepts 
“number,” “the thing,” “the subject,” “motion,” and “activity,” “no things remain 
but only dynamic quanta, in relation of tension to other dynamic quanta.”19 It is 
will to power that make a quantum of force dynamic. These additions, for 
Nietzsche, are the result of the tendency to make the world a calculable unity; a 
tendency to make the world a unity of causal chains expressible in terms of 
numbers, laws, and formulas, etc. To make the world a causal chain, mechanistic 
theory makes a distinction between cause and effect, a distinction between the 
                                               
16 WP, §564, p. 304. 
17 WP, §619, p. 333. 
18 Deleuze, p. 50. 
19 WP, §635, p. 339. 
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subject and the object in every event. However, for Nietzsche, there is no such 
distinction; it is not real, it is imposed upon us by the language we use: “Subject, 
object, a doer added to the doing, the doing separated from that which it does: let 
us not forget that this is mere semeiotics and nothing real.”20 Therefore, the 
dynamic quantum is what it does: 
A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, 
effect—more, it is nothing other than precisely this very 
driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of 
language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that are 
petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as 
conditioned by something that causes effects, by a “subject,” 
can it appear otherwise.21 
 As stated earlier, for Nietzsche, the world, or the reality, is the will to 
power and nothing besides, and “all driving force is will to power . . . there is no 
other physical, dynamic or psychic force except this.”22 Every entity, organic or 
inorganic, is a quantum or quanta of power. These power centers are in a 
constant struggle with each other to increase their power. However, as there is 
enormous yet limited amount of power, an increase in the power of any power 
center is only possible at the expense of others’ power. A power center increases 
its power by assimilating, appropriating and dominating the other power centers 
in its neighborhood. Because every power center is this essential, or natural will 
to increase its power, they may constitute constellations or unions to increase 
their powers collectively. However, this constellation is not a homogenous one. 
It is a constellation in which every member is present as an individual pursuing 
to increase its own power through this constellation. That is, it is not assimilated 
into the constellation. This is actually what Nietzsche means when he describes 
world as being “at the same time one and the many.”23 Nietzsche explains this 
formation of the constellation as follows: 
                                               
20 WP, §634, p. 338. 
21 BGE I §12, p. 45. 
22 WP, §688, p. 366. 
23 WP, §1067, p. 550. 
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My idea is that every specific body strives to become master 
over all space and to extend its force (—its will to power:) and 
thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually 
encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends 
by coming to an arrangement (“union”) with those of them that 
are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together 
for power. And the process goes on.24 
 Will to power is always active. It always searches for resistance, because 
it “can manifest itself only against resistances,” otherwise it is inconceivable; 
“therefore it seeks that which resists it.”25 Every power center is determined 
through its struggle for power with others. When a power center is confronted 
with another center, it changes according to the effects it produced on the other 
party and the effects produced on itself by the other party: “A quantum of power 
is designated by the effect it produces and that which it resists.”26 That is, in this 
encounter every party changes and determines the other. Although it is thinkable 
that those power centers do not affect each other, yet in actuality, it is not the 
case. Because it is the will to dominate and overwhelm the others, not self-
preservation that is the principle operative in the world. Therefore, a quantum of 
power is “essentially a will to violate and to defend oneself against violation.”27 
Moreover, for Nietzsche, a quantum of force affects the whole. Because, 
Nietzsche denies the existence of empty space, and sees this notion as a fiction 
and as an erroneous concept of the mechanistic world view.28 For him, because 
there is no empty space, “every atom affects the whole being”29; the effect of an 
                                               
24 WP, §636, p. 340. 
25 WP, §656, p. 346. 
26 WP, §634, pp. 337-38. 
27 WP, §634, p. 338. 
28 When describing the world through his mirror, Nietzsche rejects the notion of empty space, 
there he says that the world is “enclosed by ‘nothingness’ as a boundary; not something blurry or 
wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a 
space that might be ‘empty.’” (WP, §1067, p. 550.) Again, when he writes his forecast about the 
future of this mechanistic physics, he writes that “the dynamic interpretation of the world, with 
its denial of ‘empty space’ and its little clumps of atoms, will shortly come to dominate 
physicists.” (WP, §618, p. 332.)   
29 WP, §634, p. 338. In another note, Nietzsche writes: “Supposing that the world had a certain 
quantum of force at its disposal, then it is obvious that every displacement of power at any point 
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atom on another radiates through the whole. If any one denies this radiation of 
“power-will,” one denies the whole being, or existence. This is the reason for 
Nietzsche’s calling the world a quantum of will to power: “That is why I call it a 
quantum of ‘will to power.’”30 According to Nietzsche, there is no order in the 
world. The mechanistic theory was constructed upon “necessity” and “law”; 
because “‘[t]hings’ do not behave regularly, according to a rule.”31 There is no 
obedience to a rule in any event, it is the “degree of resistance and the degree of 
superior power”32 that is important for understanding an event. Therefore, to try 
to understand in terms of necessity and rule means to deny the world; “Physicists 
believe in a ‘true’ world in their own fashion: a firm systematization of atoms in 
necessary motion, the same for all beings . . . But they are in error.”33 The 
mechanistic theory could not understand the world by its concepts, because the 
world is a quantum of will to power, which “expresses the characteristic that 
cannot be thought out of the mechanistic order without thinking away this order 
itself.”34 Hence, the world is a quantum of will to power as a unity of other 
quanta of will to power, in which every quantum of will to power affects each 
other and the whole. It is not a homogenous unity of similar atoms, which are 
essentially and universally ordered by necessity and laws. It is a unity of unequal 
power centers struggling incessantly with each other for more power. It is this 
struggle that characterizes the world; that is, the world is the will to power.  
 Every power center has different degrees of power. Therefore, their 
effects on each other vary with regard to these power differences. That is, a 
power center may have a small effect on another center which has great power, 
and big effects on a center of power which has little power. Because of this, 
every power center treats and understands every other differently. In other 
                                                                                                                               
would affect the whole system—thus together with sequential causality there would be a 
contiguous and concurrent dependence.” (WP, §638, p. 340.) 
30 WP, §634, p. 338. 
31 WP, §634, p. 337. 
32 WP, §634, p. 337. 
33 WP, §636, p. 339. 
34 WP, §634, p. 338. 
 
22 
words, a power center looks differently to every other center with regard to the 
differences in their degree of power. This means that, each quantum of power 
knows each other differently with respect to the differences in the degree of 
power between them. For example, a power center may perceive one power 
center as strong, while another power center perceives the very same center of 
power as weak.  
 Will to power is not something from which things or entities take their 
share. It is not a property that things have or have not. A thing is just a quantum 
or quanta of the will to power, and a quantum or quanta of power is the very 
thing that it does; it is exactly what it does. A power center, an entity is the 
totality of all its effects on other power centers and others’ effect on it. “A ‘thing’ 
is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept, an image.”35 In fact, 
for Nietzsche, there is no entity which is inactive and without relations; actually, 
an inactive and unchanging entity without relations corresponds to the famous 
Kantian thing-in-itself (noumenon), which is, to Nietzsche, impossible. He 
claims that “[t]he properties of a thing are effects on other ‘things’: if one 
removes other ‘things,’ then a thing has no properties i.e., there is no thing 
without other things, i.e., there is no ‘thing-in-itself’,”36 and adds that “[t]he 
‘thing-in-itself’ nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the ‘properties,’ 
all the ‘activities’ of a thing, the thing does not remain over.”37 
 Nietzsche’s explanation of the will to power seems as if about the organic 
world. Because, he speaks of drives, wills etc. However, when he talks about 
will to power, he makes no distinction between organic and inorganic.38 
                                               
35 WP, §551, p. 296. 
36 WP, §557, p. 302. 
37 WP, §558, p. 302. 
38 According to Danto, this rejection of the distinction between the organic and the inorganic 
worlds is a typical example of Nietzsche’s “methodological monism.” Danto defines this monism 
as follows: “[r]epeated in connection with each pair of allegedly distinct pairs, we press toward a 
single principle in connection with which all may be treated as of a piece. This is Methodological 
Monism, as one might term it.” He says that the general outline of the program is the following: 
“step by step we reduce all problems to psychological ones; and reduce all psychology to a 
psychology of the unconscious, instinctual life, which courses on fundamentally in the same way, 
however it may be modified for this or that form of conscious life.” (Danto, p. 198.) 
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Because, for him, there is no inorganic matter as something dead; “‘Being’—we 
have no other idea of this than ‘living’. How, then, something dead ‘be.’”39 
Furthermore, will to power is the guiding principle in both organic and inorganic 
worlds, and because of this, such a distinction is meaningless. It is a prejudice, 
because “[t]he drive to approach—and the drive to thrust something back are the 
bond, in both inorganic and organic world.”40 The only difference between a 
living organism and an inorganic matter is the quantity in difference and the 
quality resulting from this difference. That is, they are essentially the same; they 
are manifestations of the will to power. Yet, with regard to the degree of power 
or force which they are, and with regard to their complexity, the organic and 
inorganic differs from each other. In other words, what we call an organism is 
more complex, diverse, and powerful than an inorganic entity. Nonetheless, they 
both are will to power. Let us emphasize we cannot say that an entity, organic or 
inorganic, has will to power. Because, for Nietzsche, an entity, organic or 
inorganic, is just a will to power; will to power is not a property or quality that 
some entities have and others do not have.  
 According to Nietzsche, life is “merely a special case of the will to 
power,”41 with which we are most familiar. As we have seen already,42 Nietzsche 
proposed to employ man as an analogy to understand what the will to power is. 
Man as a living organism, and also as social entity, shows us how the will to 
power operates. Nietzsche speaks of an aristocracy in the body, which results 
from the “struggle between cells and tissues.”43 The result of this struggle is the 
division of labor; the powerful subjugates the weak, and the weak becomes a 
function. Nietzsche defines life as a “multiplicity of forces, connected by a 
common mode of nutrition.”44 Thus, the body is also such a common mode of 
nutrition, in which every cell, as a quantum of the will to power, works 
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according to its task defined through the division of the labor for the increase of 
power both of the body and of itself. This common mode of nutrition is not the 
aim, or the drive to form a constellation; it is the will to power, will to ever more 
power. Let us recall that it is not the self preservation but the will to power that is 
operative in both organic and inorganic worlds. Therefore, “[o]ne cannot ascribe 
the most basic and primeval activities of protoplasm to a will to self-
preservation, for it takes into itself absurdly more than would be required to 
preserve it.”45 As a common mode of nutrition, the body, or the organism, has 
some features, which make them possible, common to all organic power 
constellations. “(1) a resistance to all other forces; (2) an adjustment of the same 
according to form and rhythm; (3) an estimate in regard to assimilation or 
excretion.”46 Then, an organism is a multiplicity of power quanta organized into 
a common mode of nutrition under the guidance, or dominance, of the higher and 
superior cells, or power quanta.  
 As a highly complex organism, the same applies also to man. As he is 
very complex, there are many other drives or wills along with the will to power; 
i.e., sex drive, hunger drive, etc. However, these drives are nothing more than a 
manifestation of the will to power. They are only derivative drives, and 
therefore, cannot be the guiding principle in the organism. For example, hunger 
is the manifestation of the fundamental desire to incorporate everything, not to 
supply the organism with what is required for its subsistence; hunger drive is 
only a side effect, or derivative, of the will to power. This can be seen, for 
Nietzsche, in the nourishment of protoplasm: it “extends its pseudopodia in 
search for something that resists it—not from hunger but from will to power. 
Thereupon, it attempts to overcome, appropriate, assimilate what it counters: 
what one calls ‘nourishment’ is merely is a derivative phenomenon.”47 
 Moreover, neither the utilitarian principle of pleasure, which is simply 
the tendency to seek pleasure and avoid displeasure, can be the principle of life. 
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Actually, those thoughts, i.e., hedonism, utilitarianism, eudaemonism, which 
take pleasure and pain as the principle of life, are regarded as naïvetés by 
Nietzsche.  
Whether it is hedonism or pessimism, utilitarianism or 
eudaemonism—all these ways of thinking that measure the 
value of things in accordance with pleasure and pain, which 
are mere epiphenomena and wholly secondary, are ways of 
thinking that stay in the foreground and naïvetés on which 
everyone conscious of creative powers and an artistic 
conscience will look down not without derision, nor without 
pity.48 
 For Nietzsche, pleasure is only a function of the will power; or rather it is 
a consequence of will to power. Pleasure, as well as displeasure, are accidental 
and depend on a value judgment of the will to power. Pleasure is the feeling of 
increase of power in the organism. Man does not want something because it is 
pleasant, but he finds it pleasant because of the possible increase in his power. 
“Pleasure and displeasure,” Nietzsche writes, “are mere consequences, mere 
epiphenomena—what man wants, what every smallest part of a living organism 
wants, is an increase of power.”49 Pleasure and displeasure appear as the result of 
the struggle for increasing power; every increase in power gives rise to pleasure 
while every decrease leads to displeasure. However, according to Nietzsche, 
displeasure is, at the same time, a stimulant for increasing of power. In this 
sense, displeasure becomes the condition of pleasure. In other words, an 
organism increases its power by overcoming what resists it, and this resistance 
means, for the organism, displeasure, or a source of pain. However, when it 
overcomes the resistance, its power increases; hence the feeling of increased 
power, pleasure.  
Displeasure, as an obstacle to its will to power, is therefore a 
normal fact, the normal ingredient of every organic event; man 
does not avoid it, he is rather in continual need of it; every 
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victory, every feeling of pleasure, every event, presupposes a 
resistance overcome.50 
 Therefore, the pleasure principle is self-contradictory; that is, pleasure 
cannot be attainable by avoiding displeasure; then, it is impossible to seek 
pleasure without seeking, at the same time, displeasure.  
2.3 Will to Power and Darwinism 
The relation between Darwinism and Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power is 
important for understanding Nietzsche’s view concerning the essence of life as 
will to power. Most of the commentators agree that Nietzsche’s philosophy is 
influenced by Darwin’s theory of evolution. However, it is not an easy task to 
determine the scope of this influence. Because, as in the case of the most of the 
crucial issues in Nietzsche’s philosophy, there are phrases and sentences that will 
make Nietzsche a Darwinist thinker, yet there are other passages, in which 
Nietzsche directly attacks Darwin and Darwinism. For example, his concept of 
the Übermensch, which is introduced as the product of an evolutionary process, 
in Zarathustra shows us that Nietzsche believes in evolution: “You have made 
your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you were 
apes, and even now, too, man is more ape than any ape,”51 and “[m]an is a rope, 
tied between beast and overman.”52 Further, as indicated by Thomas H. Brobjer, 
his continuous emphasis on struggle and competition in his description of the 
world as will to power have, “at first glance, much in common with the 
Darwinian concept of struggle for existence.”53 On the other hand, Nietzsche 
harshly criticizes Darwin’s theory of evolution, especially its regarding of the 
self-preservation and survival as the prime dynamic of the evolutionary process; 
“our natural sciences have become so thoroughly entangled in the Spinozistic 
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dogma (most recently and worst of all, Darwinism with its incomprehensibly 
one-sided doctrine of the ‘struggle for existence).’”54 There are also aphorisms 
starting with “Against Darwinism” or “Anti-Darwin.”55 Additionally, Nietzsche 
complains that those, who accuse him of being a Darwinian for his account of 
the concept of the Übermensch: “[o]ther scholarly oxen have suspected me of 
Darwinism on that account.”56 By such contradictory evidence, it is difficult to 
decide whether Nietzsche is a Darwinist thinker or not. However, it is certain 
that Nietzsche occupied himself with Darwin’s theory and, by attacking some of 
the main concepts of the theory, i.e., adaptation and natural selection. These 
attacks, as John Richardson argues by referring to Nietzsche’s aphorism 
concerning parting, maybe regarded as evidence for Nietzsche’s closeness to 
Darwin: “Not how one soul comes close to another but how it moves away 
shows me their kinship and how much they belong together.”57 Of course, this 
does not make Nietzsche a Darwinist thinker. Actually, for the purposes of the 
present study it is not a crucial question whether Nietzsche is Darwinist or not. 
What is important is to show that there is a relation between Nietzsche’s 
philosophy and Darwinian theory of evolution. It is important because, as we 
will see in the remainder of this section, it will contribute to our discussion of 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, by showing us how the will to power 
operates in nature as a life principle. I will mainly concentrate upon Nietzsche’s 
attack on Darwinism, because examining his attack will reveal the originality 
and the genealogical aspect of the doctrine of the will to power. Before going 
into the details of his attack, I am going to give a brief summary of the views of 
Nietzsche commentators concerning Nietzsche’s relation to Darwinism and how 
Nietzsche become familiar with Darwinism. Afterwards, I am going to present a 
brief synopsis of the Darwinian evolutionary theory. Finally, I am going to 
examine and discuss Nietzsche’s attack on Darwinism.  
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 As a theory, which influenced the whole scientific, intellectual and 
cultural life of the second half of the 19th century, Darwin’s evolutionary theory 
had considerable influences on the philosophy of Nietzsche. Especially, his 
doctrines of the will to power and the Übermensch are said to be influenced by 
the theory of evolution. Commentators, studying the relation between 
Nietzsche’s thought and Darwinism, agree on this point. According to Thomas 
H. Brobjer, Nietzsche’s thought is deeply influenced by Darwinism, or the 
theory of evolution, and without taking this fact and his approach to Darwinism 
into account, crucial aspects of his philosophy “such as his view of development, 
progress and history, as well as his concepts of the will to power and the 
Übermensch”58 could not be fully understood. Another Nietzsche scholar Keith 
Ansell-Pearson, emphasizing the Darwinian influences on Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, claims that  
at the very heart of Nietzsche’s outline of his fundamental 
concerns in his major text, On the Genealogy of Morals, we 
find a critical engagement with the Darwinian paradigm of 
evolution. The Genealogy is a text steeped in nineteenth-
century biological thought and ideas, and unthinkable without 
this heritage.59 
 Although, influence of Darwinism on the philosophy of Nietzsche is 
widely recognized, it is not so easy to determine the scope and the extent of this 
influence. As Dirk Robert Johnson puts it, “many contemporary studies do seem 
to agree . . . that Darwin’s theories decisively influenced Nietzsche at various 
levels – even though the nature and extent of that influence may still remain 
indeterminate.”60 According to Ansell-Pearson, this uncertainty is the result of 
the fact that Nietzsche’s “engagement with Darwin has not received the kind of 
attention it merits,” and “[w]here it has been treated, it has treated cursorily, 
without any serious effort being made by commentators to render 
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comprehensible Nietzsche’s ‘philosophical biology’, including its problematic 
aspects.”61 Johnson makes a similar claim; “Darwin’s importance for Nietzsche 
has, indeed, been underestimated and merits critical reassessment.”62 
 Ansell-Pearson is well aware that it is not an easy task to determine 
Nietzsche’s relation to Darwin. He proposes that there are many reasons, which 
make this task very hard, yet two of them are very important (at least for him). 
First “the influence of an evolutionary paradigm on Nietzsche’s thinking on life 
is evident as early as 1867 in his speculations on Kant and the question of 
teleology.”63 This means that, this influence had started at the beginning of 
Nietzsche’s academic career, when he was twenty three years old. That is, all of 
his published and unpublished works might have been influenced by Darwinian 
theory. Elizabeth Grosz makes an interesting point by calling our attention to the 
publication dates of both Darwin’s The Descent of Man and Nietzsche’s The 
Birth of Tragedy.64 
 Secondly, one is that when Nietzsche opposes Darwinian ideas in his 
writings, he is, actually, writing in a way that supports Darwinian theory. That is, 
“when Nietzsche presents himself as ‘contra’ Darwin, he is, in fact, frequently 
writing ‘pro’ Darwin.”65 For Ansell-Pearson, this confusion is the result of the 
fact that Nietzsche never read Darwin, and he knows Darwin from second-hand 
resources. “There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Nietzsche was familiar 
with the work of the English Darwinians (and prominent German Darwinians 
too, such as Ernst Haeckel), but no evidence to suggest that he had any direct 
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acquaintance with the work of Darwin itself.”66 Grosz, Brobjer, and Daniel 
Dennett make similar claims, too.67 
 Who are those popularizers of Darwin in Germany, at that time? The first 
and the most commonly accepted figure is Friedrich Albert Lange. Nietzsche, in 
1866, when he was a student, read Lange’s book History of Materialism, in 
which a chapter is devoted to Darwin. At the University of Basel, Nietzsche met 
paleontologist Ludwig Rütimeyer, who was a friend of Darwin, and who 
contributed to the spread of Darwinism in Germany. Zoologist Ernst Haeckel, an 
influential and well-known supporter of Darwinism in Germany, is another 
figure through which Nietzsche knew Darwinism. In Nietzsche’s library, there 
was Wilhelm Roux’s The Struggle of the Parts in the Organism, which, for 
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, had considerable effects on the formation of 
Nietzsche’s understanding of the world as will to power.68 Carl von Nägeli’s A 
Mechanico-Physiological Theory of Organic Evolution is another influential 
book on Nietzsche’s thought concerning Darwinism and evolution.69 Paul Rée’s 
The Origins of Moral Feelings, in which he presents a natural history of 
morality, had great influence on Nietzsche’s interest in the origin of morality. 
There might be other names that should be listed here, but for the purpose of this 
work, the above mentioned names, should be sufficient. 
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 As we have seen, there are two points on which commentators agree. 
First, they agree that Nietzsche’s thought was somewhat influenced by the 
Darwinian evolutionary theory, and due to its complexity it is very difficult to 
determine its scope and the context in which it is most evident. Secondly, they 
agree that Nietzsche never read Darwin directly, and because of this he 
misunderstood Darwin, and used this misrepresentation of Darwin in his 
criticism. After presenting the views of the commentators about the relation 
between Nietzsche and Darwin and the influence of Darwinism on Nietzsche’s 
thought, let us start to examine Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
 Darwinism, briefly put, is a theory, which explains the development and 
the diversity of life forms in terms of evolutionary change. This evolutionary 
change, for Darwin, takes place through “natural selection” and “adaptation,” 
which are the main principles of the Darwinian evolutionary theory. Darwinian 
evolutionary change has three basic assumptions: 1) there are individual 
differences, structural and behavioral, among the members of the same species in 
their adaptation to the environment; 2) these individual differences in adaptation 
are hereditary and it is conveyed to next generations by inheritance; 3) 
Malthusian law of population, according to which nature’s capacity to supply 
food could not meet the organism’s reproduction rate.70 Therefore, there is a 
struggle for existence among the individuals. As Jonathan Howard claims, “the 
principle of natural selection is a deductive consequence of heritable variation, 
multiplication, and the struggle for survival.”71 At the end of the process of 
natural selection, only the better adapted, or the better fitted, individuals will 
survive. Darwin describes natural selection as the following: 
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If under changing conditions of life organic beings present 
individual differences in almost every part of their structure, 
and this cannot be disputed; if there be, owing to their 
geometrical rate of increase, a severe struggle for life at some 
age, season or year, and this certainly cannot be disputed; then, 
considering the infinite complexity of the relations of all 
organic beings to each other and to their conditions of life, 
causing an infinite diversity in structure, constitution, and 
habits, to be advantageous to them, it would be a most 
extraordinary fact if no variations had ever occurred useful to 
each being’s own welfare, in the same manner as so many 
variations have occurred useful to man. But if variations useful 
to any organic being ever do occur, assuredly individuals thus 
characterised will have the best chance of being preserved in 
the struggle for life; and from the strong principle of 
inheritance, these will tend to produce offspring similarly 
characterised. This principle of preservation, or the survival of 
the fittest, I have called natural selection.72 
 Natural selection works in accordance with the principle of utility; for 
Darwin, natural selection works for the good of the organism; in this context, he 
describes the utilitarian doctrine as the view which claims that “every detail of 
structure has been produced for the good of its possessor.”73 That is, in the 
process of natural selection, useful and beneficial traits, organs and 
characteristics remain and develop further, while the useless and harmful ones 
diminish and become vestigial. 
Natural selection will never produce in a being any structure 
more injurious than beneficial to that being, for natural 
selection acts solely by and for the good of each. No organ will 
be formed, as Paley has remarked, for the purpose of causing 
pain or for doing an injury to its possessor. If a fair balance be 
struck between the good and evil caused by each part, each will 
be found on the whole advantageous. After the lapse of time, 
under changing conditions of life, if any part comes to be 
injurious, it will be modified; or if it be not so, the being will 
become extinct as myriads have become extinct.74 
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 Other than natural selection, in Darwin’s theory, sexual selection is also 
operative in the process of evolution. While the deciding factor in the natural 
selection is struggle for existence, in sexual selection, it is the struggle for having 
the other sex for producing better fitted offspring. However, for Darwin, it is not 
as important as natural selection. In The Origin of Species, he writes 
This form of selection depends, not on a struggle for existence 
in relation to other organic beings or to external conditions, but 
on a struggle between the individuals of one sex, generally the 
males, for the possession of the other sex. The result is not 
death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or no offspring. 
Sexual selection is, therefore, less rigorous than natural 
selection. Generally, the most vigorous males, those which are 
best fitted for their places in nature, will leave most progeny.75 
  In Descent of Man, comparing natural and sexual selection, Darwin says 
that “[s]exual selection depends on the success of certain individuals over others 
of the same sex, in relation to the propagation of the species; whilst natural 
selection depends on the success of both sexes, at all ages, in relation to the 
general conditions of life.”76 According to him, sexual selection takes place in 
two forms: first one, intrasexual selection is the struggle among the members of 
the same sex whose population is greater than the other sex (this usually occurs 
in the male population and also known as the male to male competition); and the 
second one, intersexual selection is the struggle in which the members of one sex 
competes with each other to be chosen by the other sex (this, again, usually 
occurs between the males, they try to seduce the females, and also known as 
mate choice). As Darwin puts it 
[t]he sexual struggle is of two kinds: in the one it is between 
the individuals of the same sex, generally the males, in order to 
drive away or kill their rivals, the females remaining passive; 
while in the other, the struggle is likewise between the 
individuals of the same sex, in order to excite or charm those of 
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the opposite sex, generally the females, which no longer 
remain passive, but select the more agreeable partners.77 
 After briefly presenting Darwinian theory of evolution, let us turn to 
Nietzsche’s critique of Darwin. As I have noted, many of the commentators 
claim that Nietzsche got Darwin wrong. Well, then, “what is the image of 
Darwin in Nietzsche’s thought?” or “which points of the theory were 
misunderstood by Nietzsche?” The answers of these questions will become clear 
in our discussion of Nietzsche’s critique of Darwin and Darwinism.  
 Let us start with Nietzsche’s general view about Darwin and his theory. 
First of all, for Nietzsche, Darwin is one of those “respectable but mediocre 
Englishmen,”78 whose character is to work within the limits of the present 
situations of the facts and the tendency to equalize man. Other than Darwin, 
among these “mediocre Englishmen,” Nietzsche enumerates John Stuart Mill 
and Herbert Spencer. The views of these men, in this context especially 
Darwin’s, are for the minds and the ears of the mediocre men. Because, these 
Englishmen’s working method does not involve creative and innovative 
philosophical insight. They try to understand the world and nature just in the 
same way as the common man. That is, “these uniquely English discourses 
function by the accumulation of tiny details, by servility to facts, political or 
empirical, that limits any possibilities of conceptual or philosophical innovation 
and creation.”79 For this reason, Darwinism is a theory that developed under the 
condition of distress. Because, this theory, Nietzsche says, puts the Spinozistic 
instinct of self-preservation80, which belongs to the mediocre man, or the man of 
herd, as the guiding principle in life process. “It should be considered 
symptomatic when some philosophers . . . considered the instinct of self-
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preservation decisive and had to see it that way; for they were individuals in 
condition of distress.”81 Nietzsche believes that the natural sciences of his day 
were heavily influenced by this principle of Spinoza. Darwinism is the theory on 
which this influence, for Nietzsche, had considerable bad effects; “our natural 
sciences have become so thoroughly entangled in the Spinozistic dogma (most 
recently and worst of all, Darwinism with its incomprehensibly onesided 
doctrine of the ‘struggle for existence’).”82 Nietzsche claims that this influence of 
the Spinozistic dogma is related to the origins of natural scientists. That is, they 
are heavily influenced by this principle because “they belong to the ‘common 
people’; their ancestors were poor and undistinguished people who knew the 
difficulties of survival only too well at firsthand.”83 Darwin, as one of these 
natural scientists, is a “spirit of low type.” Because, attaining knowledge is not 
sufficient for being a spirit of high type, it requires “to be something new, to 
signify something new, to represent new values.”84 Darwin’s theory belongs to 
the type of “truths that are recognized best by mediocre minds because they are 
most congenial to them,”85 because both Darwin and his theory lacks the 
requirements for being a spirit of high type. Finally, Nietzsche, in a way 
responding in advance to the interpreters who claim that Nietzsche did not have 
necessary knowledge in the field of biology or other sciences, or those who 
claim that Nietzsche did not read Darwin directly, writes that “those who can do 
things in the grand style, the creative, may possibly have to be lacking in 
knowledge—while, on the other hand, for scientific discoveries of the type of 
Darwin’s a certain narrowness, aridity, and industrious diligence, something 
English in short, may not be a bad disposition.”86 
 According to Nietzsche, Darwin’s theory of evolution is a reactive 
theory. It designates a life, which is found on adaptive reactions of the organisms 
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to the external forces. In the process of evolution, transformation of an organism 
takes place through the organism’s adaptation to external conditions, or its 
reactions to the actions of external forces. Here, in the evolutionary process, the 
defining factor is the external forces, and the organism has no effect over the 
process; it has no chance other than obeying the demands of these external 
forces. According to Nietzsche, by overestimating the influences of external 
forces, Darwin ignores “the essential thing in the life process” which “is 
precisely the tremendous shaping, form-creating force working from within 
which utilizes and exploits ‘external circumstances.’”87 However, for Nietzsche, 
adaptation is “an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity,” which takes 
place after “the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving,” 88 exerted 
their influence on the external forces. Therefore, adaptation cannot be the essence 
of life, and life cannot be defined in terms of it: “Life is not the adaptation of 
inner circumstances to outer ones, but will to power, which, working from 
within, incorporates and subdues more and more of that which is ‘outside.’”89  
 Moreover, for Nietzsche, the outcome of the process of natural selection, 
which takes place through adaptation and struggle for existence, is just the 
opposite of what Darwin expects. In other words, the evolutionary process 
results in not the survival of the strongest, fittest or the better adapted 
individuals, but the weak and the maladaptive ones. “What surprises me most . . . 
is that,” says Nietzsche, “I always see before me the opposite of that which 
Darwin and his school see or want to see today,” that is, “the elimination of the 
lucky strokes, the uselessness of the more highly developed types, the inevitable 
dominion of the average, even the sub-average types.” 90  
 According to Nietzsche, the principle of “the struggle for existence” is 
not a general rule that guides life, but it is “an exception, a temporary restriction 
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of will to life.”91 For Nietzsche, Darwin’s application of Malthusian law of 
population, leads him to misunderstand general condition of nature. Life, as this 
principle assumes, is not lack or scarcity, but wealth, riches and luxury; “One 
should not mistake Malthus for nature.”92 Nietzsche claims that if there is any 
struggle, then it is for power, not for survival. For him, to propose struggle for 
existence as the guiding principle in the process of evolution is “the symptom of 
a condition of distress,” and the “limitation of the really fundamental instinct of 
life which aims at the expansion of power.”93 In its search for more power, this 
instinct when faced with a condition in which it must choose either self-
preservation or more power, without hesitation chooses power. That is, for 
Nietzsche, it is the will to power, not the self-preservation, that is decisive in the 
life process. Self-preservation comes to the scene only after the will to power 
exerts its power; that is, it is only a side effect of the will to power:  
Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of 
preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A 
living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself 
is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect 
and most frequent results.94  
 However, when there is such a struggle for existence, it results in the 
triumph of the weak over the strong. As Nietzsche puts it, “the strongest and 
most fortunate are weak when opposed by organized herd instincts, by the 
timidity of the weak, by the vast majority,”95 and “the weak prevail over the 
strong again and again, for they are the great majority—and they are also more 
intelligent.”96 Nietzsche regards Darwin’s forgetting of the spirit (Geist) as the 
reason for this unwelcome result of the theory. “It will be noted that,” says 
Nietzsche, “by ‘spirit’ I mean care, patience, cunning, simulation, great self-
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control, and everything that is mimicry (the latter includes a great deal of so-
called virtue).”97 This spirit, as Nietzsche’s explanation implies, is morality. In 
Daybreak, Nietzsche, draws parallels between the adaptive behaviors of the 
animals and man, and claims that “entire phenomenon of morality” is nothing 
more than a tool in the service of self preservation. In this context, for Nietzsche, 
mimicry has a special role. As animals adapt themselves environing conditions 
by mimicry, i.e., changing their colors to hide from their enemies or their prey, 
“the individual hides himself in the general concept ‘man’ or in society, or 
adapts himself to princes, classes, parties, opinions of his time and place: and all 
the subtle ways we have of appearing fortunate, grateful, powerful, 
enamoured.”98 As an adaptive trait contributing to the struggle for existence, 
morality belongs to the weak and the mediocre ones; hence, they cling to it. 
However, strong ones, lusting for more power, dispense with spirit, or morality. 
As Nietzsche says “the weak have more spirit. One must need spirit to acquire 
spirit; one loses it when one no longer needs it. Whoever has strength dispenses 
with the spirit.”99 Through this morality or spirit, the weak and the mediocre type 
dominate society.  
 In a note entitled “Why the weak conquer,” Nietzsche explains how the 
weak have dominated the society. There, he emphasizes four major components 
of the process in which the weak dominates through their spirit. These are the 
weak and the sick, women, increasing civilization and the French Revolution. 
Because of their lack of power and illness, the weak and the sick have more 
sympathy with others and behave in a way that is more humane than the stronger 
and the healthy. Moreover, they have more spirit, which means, as mentioned 
earlier, “care, patience, cunning, simulation, great self-control, and everything 
that is mimicry.” This spirit makes them more “changeable,” “entertaining,” 
“interesting” and “fascinating,” than the stronger and the healthy. However, for 
Nietzsche, at the same time, they are more “malicious,” and invented “malice.” 
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Actually, the healthy and the strong are also sick at some periods in their lives; 
“the great emotions, the passions of power, love, revenge, are accompanied by 
profound disturbances.”100 Thus, they know the feelings belonging to sickness 
and weakness firsthand. As for the woman, Nietzsche says “[o]ne-half of 
mankind is weak, typically sick, changeable, inconstant.”101 Being essentially 
weak, women try to make the strong weak or to find ways of glorifying and 
sanctifying being weak and ill. To make the strong weak, Nietzsche says, 
“[w]oman has always conspired with the types of decadence, the priests, against 
the ‘powerful,’ the ‘strong,’ the men,”102 and when she succeeds she rules the 
strong. Increasing civilization is another factor in the conquest of the weak. The 
increase of the civilization is accompanied by “an increase in the morbid 
elements, in the neurotic-psychiatric and criminal.”103 According to Nietzsche, 
these morbid elements are artists as an intermediary species. These artists, again, 
because of their weakness, are between criminals and lunatics. They have 
“restrained from crime by weakness of will and social timidity, and not yet ripe 
for the madhouse.”104 These artists describe their mode of living as “naturalism,” 
which is an inappropriate word for Nietzsche. According to him, the increase in 
the number of such artists and naturalists is the sign of rapid grow of the 
civilization, which implies that “the decline keeps pace.”105 The final step, the 
French Revolution, by its demand for the equality of rights among man creates 
“a social hodgepodge.” The result of this social hodgepodge is the mixing of the 
bloods of all classes, whose result is that “two, three generations later the race is 
no longer recognizable—everything has become mob.”106 In the resulting 
society, there appears a hatred to the selected, to the privileged. This hatred is so 
powerful that the privileged succumbs to it, and to preserve his power, the 
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privileged flatters it. This relation with the privileged and the mob is mutual; that 
is, while the mob helps the privileged in retaining his power, the privileged helps 
the mob by providing the required discourses for moving the masses. The 
privileged, “the ‘geniuses’ above all,” says Nietzsche, “become heralds of those 
feelings with which one moves the masses—the note of sympathy, even 
reverence, for all that has lived a life of suffering, lowliness, contempt, 
persecution, sounds above all other notes (types: Victor Hugo and Richard 
Wagner).”107 As a result of this movement, the mob and the privileged dominate 
the society. According to Nietzsche, when civilizations experience such an 
extreme change, men’s center of gravity changes, or rather slides from “those 
men who matter most, who have, as it were, the task of compensating for the 
vast danger of such a morbid movement” to the mediocre, who, against this 
dominion, “consolidates . . . [himself] as the guarantee and bearer of the 
future.”108 Hence, by not adapting themselves to the mob and flattering the 
instincts of the “disinherited,” the mediocre becomes prevalent in the society. 
Through this dominion of the mediocrity, for Nietzsche, “once more the old 
virtue,” aurea mediocritas,* “and the entire dated world of the ideal in general, 
gains a body of gifted advocates”; hence “mediocrity acquires spirit.”109   
 For Nietzsche, as a man of herd and a mediocre and weak man, Darwin 
translates reality into morality. That is, Darwin, showing that morality is also a 
product of evolution, tries to naturalize morality. However, for Nietzsche, this 
means nothing more than to consecrate the present values in the society, with 
which Nietzsche occupies himself. Because of this translation, in the world of 
values, or society as a whole, the mediocre, the weak, and the decadents are 
regarded as more valuable than the strongest and the highest ones. Nietzsche 
rebels against this translation on the ground that “it created sublime words and 
gestures to throw over a horrible reality the cloak of justice, virtue, and 
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divinity.”110 In Descent of Man, where Darwin tries to account for the origin of 
morality by applying his notion of evolution, there are expressions that suggest 
that Darwin makes such a translation; that is, he translates reality into morality.  
 Darwin’s argument for the origin of morality depends on his conviction 
that morality is evolved from the social qualities acquired through natural 
selection. He names some of the basic social qualities as sympathy, courage, and 
fidelity, and adds that these qualities “were no doubt acquired by progenitors of 
man in a similar manner, namely, through natural selection, aided by inherited 
habit.”111 Living as a society, or to become social, for Darwin, is the 
precondition of morality. The mechanism or the instinct that compels man to 
become social is the same as that compels other organisms. That is, the 
determining factor in the development of social instincts, as in the case of animal 
instincts, is their value for the survival. “In order that primeval men, or the ape-
like men, should have become social,” says Darwin, “they must have acquired 
the same instinctive feelings, which impel other animals to live in a body.”112 
Social instincts, at the base of which there lie parental and filial affections, are 
the key factors in the development of social life. For Darwin, social instincts are 
developed through parental and filial affections: “. . . the social instinct seems to 
be developed by the young remaining for a long time with their parents.”113 
Hence, social life and taking pleasure from it are the extensions of the parental 
and filial affections. This extension of parental and filial affections to the 
pleasure of living in a society, for Darwin, although there is an effect of habit, is 
mainly attributable to natural selection. Because, living as a society increases the 
chance of survival. Darwin supports this claim by an example from bee 
community; queen-bees kill their daughter-queens for it contributes to the 
survival of the community. Thus, Darwin concludes that social instincts are prior 
to living in a society; firstly, the social instincts develop, then animals, 
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appreciating its value for the survival, start to live as communities. This is why 
Darwin puts development of the social instincts at the basis of morality. 
 Darwin summarizes the development of morality in four stages. At the 
first step, social instincts, which are innate propensities, “lead an animal to take 
pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with 
them, and to perform various services for them.”114 Secondly, after the 
development of the mental faculties into a high level, “images of the past actions 
and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of each 
individual.”115 Throughout its life every animal somehow feels dissatisfaction or 
sorrow from “any unsatisfied instinct,” and, because the social instincts are more 
basic and stronger than the later developed ones, feelings of dissatisfactions 
resulting from them lasts more than the others do. As a result, the animal’s 
ability of sympathy for others’ feelings become stronger. Whenever the later 
developed instincts and the social instincts are in conflict, if the individual 
follows other instincts instead of social ones it will feel embarrassment. This 
feeling of embarrassment lasts longer than the dissatisfactions resulting from not 
following the other ones, and as Darwin emphasizes it always haunts. At the 
third level, Darwin mentions the ever-growing intensity of the ability of 
sympathy by the acquirement of language. Through language, “the wishes of the 
community could be expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to 
act for the public good, would naturally become in a paramount degree the guide 
to action.”116 Lastly, social instincts further strengthened by habit, and at the end 
become “obedience to the wishes and judgment of community.”117 In short, “the 
social instincts – the prime principle of man's moral constitution – with the aid of 
active intellectual powers and the effects of habit, naturally lead to the golden 
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rule, ‘As ye would that men should do to you, do ye to them likewise;’ and this 
lies at the foundation of morality.”118  
 The privileged subject of Darwin’s morality is the society, herd, tribe, or 
more generally the species. The survival of the tribe is more valuable than that of 
the individual, and to this end strong or “well-endowed” individuals should 
sacrifice themselves. Well-endowed individuals, for Darwin, are those members 
of the tribe “who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, 
fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one 
another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good.”119 An increase in the 
number of the well-endowed individuals as well as in the moral standards of the 
tribe increases the survival chance of a tribe. A tribe, or society, with a high 
number of such well-endowed individuals and high standards of morality, for 
Darwin, “would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural 
selection.”120  
 This explanation of the origin of morality in terms of natural selection, 
for Nietzsche, is nothing more than imposing morality upon nature, nothing more 
than translating reality into morality. Darwin denies his principle of the survival 
of the fittest in the realm of culture or morality. In other words, in the realm of 
nature, Darwin claims that the strongest and fittest individuals survive, whereas, 
in the realm of culture, it is the weak and mediocre ones that survive. For 
Nietzsche, this is a big contradiction and Darwin commits the “basic errors of the 
biologists hitherto: it is not the question of species but of the powerful 
individuals. (The many are only a means).”121 Moreover, this explanation of 
Darwin, for Nietzsche, means altruism and therefore it is complete denial of the 
will to power, which is the will to life. If Darwinian “social instincts” (e.g., 
sympathy, parental and filial affection) prevail in the society and are accepted 
“as the fundamental principle of society, it immediately proves to be what it 
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really is—a will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and decay.”122 
According to Nietzsche, if there is a living body there is also “appropriation, 
injury, overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, 
imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, 
exploitation.”123 For Nietzsche, Darwin, ignoring this fundamental biological 
fact, proposes a morality, which is “against the efforts of nature to achieve a 
higher type.”124 
 According to Nietzsche, there is an implicit teleology in Darwin’s theory. 
Especially, for Nietzsche, the principle of struggle for existence is a teleological 
principle. “[L]et us beware of superfluous teleological principles” says 
Nietzsche, “one of which is the instinct of self-preservation.”125 Darwinian 
natural selection proceeds through the blind forces of nature; there is no designer 
behind the process of evolution. Traits are gained by blind chance, and if they are 
useful to individuals or organisms in their struggle for survival, they are 
preserved and further developed. That is, the decisive factor in an organism’s 
having a trait or an organ is its utility in the organism’s struggle for existence. 
For André Ariew, this kind of explanation is a functional teleological 
explanation in the Aristotelian sense: “What makes a trait useful is that it 
provides certain individuals an advantage over others in their own struggle to 
survive and reproduce.”126 However, Ariew mentions two differences between 
teleologies of Aristotle and Darwin. The first difference is that, for Darwin, traits 
occur by chance whereas, for Aristotle, they occur for the benefit of the 
organism’s survival. The second difference is that, for Aristotle, usefulness is the 
determining factor in the origin of organs whereas, for Darwin, it is the available 
traits. In other words, for Aristotle, “an item’s usefulness constrains the 
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necessity of the materials. That is, because eyes are useful for seeing, the organic 
ingredients coalesce,” whereas, for Darwin, “this is exactly backwards: the 
materials constrain function. Natural selection operates on the materials (the 
variants) that are available to it.”127 In spite of these differences, it seems that the 
usefulness in the struggle for existence is what makes Darwin’s theory 
teleological.  
 Nietzsche rejects the idea that struggle for existence is the determining 
factor in the formation or development of the organs. As we know, for 
Nietzsche, it is the struggle for power that is decisive in the life process. Hence, 
it is the will to power that causes the formation of organs. According to 
Nietzsche, will to power actively interprets the world, or life conditions, to gain 
more power. “In fact, interpretation is itself is a means of becoming master of 
something.”128 In the organic world, the process of interpretation constantly 
occurs, and “it is a question of interpretation when an organ is constructed.”129  
 The origin of an organ cannot be explained by its utility for the 
preservation of the organism. For Nietzsche, just the opposite is the case; “most 
of the time during which a property is forming it does not preserve the individual 
and is no use to him, least of all in the struggle with external circumstances and 
enemies.”130 For example, something useful for the preservation of the organism, 
at the same time, may cause loss of strength, or may interfere with the evolution 
of the organism. The idea behind this claim of Nietzsche is his belief that the life 
is “a multiplicity of forces, connected by a common mode of nutrition,”131 and 
his description of the individual as “a struggle between parts (for food, space, 
etc.): its evolution tied to the victory or predominance of the individual parts, to 
an atrophy, a ‘becoming an organ’ of the other parts.”132 This common mode of 
nutrition includes feelings, thoughts, ideas; in short, what makes such a nutrition 
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possible; such as, “(1) a resistance to all other forces; (2) an adjustment of the 
same according to form and rhythm; (3) an estimate in regard to assimilation or 
excretion.”133 Because of this structure of the individual or organism, the utility 
of an organ or a part in its preservation, or in its struggle with the external 
conditions, may result in the corruption of the evolution of the organism. The 
only thing that drives evolution is the inner struggle of the individual parts of the 
organism with each other. If preservation is placed in the foreground, the 
emphasis is directed towards adaptation to the external circumstances, in which 
case the organism becomes a reactive being. This means that it is not the active 
and creative forces, but the reactive ones that are prevalent in the organism. 
These reactive forces, or, as a whole, the reactive organism, cannot be the 
stimulant of evolution. As Nietzsche puts it, “there must be present something 
that wants to grow and interprets the value whatever what wants to grow,”134 and 
this something is will to power, which is “the really fundamental instinct of life 
which aims at the expansion of power and, wishing for that, frequently risks and 
even sacrifices self-preservation.”135  
 Moreover, for Nietzsche, whatever may be the cause of the formation of 
an organ, it is radically different from its utility. That is, “the cause of the origin 
of a thing and its eventual utility, its actual employment and place in a system of 
purposes, lie world apart.”136 Because, the world is will to power, and there is an 
active power struggle among power centers. In this power struggle, every power 
center constantly interprets, and is interpreted by, the other power centers. 
Hence, the utility or meaning of a power center would be in a constant change 
according to the perspective of the ever-changing power center. “Whatever 
exists, having come into being,” says Nietzsche, “is again and again reinterpreted 
to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to 
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it.”137 Because of the struggle for ever-more power in the organic world, 
Nietzsche claims, “all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming 
master,” and this process “involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through 
which any previous ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ are necessarily obscured or even 
obliterated.”138 Additionally, for Nietzsche, “purposes and utilities are only signs 
that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed 
upon the character of a function.”139 Therefore, the origin of an organ is not 
explainable by applying neither its utility nor its purpose. Consequently, 
Darwin’s introduction of the struggle for existence into the evolution as the 
principle of life process is nothing more than imposing a “superfluous 
teleological principle” upon the active, shaping, form giving, inner force, 
namely, the will to power. 
 However, a teleology is also attributed to Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will 
to power. Peter Poellner takes the will to power as a ‘teleological principle of 
explanation.’140 He claims that “[t]he nature of human activity, including the 
activity of cognition—or, as he [Nietzsche] prefers to say, of interpretation—is 
explained in terms of a teleological principle: the will to power.”141 According to 
him, will to power as a teleological principle of explanation is neither a telos to 
which all change is directed, nor a directness or disposition to a metaphysical or 
natural end. Rather, it is “a type of explanation of events in terms of ‘the goal or 
result aimed at “for the sake” of which the event is said to occur’, in 
contradistinction to the ordinary causal kind of explanation in terms of 
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‘(logically) unconnected antecedent conditions.’”142 According to Poellner, 
Nietzsche characterizes human nature as a striving for power. Because of this 
nature, all of the activities of an individual human being are directed to the 
feeling of increase of power. Nietzsche uses his doctrine of will to power to 
account for this nature of human beings. For Poellner, Nietzsche’s use of will to 
power shows us “that he resorts to a kind of explanation by purpose, that is, one 
which appeals to some moving force which is to some degree analogous to that 
which we ordinarily consider to be efficacious in intentional, volitional 
activity.”143 Poellner tries to show this analogy by analyzing the relation between 
the exertion of power and purpose. Poellner claims that, in situations, in which 
there is no purpose or intention, we cannot speak of the exertion of power. In 
other words, an individual increases his power by exerting his power over other 
individuals or nature, yet, if, somehow, individual’s capability of pursuing a 
purposeful activity is hindered, then there occurs no exertion of power. “If 
neither the ‘agent’ nor the ‘patient’ in a given situation is in principle capable of 
purposeful activity, then this not a situation in which Macht [power] is either 
exerted or suffered.”144 Poellner asserts that if we still insist on the claim that 
there occurs exertion of power without any agent capable of purposeful activity, 
then we necessarily speak in an anthropomorphizing manner; “[w]e do not 
speak—except in an anthropomorphizing metaphor—of a mountain exerting 
power over a river by standing in its way and diverting it.”145 Thus, for Poellner, 
there must be an agent with its capability for purposeful action if one may speak 
of a power exertion without falling into anthropomorphism. Poellner tries to 
show that there is such agency in the doctrine of will to power.  
 Poellner starts to analyze what Nietzsche means by exertion of power. 
According to Poellner, Nietzsche understands exertion of power mainly as 
                                               
142 Poellner, p. 165; italics are mine. Poellner takes this definition from Charles Taylor, and the 
italicized phrases in the quotation are quoted by Poellner from Charles Taylor, The Explanation 
of Behaviour, London: Daedalus Books, 1964, p. 5-6. 
143 Poellner, p. 165. 
144 Poellner, p. 166. 
145 Poellner, p. 166. 
 
49 
“appropriation,” “assimilation,” “shaping,” and “overwhelming.” However, 
Poellner warns us that we would misunderstand Nietzsche, if we ignore the 
generality of these terms. Poellner says that the term “shaping,” for Nietzsche, 
not only means a shaping activity of an artist or a craftsman, but also to that of, 
for example, a teacher’s “shaping” the minds of students, etc. In addition, 
Poellner emphasizes Nietzsche’s use of “grasping” and “comprehension” as 
instances of “appropriation.” He continues his discussion about teleology of will 
to power, by saying that all these ways of exerting power “involves the 
recognition of a ‘difference’ which ‘presuppos[es] a comparison’ . . . by the 
agent between the state of an object or opponent before the agent has acted on it 
and after, or during, his activity.”146 Here, Poellner seems to claim that there is a 
series of cognitive states in which the agent is aware of its opponent and the 
courses of its struggle with that opponent. This requires, as Poellner avers, both 
awareness of the processes in which exertion of power occurs and the awareness 
of “self” and “other.” However, the self-awareness, which appears in the process 
of power exertion, does not mean that Nietzsche has a traditional concept of self-
awareness. “[T]he self-awareness involved in the experience Nietzsche calls the 
feeling of power,” says Poellner, “is different from introspection, for attention is 
focused here on the object of the activity,” and “the ‘self’ at issue (the 
‘encroaching unit’)” is not “the mental substance of the philosophical 
tradition.”147 Nietzsche, already, opposes traditional view of self by claiming the 
phenomenality of self: “I maintain the phenomenality of the inner world, too. 
Everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, 
interpreted . . . The ‘apparent inner world’ is governed by just the same forms 
and procedures as the ‘outer’ world.”148 For Poellner, the teleological principle 
of explanation, together with Nietzsche’s “phenomenal self” postulation, 
explains his notion of truth, too, without postulating any metaphysical or 
Cartesian self as the criterion of truth. That is, we perceive our selves as we 
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perceive other organisms and the entities in the phenomenal world; we have no 
privileged access to our self. Hence, we interpret our feelings, desires, etc., as we 
interpret the entities in the outer world. As we know, Nietzsche’s criterion for 
truth is the enhancement of feeling of power. To say that any idea, belief, etc. is 
true means that it enhances the power, or feeling of power, of the agent who 
makes this judgment. Poellner says that, for Nietzsche, truth, as well as the 
feeling of power, is relative.149 This relativity, for Poellner, implies that the agent 
is aware of “a difference between two or more successive states” and this 
difference “can only be realized and maintained if the power of the individual is 
continually increased, that is, if the process—as it appears to the agent—of 
overcoming resistances, of exerting power, does not cease.”150 
 Consequently, what we learn from Poellner’s analysis of the will to 
power, as a teleological principle of explanation, could be summarized as the 
follows. Nietzsche characterizes human nature as striving for power; that is, 
every human being tries to increase his power or his feeling of power. Power 
increase requires exertion of power over other human beings or nature, yet, 
without purpose, we cannot speak of exertion of power. Therefore, there must be 
an agent capable of pursuing purposeful activities if there is an exertion of power 
in any event. Exertion of power requires also a capability to compare and 
evaluate the opponent. This means that the agent, who exerts power, should have 
an awareness of self and other. However, this self-awareness is a 
phenomenological one; here neither the self is a mental substance nor awareness 
is introspection. This notion of phenomenal self enables Nietzsche to assert a 
truth criterion that is not rooted in a metaphysical or Cartesian self. That criterion 
is the enhancement of the feeling of power. For Poellner, all of the activities of 
human beings, including cognitive ones, thus, explained by Nietzsche in terms of 
the goal of increasing the feeling of power, or in terms of the will to power. 
 However, I think, Poellner misses some of the crucial points in 
Nietzsche’s characterization of will to power. Firstly, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
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will to power does not aim mainly at explaining human activities, whether it is 
physiological or cognitive. The scope of this doctrine is not limited to organic 
life, either. As we have seen, Nietzsche does not agree with the traditional 
distinction between organic and inorganic entities. Because he views the world 
as the world of becoming, there is no inorganic entity as something dead, in this 
world; “‘Being’—we have no other idea of this than ‘living’. How, then, 
something dead ‘be.’”151 Therefore, Poellner’s explanation does not work in the 
realm of those matters, which we regard as inorganic. Nietzsche clearly express 
his view about extending will to power doctrine to those apparently inorganic 
entities: 
The will to accumulate force is special to the phenomena of 
life, to nourishment, procreation, inheritance—to society, state, 
custom, authority. Should we not be permitted to assume this 
will as a motive cause in chemistry, too?—and in the cosmic 
order?152 
 Moreover, Poellner’s discussion of the relation between exertion of 
power and the capability of purposeful activity seems to commit a fatal 
misunderstanding of will to power. Nietzsche does not contemplate will to power 
as an attribution of the power quanta. In other words, there is not a separate 
entity, or power center, on which the will to power is attributed, because that 
entity is just will to power. Let us remember that Nietzsche is against the 
distinction between the doer and the deed; a thing, an entity, is what it does; it is 
the totality of its effects on other and the effects of the other on it. Furthermore, 
for Nietzsche, there is no inactive thing, everything is in motion; that is, 
everything is always in a struggle for power with every other thing. Therefore, 
everything continuously exerts power over other things. In this sense, we can say 
that, for Nietzsche, the world is power exertion and nothing else; “every power 
draws its ultimate consequence at every moment.”153 Therefore, Poellner’s belief 
that without purpose we cannot speak of any power exertion is senseless.  
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 Finally, Poellner’s claim that will to power is a teleological principle of 
explanation is not a fair charge for the doctrine of the will to power. Because, if 
we take such an accusation of teleology as plausible or correct, then we can 
charge every explanation as being a teleological principle of explanation. Every 
explanation, in a way, already aims at explaining a process, a course of action, an 
event or whatever else by showing the way that it follows through its occurrence. 
That is, an explanation is an expression or a description of the life of a process in 
which an event takes place; it, formally, starts from the beginning of an action 
and finishes with the end of that action. There may not be even necessary causal 
relations between the phases of the process; whole course of action could result 
from wholly chance or accident. However, we still claim that the end of the 
process or action, which we use in our explanation of the action, is a teleological 
principle of explanation. Therefore, the charge of being a teleological principle 
of explanation is not a fair charge.  
 As we have seen through Nietzsche’s attacks, he and Darwin share much 
in the sense that they both have a theory for explaining life. They seem to agree 
on some general points; both believe in evolution, or mutation, of the organic 
forms; they both have an evolutionary concept of morality free of God or a 
transcendental realm as its origin; they both have a concept of struggle, or 
competition, in the organic world, etc. However, their way of explaining the 
phenomenon radically differs from each other. While Darwin tries to explain the 
evolutionary character of organisms by adaptation and struggle for existence, 
Nietzsche explains it by will to power and struggle for power. Darwin’s 
explanations lead to a conception of an organic world, in which the individual 
organisms or groups of individuals try to adapt themselves to the environing 
conditions for their survival. Because of this adaptive trait attributed to 
organisms and presentation of survival as the end of organic life, Nietzsche 
accuses Darwin’s theory as a reactive theory. On the other hand, Nietzsche 
conceives of a world of active and dynamic power quanta, which struggle for 
increasing their power at the expense of their survival. Although, in a way, both 
Nietzsche and Darwin try to explain the same phenomenon without appealing to 
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any transcending being or realm, they reach to two radically different theories of 
evolution. Therefore, looking at the general similarities between Darwin’s and 
Nietzsche’s thoughts, which results from engaging with the same phenomenon, 
namely life, it is not fair to conclude that Nietzsche is a Darwinist thinker.  
 Differences between their explanations of the phenomenon of life, as we 
have seen, show itself clearly in Nietzsche’s attacks on Darwin’s explanation of 
the origin and the evolution of morality in human beings. Darwin’s view on 
morality is a completely altruistic one, because it is based on the struggle for 
survival. Nietzsche names this as the ascetic ideal, and says that 
[T]he ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a 
degenerating life which tries by all means to sustain itself and 
to fight for its existence; it indicates a partial physiological 
obstruction and exhaustion against which the deepest instinct 
of life, which have remained intact, continually struggle with 
new expedients and devices. The ascetic ideal is such an 
expedient; the case is therefore the opposite of those who 
reverence this ideal believe: life wrestles in it and through it 
with death and against death; the ascetic ideal is an artifice for 
the preservation of life.154 
 Hence, for Nietzsche, a morality based on the instinct of self-preservation 
is inimical to life. If the preservation instinct is taken to be the principle of life, 
then life, which wants to become more and stronger, will be castrated and lose its 
creative and form giving force. Yet, preservation is only a byproduct of the will 
to power: “A living thing wants above all to discharge its force: ‘preservation’ is 
only a consequence of this.”155 Therefore, the instinct of self-preservation could 
not be the key principle for explaining neither organic life nor origin of morality. 
 Moreover, Nietzsche’s concept of will to power could not be taken as a 
Darwinian principle. Because, as we have just seen, the will to power is stronger 
than the Darwinian instinct of self-preservation. However, this does not mean 
that Nietzsche ignores self-preservation; it is included in the concept of the will 
to power, yet only as a side-effect of it. That is, a quantum of force seeks to 
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increase its power, and, through this increase, it also preserves itself. As a power 
quantum is essentially will to power, when the struggle requires, it does not 
hesitate to risk its preservation.  
 Other than these differences, there is the problem of teleology that is 
attributed to both thinkers. Darwin eliminated the metaphysical teleology by 
eliminating the notion of a world of God and nature’s inherent teleology with his 
theory of evolution, which explains the phenomenon of life and its evolution 
without appealing to any teleological sources. However, this elimination of 
teleology is only apparent, because his very theory of evolution is based on 
another teleology. In other words, his explanation of the evolution of organisms 
through adaptation and natural selection carries a hidden teleology; the teleology 
of survival. His explanations of all morphological transformations and 
developments, and, of course, adaptation are guided by the survival of the 
organisms. If any change occurs in the morphological structure of the organism, 
or if any new organs develop, this occurs for the sake of its utility in the 
preservation of the organism. Hence, Darwin’s elimination of teleology is 
nothing but a change of the source of the teleology. As discussed above, 
Nietzsche opposes this teleology on the grounds that utility in the struggle for 
preservation cannot be the dynamic of the organic process.  
 I will conclude this section by drawing some conclusions from the above 
presented discussions. The similarity between Nietzsche’s philosophy and 
Darwinism is only an apparent one. Their similarity comes mostly from the fact 
that they try to explain the same phenomenon, namely life, with an evolutionary 
approach. There is a fundamental difference between these thinkers; Darwin’s 
concern is limited to organic life whereas Nietzsche’s concern is the world, 
including organic and inorganic realms. Their approaches to the phenomenon are 
almost directly opposite; while Darwin pictures a life that is essentially passive, 
or reactive, Nietzsche pictures a life that is wholly active and dynamic. In that 
sense, Darwin’s theory seems to imply a passive adaptation process while 
Nietzsche presents an active and shaping process to us. While Darwin puts the 
instinct of self-preservation as the principle of the evolution, Nietzsche puts the 
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power struggle and the dynamic form giving, shaping force, the will to power as 
the dynamic of the morphological change. Furthermore, Darwin’s theory seems 
to be a teleological explanation of life whereas Nietzsche opposes teleology and 
presents a non-teleological doctrine about life and the world. Another 
fundamental difference between Darwin and Nietzsche concerns their views 
about the origin and the development of morality. Darwin bases morality on the 
social instincts attained through natural selection. As a product of natural 
selection, Darwinian morality aims at preservation of society, groups of 
individuals, or species. However, this morality, as Nietzsche notes, results in the 
opposite of what Darwin’s theory of evolution expects; that is, not the fittest or 
better adapted individuals but the least adapted and weak ones survives through 
this morality. Nietzsche rejects such a morality as being altruistic, and harshly 
criticizes this altruistic morality. These differences between the thoughts of 
Darwin and Nietzsche, in my opinion, are so fundamental and so irreconcilable 
that it is impossible to claim that Nietzsche is a Darwinian thinker or that the will 
to power is a Darwinian principle.  
2.4 Discussions Concerning the Metaphysical Character of the Will to 
Power 
As we have seen in the preceding section, will to power is Nietzsche’s answer to 
the question “What is there?” Although it is evident that it is not a kind of 
principle as that of traditional metaphysics, there are commentators who claim 
that it is metaphysical. The most important of those commentators is Heidegger. 
He claims not only that it is a metaphysical principle, but also that with this 
metaphysical principle, Nietzsche’s philosophy is the consummation of Western 
metaphysics. In his Nietzsche, Heidegger writes, 
In the thought of will to power, Nietzsche anticipates the 
metaphysical ground of the consummation of the modern age. 
In the thought of will to power, metaphysical thinking itself 
completes itself in advance. Nietzsche, the thinker of the 
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thought of will to power, is the last metaphysician of the 
West.156 
 Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy and his doctrine of 
the will to power were very influential on Nietzsche interpreters and the 
interpretations between the early 1960’s and 1970’s.157 His influence, in my 
opinion, comes from several factors, which makes Heidegger an influential 
Nietzsche interpreter when joined together with his philosophical deepness. 
Firstly, he is a German and knows the German culture, language, philosophy, art 
and tradition directly, which enables him to access to the poetic and aphorismic 
language of Nietzsche and the issues with which Nietzsche is engaged. Secondly, 
both Nietzsche and Heidegger belong to the continental philosophy tradition; this 
is another advantage for Heidegger to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
Belonging to the same tradition enables Heidegger to grasp Nietzschean 
concepts more adequately and to penetrate the issues handled by Nietzsche more 
easily. And, maybe it is because of the influence of Nietzsche over him, 
Heidegger’s use of language often very similar to that of Nietzsche. This 
similarity in the use of language, for me, shows his success in understanding 
Nietzsche’s thought. In other words, this similarity means that Heidegger is well 
aware of the fact that Nietzsche finds the traditional, or ordinary, language, as an 
inadequate way of expressing his thoughts, and he uses this language by 
deforming it. However, Heidegger’s access to Nietzsche’s language does not 
mean that in his lectures, or in his writings on Nietzsche, he correctly represents 
Nietzsche’s thoughts. In spite of Nietzsche’s plain denial of metaphysics, 
Heidegger’s accusation of him for doing metaphysics and his claim that 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power is a metaphysical doctrine support my 
claim. I think that all of Heidegger’s writings and lectures on Nietzsche could be 
evaluated as, in Nietzsche’s sense of the word, interpretations; they are just 
interpretations and nothing else. However, then, it becomes problematic to claim 
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that these works are about Nietzsche; that is, the thoughts reconstructed in 
Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretations could be regarded as Heidegger’s own 
thoughts. Alan D. Schrift reports a story about Heidegger. According to the 
story, Heidegger replies the criticisms about his interpretation of Kant by saying 
that “it may not be good Kant, but it’s excellent Heidegger.”158 However, this 
does not diminish the influence of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. His 
acceptance of Nietzsche’s philosophy as the consummation of Western 
metaphysics and his evaluation of main doctrines of Nietzsche’s philosophy as 
metaphysical doctrines are still one of the main themes of Nietzsche studies. 
Especially, for the studies concerning Nietzsche’s theory of knowledge, it is 
indispensable to confront with claims concerning the metaphysical character of 
the doctrine of the will to power and of Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
 Heidegger is not the only commentator, who accuses Nietzsche of doing 
metaphysics. John Richardson, who is an analytically oriented scholar, also 
claims that the doctrine of the will to power is a metaphysical doctrine. Like 
Heidegger did between the early 1960’s and 1970’s, Richardson is one of the 
main figures of current Nietzsche studies. Because of this and the reasons that 
will be presented in the remainder of this paragraph, I feel compelled to include 
Richardson’s claims about the metaphysical character of the doctrine of the will 
to power. First of all, nowadays, as in the case of all other domains of 
philosophy, Nietzsche interpretations tend to be more analytical; most of the 
recent Nietzsche studies have been the products of the scholars of analytic 
philosophy. Especially in the English-speaking world, analytical philosophy is 
regarded as the only way of doing philosophy.159 Actually, being an analytical 
thinker, or doing philosophy in accordance with analytical methods, has become 
the basic properties for getting a “job” in the universities and colleges. In his 
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“Memorandum”160 for the students, planning to do a dissertation on Nietzsche, 
Brain Leiter explains how to write a “good” dissertation and get a good job after 
finishing the dissertation. Leiter’s first advice to the doctoral students is to avoid 
writing a “philosophically superficial and unsophisticated” dissertation, like the 
works of Walter Kaufmann and Tracy B. Strong. According to Leiter, the model 
of a scholarly good work could be found in Maudemarie Clark’s Nietzsche on 
Truth and Philosophy, and John Richardson’s Nietzsche's System. “These are,” 
says Leiter, “studies that are philosophically serious and textually scrupulous.”161  
 Briefly put, Richardson claims that, by this doctrine, Nietzsche proposes 
a metaphysical principle as he mentioned in his Philosophy in the Tragic Age of 
the Greeks. There, Nietzsche writes that “[w]hat drove” Thales to claim that 
“water is the primal origin and the womb of all things . . . was a metaphysical 
conviction which had its origin in a mystic intuition. We meet it in every 
philosophy, together with the ever-renewed attempts at a more suitable 
expression, this proposition that ‘all things are one.’”162 
 Actually, such claims sound implausible, when we see the passages 
where Nietzsche expresses his aversion to the metaphysicians and to the Western 
metaphysics. For example, he calls himself as a “godless anti-metaphysician,”163 
and, when he defines the epistemological starting point for himself writes 
“[p]rofound aversion to reposing once and for all in any one total view of the 
world.”164 He further writes “I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The 
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will to a system is a lack of integrity.”165 However, it is not easy to discard such 
claims by simply saying that Nietzsche is opposed to all metaphysical views. 
Therefore, they should be studied thoroughly and carefully. Now, let us see how 
Heidegger and Richardson base their arguments for the metaphysical character of 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power respectively. 
2.4.1 Heidegger’s Case: Metaphysics as forgetfulness of Being 
Before going into details of Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche is “the last 
metaphysician of the West,” it should be mentioned that there are three reading 
strategies that Heidegger applies in his reading of Nietzsche, as well as other 
thinkers.166 Actually, these are, for him, somewhat the structure of thinking. The 
first strategy is to discover “the unsaid” or “the unthought” in a thinker’s 
thought. The unsaid in what is said and the unthought in what is thought, to 
Heidegger, is “the Truth of Being.” In other words, thinkers of the Western 
philosophy, by their main concepts, i.e., idea of Plato, Absolute Spirit in Hegel, 
etc., refer to the being of the entities. Throughout their philosophical works, they 
try to answer the question “What is Being?” by their main concepts, or rather, 
they try to explain “what everything is, just qua Being.”167 This question, for 
Heidegger, is the “guiding question,” yet the crucial question is that concerning 
the meaning of Being, which is the “grounding question.” According to 
Heidegger, metaphysics does not question the meaning of Being. However, 
without answering this question, it is not possible to answer the question 
concerning beings. At the beginning of Being and Time, Heidegger writes: 
Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we 
really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is fitting that 
we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But 
are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand 
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the expression ‘Being’? Not at all. So first of all we must 
reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question.168 
 Heidegger avers that this question is never asked in the history of the 
Western thought, and accuses the thinkers of forgetting the Being. However, 
Being is still there in the form of unsaid or unthought in philosophical discourse 
of the Western thought. According to Heidegger, history of the Western 
metaphysics is the history of the forgetfulness of Being. This forgetfulness is 
rooted at the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. They regarded Being as a given 
universal, which are only accessible or understandable through particular beings; 
i.e., Plato’s account of Being as eidos or Idea. For Heidegger, this account of 
Being has contributed to the development of “a dogma . . . which not only 
declares the question about the meaning of Being to be superfluous, but 
sanctions its complete neglect.”169 Under the influence of this dogma, Being is 
regarded as “the most universal and the emptiest”170 concept through the history 
of Western thought. Conceptualized as such, the concept Being becomes 
indefinable; that is, “it resists every attempt at definition.”171 Actually, for 
Heidegger, it is used in a way that it does not require any definition anymore; 
that is, it is used as if its meaning is so evident that it needs no definition. The 
concept of Being, which once was a very perplexing, disturbing and hidden for 
the ancients, at the end, becomes self-evident. This is the meaning of the 
“forgetfulness of Being”; the meaning of Being is taken for granted without 
questioning. That is, while the Western metaphysics tries to understand being as 
presence, it forgets Being which makes this presence possible. Although it is 
forgotten, the traces of Being are there below the surface meaning of the 
discourses or the texts of the Western metaphysics. Therefore, Heidegger 
searches for the traces of this forgotten ground (the unsaid) in the works of the 
philosophers (the said) to bring it into the light. Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche 
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proceeds on this ground; that is, he tries to retrieve the unsaid in the works of 
Nietzsche. Let us return to Heidegger’s elaboration of Nietzsche’s philosophy as 
the culmination of metaphysics with this brief explanation of Heidegger’s 
methodology in our minds. 
 As we have seen that, for Heidegger, to understand what a philosopher or 
a text actually expresses we should search for the unsaid in the said. Because, for 
Heidegger, “[t]he ‘doctrine’ of a thinker is that which, within what is said, 
remains unsaid, that to which we are exposed so that we might expend ourselves 
on it.”172 This conception of the unsaid has an equivocal meaning concerning 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. The first one is that Nachlaß and The Will to 
Power are the unsaid in the published books of Nietzsche, which simply are the 
said. It is this meaning of the unsaid that has led Heidegger to regard Nachlaß as 
Nietzsche’s philosophy proper and The Will to Power as his magnum opus.  
Nietzsche’s philosophy proper, the fundamental position on the 
basis of which he speaks . . . in all the writings he himself 
published, did not assume a final form and was not itself 
published in any book, neither in the decade between 1879 and 
1889 nor during the years preceding. What Nietzsche himself 
published during his creative life was always foreground . . . 
His philosophy proper was left behind as posthumous, 
unpublished work.173 
 The second meaning of the unsaid is related to his notion of unthought, 
which grounds thinking. The unsaid can be understood through the unthought. 
Heidegger claims that approaching a text in a purely historical way, which, for 
him, accepts that our background is “what is handed down to us by tradition,” 
“prevents us from hearing the language of the thinkers.”174 Actually, for 
Heidegger, we are captives of, and destined to, this inheritance. Our reliance 
upon this inheritance is one of “the vast self-deceptions” of humanity. Because 
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when we accept this inheritance as our backgrounds, our thoughts are limited and 
determined by it; it prevents the development of genuine thinking. As Heidegger 
says “we must remain entangled [in this self deception] as long as we are still not 
really thinking.”175 Under the influence of this self-deception, we take the 
language or text as mere expressions, which set forth the views of the 
philosopher. However, the language of the philosopher tells us “what is,” not his 
views. It is not so easy to hear what the language of the philosopher tells us. For 
Heidegger, in order to hear it “[w]e must acknowledge and respect it.”176 In other 
words, we must let the thoughts of the philosopher to show themselves in their 
uniqueness without imposing our inherited categories of understanding upon 
themselves. We must let it to show its inexhaustible meanings which remain 
hidden at the depths of his thought. It is the unthought in the thought of the 
philosopher that causes these inexhaustible meanings to remain hidden. What 
Heidegger means by unthought is not a deficiency in the thought of the 
philosopher, on the contrary, it is what makes his thoughts richer and more 
original. “What is unthought in a thinker’s thought is not a lack inherent in his 
thought. What is un-thought is there in each case only as the un-thought. The 
more original the thinking, the richer will be what is unthought in it.”177 The 
unthought in the thought of the philosopher cannot be understood by the 
common mode of comprehension, and it always remains incomprehensible to 
this mode of comprehension. Even the unthought is labeled as untruth by the 
common mode of comprehension. Because this mode of comprehension is so 
proud of its power of comprehending everything; if it could not comprehend 
something then it denies it as something absurd and untrue. Instead of 
questioning its own power of comprehension it blames the unthought as 
incomprehensible. However, for Heidegger, because of its conviction that it can 
know everything knowable, this mode of comprehension could not respect and 
acknowledge the thought of the thinker which is necessary for comprehending 
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the unthought. Therefore, the unthought could not be comprehended by the 
common mode of thought which we inherited from our ancestors. Heidegger 
proposes a mode of comprehension which show respect and acknowledge the 
thoughts of the thinker. Only then we can hear what the thinker’s thought 
actually mean; only through respect and acknowledgment we can hear what is 
hidden at the depths of the thinker’s thought in the mode of unthought. “For 
acknowledgment and respect call for a readiness to let our own attempts at 
thinking be over come, again and again, by what is unthought in the thinker’s 
thought.”178 According to Heidegger, this requires a face-to-face confrontation 
and converse. This encounter could take two different forms; or rather it could be 
performed in two different manners. The first one is to encounter with the 
thinker’s thought, which requires “magnifying still further what is great in his 
thought,” only then, for Heidegger, “we will enter into what is unthought in his 
thought.”179 The second manner of encounter is to counter, which minimizes 
what is great in his thought. In countering with his thought, we reduce what is 
significant in his thought into the status of a mere presumption, belonging to our 
common mode of comprehension. That is, it loses its all significance and depth; 
it becomes obvious. When the greatness of the thought of a thinker diminished 
by such a counter, it makes no difference to praise its owner as a great thinker; 
“It makes no difference if we assert in passing that Kant was nonetheless a very 
significant thinker. Such praises from below are always an insult.”180 Therefore, 
in order to comprehend what a thinker’s thought really means, or what is 
unthought in the thought of the thinker, we must leave sound common sense, 
which ignores unthought as incomprehensible. Because, under the domination of 
this sound common sense, for Heidegger, “notwithstanding many exaggerations 
and dark allusions, everything Nietzsche offers to our thought looks largely as if 
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it were perfectly obvious . . . But that is a pure illusion.”181 To get rid of this 
illusion we must find out what is unthought in Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
 As we have seen, it is this unthought on which the thought of a 
philosopher is based. In Nietzsche’s thought, for Heidegger, what is unthought is 
“the Truth of Being.” Actually, it is the same as what remains unthought in the 
thought of Western metaphysics through its history. All of Nietzsche’s key 
concepts, i.e., “will to power,” “eternal return,” “Übermensch,” are to be 
understood or comprehended through this unthought question of the truth of 
Being. Actually, these concepts, for Heidegger, are basic metaphysical concepts. 
To illustrate, for the doctrine of the Übermensch, Heidegger writes that “[t]he 
doctrine of the superman, which by its very nature can never be an anthropology, 
belongs, like every metaphysical doctrine of man, among the basic doctrines of 
every metaphysics; it belongs to the doctrine of the Being of beings.”182 
 Then, to comprehend what Nietzsche really thought we must return to 
what is unsaid (Nachlaß) in what he said (his published books by himself) and 
search for what is unthought in the unsaid. In other words, “[w]hat Nietzsche 
really thought is to be found in his Nachlaß, and even there we find what 
Nietzsche really thought only in the form of what is unthought.”183 Moreover, 
what remains unthought is the question of the truth of Being, which is also the 
characteristic of the traditional Western metaphysics. Therefore, Heidegger 
suggests that if we want to reach Nietzsche’s philosophy proper we should 
regard him as the culmination of Western metaphysics, and then to proceed to 
the question of what is unthought in his thought, or to question of the truth of 
Being. In his Nietzsche, Heidegger asserts that “we can never succeed in arriving 
at Nietzsche’s philosophy proper if we have not in our questioning conceived of 
Nietzsche as the end of Western metaphysics and proceeded to the entirely 
different question of the truth of Being.”184 Here, the culmination of metaphysics 
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means that if we, following Heidegger’s suggestion, have succeed in arriving at 
Nietzsche’s philosophy proper, in which the question of the truth of Being is 
unthought, then it will be possible to think this formerly unthought; in short, it 
will become possible to think about the question of the truth of Being. 
 The second strategy that Heidegger applies in his reading of Nietzsche is 
that “every thinker thinks only one single thought.”185 Actually, for Heidegger, 
“[w]ith the term thinker we name those exceptional human beings who are 
destined to think one single thought, a thought that is always ‘about’ beings as a 
whole. Each thinker thinks only one single thought.”186 This is characteristic of 
every genuine thinker, and he differs from a researcher or a scientist. That is, as 
Heidegger puts it, while a researcher needs new discoveries and innovations, a 
genuine thinker needs to think about one single thought. Heidegger, by using this 
strategy, systematizes Nietzsche’s philosophy. The one and the single thought, 
which Nietzsche thinks, is the eternal recurrence of the same. It is this thought, 
around which all of Nietzsche’s philosophy is centered.  Then, if every thinker 
thinks only one single thought, and if that one single thought of Nietzsche is the 
eternal recurrence of the same, then all other major themes of his philosophy are 
the same. Because all of these doctrines are about beings as a whole.  
The five main rubrics . . . —“nihilism,” “revaluation of all 
values hitherto,” “will to power,” “eternal recurrence of the 
same,” and “Overman”—each portrays Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics from just one perspective, although in each case it 
is a perspective that defines the whole. Thus Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics grasped only when what is named in these five 
headings can be thought—that is, essentially experienced—in 
its primordial and heretofore merely intimated conjunction.187 
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 These five main themes are the same in the sense that in all of them what 
is unthought is the same, namely the question of the truth of Being. In relation to 
the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same this question becomes the 
question of Being and Time. That is, when Nietzsche thinks about the eternal 
recurrence of the same, for Heidegger, he “thinks and meditates on Being, that is, 
on the will to power as eternal recurrence.”188 In this doctrine, eternity appears 
“not as a static ‘now,’ nor as a sequence of ‘nows’ rolling off into the infinite, 
but as the ‘now’ that bends back into itself.”189 According to Heidegger, this is 
“the concealed essence of time,” and Nietzsche’s thinking of Being as eternal 
return “means thinking Being as Time,” yet he “does not think it as the question 
of Being and Time”190 as in the case of Plato and Aristotle when they consider 
Being as ousia (enduring presence). Because Nietzsche is not concerned with 
this question, he belongs to that long tradition of Western metaphysics.  
 The third strategy of Heidegger is related to his belief that Nietzsche is a 
metaphysician and his philosophy is the culmination of the Western metaphysics. 
Because, for him, it is the condition on which Nietzsche’s being a serious 
philosopher depends. In other words, Heidegger thinks that every serious 
philosophy must be metaphysical otherwise it is nothing at all. It is this belief 
which leads Heidegger to take Nietzsche a metaphysical thinker. He explains his 
reflection on Nietzsche’s metaphysics in the following way: 
The fact that we are reflecting on Nietzsche’s metaphysics does 
not mean that, in addition to considering his ethics and his 
epistemology and his aesthetics, we are also and above all 
taking note of his metaphysics; rather it means that we are 
trying to take Nietzsche seriously as a thinker.191 
 Then, it seems that whole of Heidegger’s aim in presenting Nietzsche as 
a metaphysical thinker is to show that he is a genuine philosopher. According to 
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Schrift, “Heidegger’s metaphysicalization” of Nietzsche is “the consequence of 
his desire to . . . rescue Nietzsche from the common, yet erroneous, judgment 
that he is a ‘poet-philosopher’ or a ‘philosopher of life.’”192 Heidegger defines 
metaphysics as “the truth of what is as such in its entirety.”193 In this sense, 
metaphysics is ontology; actually, for Heidegger, “[a]ny metaphysical thinking is 
onto-logy or it is nothing at all.”194 For this reason, Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
will to power is an ontological, hence a metaphysical, doctrine; it is his answer to 
the question “What is there?” or “What are beings?”; that is, beings, or entities 
are will to power; will to power is what there is. For Heidegger, such claims 
about “what there is” presupposes Being; or to put rightly, when we try to 
explain what there is we behave as if we are familiar with the sense or meaning 
of Being. We mention beings, or “what there is,” without mentioning Being, 
which grounds beings, as if the meaning of it clear and accessible to all of us; 
hence, Heidegger’s famous charge of the forgetfulness of Being as typical 
characterization of the Western metaphysics.  
 To summarize, Heidegger uses three strategies in reading Nietzsche’s 
works, both published and unpublished. Indeed, he uses these strategies in 
general for reading philosophical texts. His first strategy is to discover the unsaid 
or unthought in what is said or thought in those texts. To understand a thinker’s 
thought, or what he really said, for Heidegger, we should discover what is unsaid 
or unthought in his works. Heidegger claims that what is unsaid is “the truth of 
Being.” Without questioning the truth of Being, all the philosophers have used 
Being as a grounding principle in their answers to the question of being, or “what 
there is.” However, Being is always assumed, and remains unexplained, in those 
texts. That is, as a grounding principle, the concept of Being is overtly or 
covertly used by the philosophers, yet it is neither questioned nor explained; it 
has been forgotten or ignored. This is what Heidegger names as “the 
forgetfulness of Being.” According to him, this forgetfulness is the characteristic 
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of the Western metaphysics. By his doctrine of the will to power, Heidegger 
claims, Nietzsche tries to answer the question of being without questioning 
Being. Hence, Nietzsche remains in the tradition of Western Metaphysics. The 
second strategy of Heidegger is his conviction that every genuine thinker thinks 
only one thought, which is always about beings as a whole. Of course, for 
Heidegger, Nietzsche was a genuine thinker, and his thoughts were about beings 
as a whole. This means that all of Nietzsche’s doctrines and thoughts, although 
they seem to be very unsystematic, constitute a systematic unity. Heidegger’s 
third strategy is to consider all serious philosophy as metaphysics. Since 
Heidegger accepts Nietzsche’s philosophy as the consummation of Western 
metaphysics, it is one of the most serious of all philosophical thoughts in the 
history of Western thought. Therefore, Nietzsche’s philosophy is a metaphysical 
one. 
 After presenting Heidegger’s reading strategies which support his 
understanding of Nietzsche as a metaphysician, let us return to the issue of the 
will to power as a metaphysical doctrine. As we know, Heidegger takes Nachlaß 
and The Will to Power as Nietzsche’s philosophy proper. Because of the fact that 
the main concept or doctrine, which dominates all of these notes, is the will to 
power, and, for Heidegger, it is a metaphysical doctrine, he suggests that 
Nietzsche’s “philosophy can be called the metaphysics of the will to power.”195  
 Heidegger starts his discussion of the metaphysics of the will to power by 
showing that the literal meaning of the phrase is not what Nietzsche means by it. 
He asserts that “will” is to strive or lust for something that we do not have, and 
“power” means to exercise force, then “[w]ill to power is evidently striving for 
the possibility to exercise force, striving for the possession of power.”196 For 
Heidegger, such an explanation of will to power implies a deficiency which 
would lead to romanticism; that is, it is the characteristics of the romanticism to 
lust for something that is not possessed. In addition, will to power, as a drive to 
increase power, also implies a drive to violence. However, such an 
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understanding of will to power, for Heidegger, is at odds with what Nietzsche 
means by this phrase. After showing the inadequacy of understanding the phrase 
will to power in its literal meaning, Heidegger starts a more detailed 
investigation of the phrase to find out what Nietzsche means by it. Heidegger 
firstly tries to understand what Nietzsche means by will or willing.  
 Willing is not wishing or striving for something, rather it is commanding. 
That is, “[t]o will is to will-to-be-master.”197 However, this commanding or 
willing to be master should not be understood in terms of the traditional relation 
between master and slave; that is, this commanding should be distinguished from 
that of the master’s. Because will to power is also operative in the slave, yet not 
as wishing to free himself from the master’s domination over him; slave as a 
slave or underling makes the master dependent on him, and he becomes 
indispensable for the master, and as such dominates the master. “Being a servant 
is still a form of will to power. Willing never be a willing to be master if the will 
were merely a wishing and striving, instead of being—from top to bottom—a 
command.”198  
 Heidegger asserts that commanding is self-overcoming. To command is 
to be master over himself in order to be ready for exploiting possibilities of 
efficacious action for self-overcoming; it is to have a disposition for such an 
exploitation. What is commanded in the command is to execute this disposal, 
and who obeys the command is the one that who commands. Hence, “the one 
who commands proves superior to himself in that he ventures even his own 
self.”199 Who commands and who obeys are the same; by commanding and 
obeying the command, the commanding one overcomes himself. Heidegger 
warns us that the will does not will something which it does not have, on the 
contrary, what the will wills is it already has; that is, it wants itself; it wants to 
become more. In Heidegger’s words, “[w]hat the will wills it has already. For the 
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will wills its will. Its will is what has willed. The will wills itself.”200 This will 
wills itself to become stronger, which means that it wills beyond itself. Here 
“stronger” means “more power.” As in the case of will, the essence of power is 
to overcome itself; “[t]o the essence of power belongs the overcoming of 
itself.”201  
 Power is also commanding, and it commands itself to overpower the 
attained level of power. Heidegger asserts that power remains as power only in 
so far as it enhances itself. When it could not enhance itself, or the enhancement 
of power pauses, then there is a decline in power. However, this power-
enhancement is not for the sake of attaining next level of power, but for the sake 
of attaining power over itself. Then, power, as in the case of will, is directed 
toward itself; that is, it always overpowers itself because this overpowering is its 
essence. “Power is thus continually under way ‘to’ itself.”202 In the light of such 
an understanding of “will” and “power,” the phrase will to power seems to imply 
power for power. Here, for Heidegger, “power for power” means “empowering 
for overpowering,” which is the essence of power. 
 After presenting what will and power means in Nietzsche’s philosophy, 
Heidegger concludes that they are the same. However, they are not the same as 
two separate concepts, but “[t]hey are the same in the sense of their essential 
coherence in the unity of one essence,”203 which is will to power. When they are 
posited as separate concepts, the essence of will to power cannot be grasped. 
Because will, when willing itself, wills power for power. Heidegger, in a 
conclusive passage writes: 
In the name “will to power” the word “power” connotes 
nothing less than the essence of the way in which the will wills 
itself inasmuch as it is a commanding . . . will and power are, 
in the will to power, not merely linked together; but rather the 
will, as the will to will, is itself the will to power in the sense of 
the empowering to power. But power has its essence in the fact 
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that it stands to the will as the will standing within that will. 
The will to power is the essence of the power. It manifests the 
unconditional essence of the will, which as pure will wills 
itself.204 
 After presenting what is the meaning of the will to power in Nietzsche’s 
sense, Heidegger proceeds to explain the metaphysics of the will to power by 
relating it with Nietzsche’s discussion of value. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s 
metaphysics is “the metaphysics of values,”205 and it is very important to 
understand what Nietzsche means by value for understanding his metaphysics. 
Heidegger asserts that will to power involves both preservation and enhancement 
of power; that is, “enhancement of power is at the same time in itself the 
preservation of power. Power can only empower itself to an overpowering by 
commanding both enhancement and preservation.”206 By this command, power 
posits also the conditions of enhancement and preservation. Heidegger, to 
explain the nature of these conditions, quotes Nietzsche: “The viewpoint of 
‘value’ is the viewpoint of conditions of preservation and enhancement for 
complex forms of relative life-duration within the flux of becoming.”207 
Heidegger concludes that the conditions of preservation and enhancement are 
“viewpoints.” For him, these viewpoints belong to a particular seeing; that is, 
these viewpoints belong to the seeing, or the perspective, of will to power. This 
perspective of will to power is not a mere perspective of vision, on the contrary, 
it is the perspective of the will to power which looks toward conditions of 
enhancement and preservation. Heidegger names these conditions of 
enhancement and preservation as the conditions of will to power. Under the 
perspectival seeing of will to power the conditions of will to power, which are 
viewpoints, appear as values. Referring Nietzsche’s aphorism §715 of The Will 
to Power, Heidegger asserts that “[v]alue is ‘essentially the viewpoint’ of the 
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powering-reckoning seeing of will to power.”208 As Nietzsche sees life as will to 
power, Heidegger concludes that life in its essence is the value-positing will; that 
is, will to power posits the conditions of preservation and enhancement of power. 
Furthermore, will to power, as the value-positing will, is also the principle, 
which guides the evaluation of values. As we know that, for Nietzsche, 
everything real is will to power, therefore, this value-positing will is the 
“fundamental characteristic of everything real.”209 This means, for Heidegger, 
that Nietzsche thinks beings in terms of values. Heidegger writes that “the way 
we think through beings as such in their truth, that is, truth as the thinking of will 
to power, inevitably becomes thinking according to values.”210 Hence, by the 
doctrine of the will to power, Nietzsche transforms truth and Being into values. 
According to Heidegger, because of this translation Nietzsche remains within the 
metaphysical tradition.  
 Furthermore, Heidegger asserts that Descartes’ search for certainty takes 
the form of security in Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power. What the will to 
power posits as values are the conditions of preservation and enhancement. By 
positing “the preservation, i.e., the securing, of its constancy and stability, as a 
necessary value,” the will to power “at the same time justifies the necessity of 
such securing in everything that is.”211 This making secure means certainty, 
which is the principle of modern metaphysics. Heidegger claims that Nietzsche 
has placed this principle into the will to power; that is, Nietzsche has replaced 
the Cartesian ego cogito with the will to power. Thus, Nietzsche remains within 
the metaphysical tradition:  
Despite all his overturnings and revaluings of metaphysics, 
Nietzsche remains in the unbroken line of the metaphysical 
tradition when he calls that which is established and made fast 
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in the will to power for its own preservation purely and simply 
Being, or what is in being, or truth.212 
 Moreover, Nietzsche’s transformation of Being into value, Heidegger 
claims, brings the consummation of metaphysics. Nietzsche by the will to power 
attempts at the overcoming of nihilism, which is the devaluation of the highest 
values,213 and, this overcoming of nihilism takes place through re-valuation of all 
values. The principle that guides this process of re-valuation is the will to power; 
that is, value becomes the principle of this overcoming. For Heidegger, “value 
does not let Being be Being, does not let it be what it is as Being itself.”214 
Because of this, for him, Nietzsche’s overcoming of nihilism becomes the 
consummation of metaphysics, because “now metaphysics not only does not 
think Being itself, but this not-thinking of Being clothes itself in the illusion that 
it does think Being in the most exalted manner, in that it esteems Being as a 
value,” hence, “all the questions concerning Being become and remain 
superfluous.”215 
 As Heidegger’s three reading strategies suggest, his main strategy seems 
to be first accepting Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker and his philosophy as 
metaphysics, then trying to show that it is really so. To show that Nietzsche is a 
metaphysical thinker, Heidegger tries to show that one of the most important 
doctrines of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the doctrine of the will to power, is a 
metaphysical doctrine. Heidegger bases his argument on the relation between the 
will to power and value. Emphasizing Nietzsche’s characterization of the world 
as the chaotic world of quanta of power struggling with each other for increasing 
their power, Heidegger claims that the preservation and enhancement of power 
appear as values. That is, every power quantum evaluates the rest of the world 
according to possibilities for increasing its power; each quantum of power 
interprets the world from the perspective of increasing its power. The conditions 
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for the preservation and increase of power are values, and every power quantum 
posits these values. Because of this, Heidegger claims that the will to power is 
essentially the value-positing will. As everything is, for Nietzsche, will to power, 
the essence of everything real is this value-positing will. Further, value-positing 
of the will to power is nothing more than Descartes’ search for certainty. That is, 
by positing values, which are simply the conditions of preservation and 
enhancement, will to power tries to secure its continuity and stability. In 
Nietzsche’s case, if we follow Heidegger, Descartes’ secure base for the 
epistemological edifice, which is presented in his famous phrase “I think 
therefore I am,” becomes the preservation of the will to power, who posits the 
conditions of preservation as values. In other words, the epistemological 
foundation of Cartesian philosophy “I think” becomes “I exist,” or “I preserve 
myself”; hence, the conditions of preservation and enhancement, or values, 
become the truth conditions. As such, for Heidegger, Being and truth are 
transformed into values; this is why Heidegger calls Nietzsche’s metaphysics as 
“the metaphysics of values.” Moreover, to claim that Nietzsche’s metaphysics is 
metaphysics of value amounts to claiming that it is, at the same time, 
metaphysics of subjectivity. That is, value is always subjective; it is always 
posited by a subject. Thus, the subject, which is simply will to power as a 
quantum or constellation of power, becomes the measure of everything, in 
Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
 Consequently, for Heidegger, Nietzsche’s philosophy remains within the 
boundaries of Western metaphysics. By the doctrine of will to power, Nietzsche 
proposes a metaphysical system, which is, for Heidegger, inverted Platonism. 
This means that the metaphysics Heidegger attributes to Nietzsche is similar to 
that of Plato. By the declaration of the death of God through mouth of the 
madman, Nietzsche announces the dethroning of the supra-sensory world of 
Ideas, which supports and determines the sensory world. The world of Platonic 
Ideas, which is regarded as the real world, is no longer the ground of the 
sensuous world, in which we live. In Plato’s metaphysical system, entities in the 
sensory world are valued according to their closeness to Ideas, and truth is 
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determined according to this closeness. However, for Heidegger, Nietzsche gives 
the function of the world of Ideas to the will to power. That is, it is the will to 
power, who determines and values the sensory world and truth by positing 
values, or the conditions of preservation and enhancement. Therefore, what has 
Nietzsche done is nothing more than replacing the world of ideas with the world 
of values. Hence, Nietzsche is a metaphysical thinker. 
 Actually, Heidegger’s discussion is far more detailed and longer than this 
brief presentation of it, yet it is not possible for me to present all of his 
discussion. This brief presentation is enough for the purpose of the present study. 
Now, let us try to find out if Heidegger’s ascription of metaphysics is correct. 
 As we have seen earlier, Nietzsche is against metaphysics, and he sharply 
criticizes Western metaphysics. How could, then, Heidegger accuse him of doing 
metaphysics? Either Nietzsche is actually doing metaphysics and not aware of 
this fact, or Heidegger misinterprets, consciously or unconsciously, Nietzsche’s 
thought and tries to make him a metaphysical thinker. These two possible 
answers could be true at the same time, but, for me, it is not possible. I could not 
accept the first one as an answer. Because, then, Nietzsche ceases to be a genuine 
thinker. If he is not aware of this fact then he does not deserve to be called even a 
thinker. However, it is very ironic to see that Heidegger calls Nietzsche as a 
genuine thinker at the cost of making him a metaphysical thinker. Hence, I reject 
the first possible answer.  
 Now, we have only one possible answer; that is, consciously or 
unconsciously, Heidegger misinterprets Nietzsche, and makes an unfair claim 
about his philosophy. In the light of his reading strategies, Heidegger’s Nietzsche 
interpretation may easily be regarded as “excellent Heidegger.” That is, applying 
those reading strategies, which is applied by him to the thinkers before 
Nietzsche, Heidegger makes Nietzsche’s philosophy one of the main 
metaphysical systems of the Western philosophy; he prunes away all of the 
differences, and the originalities, of Nietzsche’s philosophy; especially, 
Nietzsche’s critique of Western metaphysics’ search for a stable and unchanging 
world; metaphysical and true world of Being. Nietzsche’s critique is directly 
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against the notion, and of course the world, of Being, which has been at the 
center of Western metaphysics. Western metaphysics, from its beginning posits a 
real world beyond and over the sensory world, i.e., Plato’s world of Ideas. 
Heidegger, ignoring this side of Nietzsche’s thought, places him in the long 
tradition of Western metaphysics as the consummation of that tradition. 
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s metaphysics is an inverted Platonism, 
which means, for Heidegger, Nietzsche posits the sensuous world over the 
suprasensuous world of Ideas.  
For Plato suprasensuous is the true world. It stands over all, as 
what sets the standard. The sensuous lies below, as the world 
of appearances. What stands over all is alone and from the start 
what sets the standard; it is therefore what is desired. After the 
inversion . . . the sensuous, the world of appearances, stands 
above; the suprasensuous, the true world, lies below.216 
 Heidegger, by viewing Nietzsche’s philosophy as an inverted Platonism, 
ignores Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his continuous attacks on the Western 
metaphysics. Nietzsche’s aim is not to correct the falsities of Platonism, or 
Western metaphysics, by inverting it, but to overcome it. Hence, as Ruediger H. 
Grimm points out, Heidegger’s claim could be true “if Nietzsche were thinking 
in traditional conceptual terms and merely replacing an outmoded concept of 
static truth with a new but equally static concept.”217 However, Nietzsche does 
not think in the conceptual terms of the Western metaphysics. When he uses 
those concepts and terms, he does not use them in their traditional sense. For 
example, as there is no other medium to express thoughts than the language that 
we use, Nietzsche necessarily uses the terms “true” and “false.”218 However, he 
does not use these terms in their traditional sense, which presupposes a true and 
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changeless world as the criterion of truth. Furthermore, the truths, for which the 
traditional metaphysics searches, are eternal and universal truths. Conversely, for 
Nietzsche there is neither an unchanging world nor the universal knowledge of it. 
The notion of an unchanging world, as well as the distinction between the real 
and the apparent world, are only illusions, or perspectival falsifications. As we 
know that the world is, for Nietzsche, a dynamic world, in which every quantum 
of power struggles with each other for increasing its power. There is no world 
other than this chaotic world, in which we live as complex power constellations. 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism is based on this chaotic and ever-changing world of 
power quanta. In accordance with his perspectivism, Nietzsche defines the 
criterion of truth as “the enhancement of the feeling of power.”219 As this 
criterion shows, his use of the term “true” or “truth” has nothing to do with that 
of the traditional Western metaphysics. Thus, Nietzsche neither thinks in 
traditional conceptual terms nor replaces the old concept of static truth with 
another static one. Therefore, Heidegger’s claims fail to make Nietzsche a 
metaphysical thinker.  
 Other than those reading strategies of Heidegger, his ignoring of 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism is behind his accusation of Nietzsche for doing 
metaphysics. It is perspectivism, through which Nietzsche overcomes Western 
metaphysics. When we discuss Nietzsche’s perspectivism in the following 
chapter, this point will become more clear. This ignorance maybe another 
Heideggerian strategy to make the way for “excellent Heidegger.” 
2.4.2 Richardson’s Case: Metaphysics as Essence Claim 
Nietzsche interpretations, with the rise of the hegemony of analytical tradition on 
the philosophical institutions all over the world, have become more analytical. 
This rising hegemony of the analytical philosophy, also, has resulted in the 
degradation of the non-analytical Nietzsche interpretations and honoring the 
analytical ones.  One of the leading analytically oriented scholars of Nietzsche is 
John Richardson. His Nietzsche studies are very influential over the 
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contemporary Nietzsche studies in the analytical tradition. What makes him a 
concern of the present study is his regarding Nietzsche’s philosophy as 
metaphysics. Like Heidegger, Richardson believes that Nietzsche is a 
metaphysician, and his philosophy, which is centered on the ontology of the will 
to power, is a metaphysical system. Richardson devoted his book Nietzsche’s 
System to show that his belief is true. At the beginning of the book, he declares 
his aim in writing this book as the following: “The book’s project is to show that 
Nietzsche has a metaphysics—to show it by presenting, in conceptual and 
argumentative detail, a metaphysical system that both fits and clarifies what he 
says (writes).”220 He also declares that to show that Nietzsche has a metaphysics 
does not mean to “diminish” him, but to show the richness and greatness of his 
thought. This sound as if Richardson is following the above discussed 
Heideggerian reading strategies, for which a philosopher is a serious and real 
philosopher as long as he is a metaphysician.  
 Richardson’s first step is to state what he means by metaphysics. 
According to him, those philosophical systems preceding Nietzsche are 
metaphysical. They are so, because they are centered systematically around a 
metaphysical core. This core “consists in an account of the ‘essence’ or ‘being’ 
of things, so that ‘metaphysics’ is equivalent to ‘ontology.’”221 Here, again, 
Richardson seems to follow Heidegger’s claim that “[a]ny metaphysical thinking 
is onto-logy or it is nothing at all.”222 However, his discussion of metaphysics of 
Nietzsche is radically different from that of Heidegger. Richardson’s discussion 
about metaphysics of Nietzsche depends mainly on this equation. Hence, 
metaphysics, for Richardson, “claims a (1) systematic (2) truth (3) about 
essence.”223 After this brief summary of his preliminary assumption about 
metaphysics, let us return to his discussion of the metaphysics of the will to 
power. 
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 Richardson’s basic claim is that by the doctrine of the will to power 
Nietzsche presents an ontology of power; and because ontology and metaphysics 
are equivalent, it is a metaphysical doctrine. Nietzsche, by this doctrine, tells us 
what the world basically is; or he tells us that the essence or being of things is 
will to power, which amounts to claim that “all is one” as his predecessors did. 
In order to support his claim, Richardson begins to analyze the meaning of the 
phrase “will to power” in Nietzsche’s thought. He states that the surface meaning 
of the phrase seems to suggest that Nietzsche proposes a kind of psychological 
hedonism by replacing power for pleasure. That is, if we understand the phrase 
in its surface meaning, then Nietzsche appears to be “speaking of a human 
willing that aims at power over other persons as its ultimate end.”224 Richardson 
says that will to power implies gaining power over other persons is the sole 
good, or the highest end, to which our other ends are directed, or aimed at. 
According to Richardson, this understanding of the doctrine of the will to power 
is not an unsupported first impression, on the contrary, it is supported by some of 
Nietzsche’s writings, even the passages in which he expressly criticizes the very 
notion of psychological hedonism. Richardson lists those passages without 
quoting any single word from them,225 and the most crucial one is HAH, vol. I, 
§18, in which, for him, Nietzsche accepts psychological hedonism. I do not want 
to go into the details of all these passages, but I could not pass without 
mentioning his misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s view in that passage of Human, 
All too Human. Because, Nietzsche does not accept psychological hedonism, 
rather he shows how the sensation of pleasure and pain contributed to the 
development of the famous idea of substance. In other words, there, Nietzsche 
presents fundamental questions of metaphysics through a brief genealogy and a 
critique of traditional Western metaphysics, which places a self-subsistent and 
unchanging substance behind the sensible world. Moreover, for metaphysics, this 
substance is the object of the knowing subject. Nietzsche quotes Afrikan 
Alexandrovich Spir as a representative of this conception of the knowing subject 
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and the substance: “The primary universal law of the knowing subject consists in 
the inner necessity of recognizing every object in itself as being in its own 
essence something identical with itself, thus self-existent and at bottom always 
the same and unchanging, in short as a substance.”226 Nietzsche claims that when 
we try to understand this sentence of Spir through “the history of the genesis of 
thought,” the real meaning of it will be revealed. According to Nietzsche, the 
history of thought shows us that this primary law evolved, yet how this evolution 
had occurred is not evident enough to understand at this stage of the history of 
thought. However, Nietzsche has some foresight about the way in which this 
evolution had occurred:  
This law, too, which is here called ‘primary’, evolved: one day 
it will be shown how gradually, in the lower organisms, this 
tendency comes into being: how the purblind mole’s eyes of 
this organization at first never see anything but the same thing; 
how then, when the various pleasurable and unpleasurable 
stimuli become more noticeable, various different substances 
are gradually distinguished, but each of them with one 
attribute, that is to say a single relationship with such an 
organism.227 
 Nietzsche’s this foresight shows us that sensations of the pleasure and 
pain come into the scene later as the differentiating factor. That is, the organism, 
before the sensations of the pleasure and pain become more noticeable, does not, 
or could not, differentiate things or substances surrounding it. This implies 
judgment; organism makes a judgment concerning its sensations. As Nietzsche 
puts it, judgment is the first stage of the logical; and the essence of the judgment 
lies in belief, at the bottom of which there lies the sensation of pleasure or pain. 
As a result of these sensations of pleasure or pain, there comes a new sensation, 
which is, for Nietzsche, judgment in its lowest form. For Nietzsche, this shows 
us that “[i]n our primary condition, all that interests us organic beings in any 
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thing is its relationship to us in respect of pleasure and pain.”228 This sensation of 
pleasure or pain is crucial to the development of the idea of the stable and 
unchanging world. Because, as Nietzsche puts it, when we become conscious of 
the sensations of pleasure or pain, we are so indulged in that sensation that “the 
world and every thing is devoid of interest to us, we notice no alteration in it 
(just as now anyone absorbed with interest in something will still not notice 
someone walking by him).”229 Moreover, between the states, in which we are 
conscious of pleasure and pain, there is the state of non-sensation or repose. 
Therefore, in either of two situations, the world is unchanging and there are 
identical things in it. That is, if we have sensation of pleasure and become 
conscious of it, for example, then we are so absorbed in that sensation that we 
lose our interest in the rest of the world, on the other hand, when we have not 
sensation of it, then the world becomes indifferent to us and we experience the 
world as a plant experiences it: “To the plants all things are usually in repose, 
eternal, every thing identical with itself.”230 In his brief yet insightful discussion 
of the genesis of the substance of the Western Metaphysics, I do not see any 
acceptance or appreciation of the psychological hedonism by Nietzsche. What 
Nietzsche tries to explain is that how the insensible and unchanging substance of 
the Western metaphysical thought is dependent on pleasure and pain. That is, the 
genealogical history of the Western thought, shows us that the idea of substance 
is primarily the product of the sensations of pleasure and pain; hence the 
knowing subject in a way creates its object. Richardson takes Nietzsche’s 
genealogical investigation of the substance as his own position and claims that 
Nietzsche accepts psychological hedonism. However, as the above discussion 
shows us, Nietzsche’s intention is to show that the genesis of the idea of 
substance is the sensation of pleasure and pain. We know that Nietzsche does not 
accept the idea of substance and the contemplation of the world as unchanging, 
and we know also that, for him, pleasure and pain are the byproduct of the will to 
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power. Therefore, it is not possible to interpret the above passage from Human, 
All too Human as Nietzsche’s assertion of psychological hedonism.  
 However, Richardson rejects those approaches which take the doctrine of 
the will to power only as a version of psychological hedonism. These views 
presuppose that the doctrine of the will to power is an anthropological doctrine; 
that is, they take will to power as only applied to people. Richardson asserts that 
Nietzsche applies will to power to simpler units such as drives or forces, which 
Nietzsche calls as “points” or “power quanta.” According to Richardson, if we 
understood these simpler units of the will to power, we will better understand the 
complex structures of the will to power, such as human beings. The application 
of the will to power to the simpler units, or Nietzsche’s contemplation of the will 
to power as being such units, for Richardson, suggests that we must not 
understood will as something peculiar to humans; that is, will must not be 
understood as human willing. Since “we are constituted out of drives or forces, 
we don’t ‘will’ anything in the way we ordinarily suppose.”231 
 For Richardson, power, like will, should be understood in a special way. 
It should not be understood as a human end, i.e., political or economical power. 
Richardson says that understanding of power as a human end means 
psychological hedonism; therefore it must be understood differently. In other 
words, power cannot be the highest end as pleasure is for psychological 
hedonism. According to Richardson, every drive has a peculiar activity, which 
does not essentially aim at gaining power. Furthermore, it is not possible to 
describe power without reference to the activities of drives. This dependence of 
the activities of drives, since every drive has a peculiar activity, individuates 
power: “This means that power is ‘individuated’, necessarily different in content 
in different wills.”232 Richardson asserts that this conception of power suggests, 
rather than a new end, a new telic structure different from our natural 
understanding of it. That is, the doctrine of the will to power is a teleological 
principle, yet it is different from that of the psychological hedonism in which the 
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end is the same for all drives or activities, namely pleasure. Power cannot be 
such an abstract and universal end. Richardson claims that drives already have 
differentiating internal ends in themselves, and a drive wants power about this 
end. “So it’s not that the sex drive . . . possesses a sense of power in the abstract, 
for whose sake it chooses sexuality as a means to an end; rather, it’s already 
polarized into valuing only specifically sexual power.”233 However, Richardson 
does not mention how this polarization occurs, he takes it for granted. 
Furthermore, he claims that since a drive is will to power, to say that it wants 
power is meaningless. Yet, immediately, he adds that a drive is a way of 
pursuing power in a pre-established project. “To be a will to power, it must 
already want something other than power. Thus each drive is a specific way of 
pursuing power in a project whose overall lines drawn beforehand.”234  
 Richardson claims that, since power is not a higher or first-order end like 
pleasure or political power, it could not be separated from drives. Power, he says, 
is the improvement of the activities of a drive; hence it could not be defined 
without these activities. That is, power is dependent on the activities of drives, 
and because of this dependence, it appears different for each drive. Every drive 
has different activity patterns, and power is the enhancement of them, thus, the 
definition of power is different for each drive. This is what Richardson means by 
the individuation of power. Consequently, power, “as something willed by every 
drive, ‘lacks content’, requiring a contingent filling out from some given 
case.”235 Every drive, in its search for the ways of improving its activities, goes 
to different directions; that is, each one of them has a different route to power. 
This individuation of power is, indeed, what perspectivism basically means. 
Furthermore, it is also “the metaphysical root for Nietzsche’s individualism in 
values.”236 
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 If a drive, as a will to power, does not want power, then why does it 
bothers pursuing power? It seems to me that Richardson, to reach his pre-
established Nietzsche project, willingly or unwillingly misinterprets Nietzsche, 
like of Heidegger. Richardson’s interpretation of the will to power really misses 
the crucial point, which lies in Nietzsche’s characterization of the world as a 
chaos, resulting from the power struggles of the quantum or constellation of 
power quanta. There is no pre-established project for any quantum of power to 
increase its power; if there were, the world would not be chaotic one. To suppose 
that there is a pre-established project for every drive and they pursue power 
according to it is nothing but to say that the world is a well-ordered or law-driven 
one. Moreover, Richardson by placing an internal end into the drives as 
differentiating factor reduces will to power, the fundamental drive, to the status 
of a secondary drive. However, for Nietzsche, the will to power is the 
“fundamental instinct of life which aims at the expansion of power and, wishing 
for that, frequently risks and even sacrifices self-preservation.”237 As this 
quotation shows, those ends presented by Richardson as the ends of drives 
cannot be the ends to which the enhancement of power is directed. These ends 
are subordinated to the will to power, in its search for enhancement of its power. 
Will to power is prior to the all other drives. This can be seen in his explanation 
of the hunger drive: “It is not possible to take hunger as the primum mobile . . . 
only later, as a result of the division of labor, after the will to power has learned 
to take other roads to its satisfaction, is an organism’s need to appropriate 
reduced to hunger, to the need to replace what has been lost.”238 Richardson 
misses these crucial points and continues to achieve his pre-established project; 
constructing a metaphysical Nietzsche. 
 In the remainder of his book, Richardson tries to show the systematic 
character of Nietzsche’s philosophy by explaining how Nietzsche’s views about 
value, truth, and ethics are centered around and compatible with this 
metaphysical core. At the end of book, he tries to construct Nietzsche’s 
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metaphysical system as “perspectivist metaphysics.” Briefly put, Richardson 
starts with questioning how the power ontology can be known. He mentions two 
possible ways of knowing the principles of this ontology; by intuition or by a 
transcendental argument. Richardson claims that Nietzsche rejects intuition and 
immediate certainty as a possible way of knowing those principles. Since, says 
Richardson, Nietzsche is “highly suspicious of consciousness and stresses that 
what it gives us ‘inwardly’ is also just appearance, not facts.”239 The other 
choice, grounding the ontology of power on a transcendental argument,240 which 
regards this ontology as the condition of the possibility of experience, is also 
rejected by Nietzsche. According to Richardson, Nietzsche accepts such 
arguments “as showing that we can’t help but think or experience the world as it 
is not.”241 In contrast, the ontology of power shows us how the world is. Showing 
that these two possible alternatives as inadequate or inappropriate ways of 
understanding or knowing the ontology of power, Richardson proposes his 
alternative based on Quine’s notion of “web of beliefs.” This time, the ontology 
of power regarded not as foundation, but as the center of a web. That is, “[t]he 
essence claims stand not as foundations (laid down first and a priori) but at the 
center of a web, providing the basic concepts and structures employed by all 
more particular views, including those ‘at the periphery’, that describe particular 
data.”242 It is not possible to confirm or disconfirm the ontological claims at the 
center of the web by experiential data. Because, for Richardson, there is no way 
of isolating that part of the web and submitting it to test. However, they are 
partly confirmed or disconfirmed; that is, these claims provide the basic concepts 
and structures for describing experiential data, and if they are successful, then 
they are partly and indirectly confirmed. Richardson says that there is not a sharp 
border that separates the claims of Nietzsche’s power ontology from experiential 
data; since they are subject to appraisal through experience. Hence, for 
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Richardson, there is “a continuum or range in generality, in how broadly, hence 
indirectly, they bear on experience.”243 This means, for him, that the claims of 
Nietzsche’s power ontology are empirical and hypothetical. However, 
Richardson claims, Nietzsche “knowingly” puts his ontological claims beyond 
the warrant of properly conceived and studied experience, hence they are “all the 
more hypothetical.” Furthermore, since Nietzsche’s thoughts are centered around 
these hypothetical ontological claims, he is still in line with previous 
metaphysical views. “Although he renounces the effort at a decisive, conceptual 
proof of these central claims, he still offers them as true in a sense . . . crucially 
continuous with the traditional one.”244 
 Richardson’s understanding of the will to power as an essence claim does 
not seem to be fair to Nietzsche’s understanding of the will to power and 
essence. As we know, Nietzsche claims that everything is will to power and 
everything is in a constant change. There is nothing stable and unchanging. Yet 
essence claims are about something unchanging and stable; i.e., about the 
essence of something. Then, Richardson’s claim is that Nietzsche’s doctrine of 
the will to power is about the unchanging essences of beings. If there is 
something unchanging, then it is not in the chaotic world of power quanta. This 
means that Nietzsche must be drawing the famous metaphysical distinction 
between the apparent and real world. However, this distinction is one of the main 
targets of Nietzsche’s attacks on metaphysics. As we will see in the following 
chapter, where Nietzsche’s perspectivism will be explained in detail, the 
rejection of this distinction is one of the main elements of his perspectivism. 
However, it is not only this distinction, on which Nietzsche’s rejection of the 
metaphysical conception of the essence is based. His rejection is directly related 
with perspectivism. According to Nietzsche, the essence of something is 
dynamically determined through the power struggle of power quanta. Every 
power quantum determines the essence of the others by evaluating and imposing 
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a meaning onto every other power quantum according to this evaluation. Hence, 
for Nietzsche,  
[t]he question “what is that?” is an imposition of meaning from 
some other viewpoint. “Essence,” the “essential nature,” is 
something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. 
At the bottom of it there always lies “what is that for me?” (for 
us, for all that lives, etc.) 
 A thing would be defined once all creatures had asked 
“what is that?” and had answered their question. Supposing one 
single creature, with its own relationships and perspectives for 
all things were missing, then the thing would not yet be 
“defined.”245 
 Therefore, it is not possible to ascribe Nietzsche a metaphysics based on 
the claim that his will to power is an essence claim. Furthermore, Richardson’s 
use of Quine’s metaphor of the web of beliefs for providing a base for his claim 
about the ontology of the will to power does not work. For this approach is not 
different from a metaphysical base in their being stable and unchanging. That is, 
this approach also dismisses the dynamic structure of the doctrine of the will to 
power. Everything is always in a constant change, there is nothing stable to use 
as a firm basis in Nietzsche’s doctrine. However, the metaphor of the web still 
presupposes a world in stable order. 
 Consequently, neither Heidegger’s, nor Richardson’s claims are 
convincing and strong enough to regard Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker. 
They both have missed something important about Nietzsche’s philosophy. His 
perspectivism is missed by these two great Nietzsche scholars. This is not the 
only similarity between them. Although they belong to different, if not directly 
opposite, traditions of philosophy, both Heidegger and Richardson follow the 
same route in their attempt to make Nietzsche a metaphysical thinker. First, of 
course, they both believe that Nietzsche is a metaphysician. Second, Heidegger 
and Richardson believe that being a metaphysician is good for Nietzsche. 
According to Heidegger, this makes Nietzsche a serious and genuine thinker 
whereas for Richardson it shows the greatness and richness of his thought. Third, 
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they both claim that metaphysics is ontology, that it speaks about the essence, or 
being, of things. Fourth one, related to the first, both Heidegger and Richardson, 
to reach their pre-established metaphysician Nietzsche projects, distort 
Nietzsche’s thoughts and ignore perspectivism, which one of the most crucial 
aspects of his thoughts.  
 One of the most interesting results of these similarities is that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is compatible with, or a representation of, the chaotic world of power 
quanta, and with his perspectivism. Most of the Nietzsche scholars accept the 
unsystematic, even, sometimes self-contradictory, character of his works. This 
unsystematic character of Nietzsche’s works is what makes them chaotic and 
very difficult to understand for those, who are used to think systematically as if 
the world has a systematic and static structure. Because Nietzsche thinks in terms 
of becoming; as he puts it, it is easier to think in terms of being than to think in 
terms of becoming: “The doctrine of being, of things, of all sorts of fixed unities 
is a hundred time easier than the doctrine of becoming, of development.”246 
Nietzsche’s works are chaotic and inextricably complicated for those thinkers 
who work within the traditional static concept of truth and the world. Nietzsche, 
instead of imposing the character of being upon the world of becoming, chooses 
the difficult way and tries to comprehend the world as it is, as a world of 
becoming. Therefore, it is not possible to comprehend, or understand, 
Nietzsche’s thought by traditional concepts; they are designed to express the 
world of being. As the structure of Nietzsche’s works is similar to that of the 
chaotic world of power quanta and, for him, this world is not knowable but 
interpretable, then his works are also interpretable; there is no one stable 
meaning hidden behind their unsystematic structure. That is, his works has as 
many meanings as the numbers of the interpreters. My point may become more 
clear if we consider his definition of perspectivism: “In so far as the word 
‘knowledge’ has any meaning, the world is knowable: but it is interpretable 
otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings.—
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Perspectivism.”247 Although this definition seems to be implying relativism, as 
we will see in the next chapter, perspectivism has nothing to do with 
relativism.248 Hence, as this quotation implies, Heidegger’s and Richardson’s 
claims are only interpretations. As Nietzsche asserts “[i]t is our needs that 
interpret the world,”249 it is Heidegger’s and Richardson’s needs that interpret 
Nietzsche’s works. They both interpret Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker, as 
their needs compel them to do so. At this point, the reason for their distortion of 
Nietzsche, ignoring of his perspectivism, and following the same route intersects 
and becomes clear. Although they have different philosophical backgrounds, 
they have reached the same conclusion by following similar routes, yet applying 
different methods of argumentation according to their philosophical 
backgrounds. They both have to present Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker for 
their philosophical concerns. Consequently, I maintain that neither Heidegger’s 
nor Richardson’s attempts are convincing enough to prove that Nietzsche is a 
metaphysical thinker. 
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In the preceding chapter, we have seen that Nietzsche presents us a world of 
ever-changing power quanta. This is a dynamic world, in which there is nothing 
stable. There is a continuous power struggle among these power quanta, and 
because of this struggle, everything is in a constant flux. To view the world as 
world of change is not a new idea; there are philosophers who see the world in 
which we live as the world of change. For example, Plato also views the world as 
the world of change; yet, for him, this world could not be the object of our 
knowledge. Plato puts another world against this changing world; namely the 
world of Ideas. This world is the real world and the world in which we live is 
false in the sense that the entities or individuals in this world are only imitations 
of the real entities in the world of ideas. For Plato, knowledge is that of the Ideas, 
hence the individuals in the world of change could not be the objects of our 
knowledge. Because, for him, knowledge must be universal and unchanging. 
Yet, universality could not come from the world of change; therefore, it must 
come from the world, in which there is no change. 
 However, Nietzsche rejects such a dualistic conception of the world and 
universal knowledge. For Nietzsche, there is no other world than this one, in 
which we live. If we have anything to do with the world, then we should do it 
without appealing to another metaphysical and true world. Then, our traditional 
concept of knowledge falls down. That is, if we have only a changing world, 
then there is no way to secure our beliefs or ideas about this world.  
 This elimination of the real world, or the rejection of the traditional 
distinction between the real and the apparent world, faces us with the question of 
attaining and securing knowledge. Here, Cartesian dualism seems to help us in 
securing our knowledge. However, Nietzsche also rejects the Cartesian 
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distinction between res cogitans and res extensa. That is, he rejects the Cartesian 
distinction between the knowing subject and the knowable object. Moreover, 
Nietzsche also rejects the Cartesian motto “cogito ergo sum,” by declaring the 
“phenomenality” of the self. That is, for Nietzsche, the self-awareness of the 
thinking subject, on which Descartes builds the edifice of knowledge, is as 
phenomenal as the awareness of the external world, which is rejected as the 
possibility of being a hallucination. 
 Nietzsche’s rejections are not limited only to apparent-real world, 
subject-object distinctions and the traditional conception of the self as the 
knowing or thinking subject. He also attacks other respected and reliable 
components of our cognitive paradigm, i.e., logic and causality. These rejections 
show us that Nietzsche is actually rejecting all of our trusted and honored 
cognitive tools and categories and our concept of truth, all of which presuppose a 
static and unchanging world order. Thus, our conception of knowledge and truth 
become susceptible on the face of these rejections.  
 However, by these rejections, Nietzsche does not claim that we cannot 
attain knowledge about the world in which we live. What he tries to do is that 
our conceptions of knowledge and truth are wrong or false on the ground that it 
assumes a static and unchanging world order and aims at universal and eternal 
truths, whereas there are no such things as stable world order and universal and 
eternal truths. Instead of these elemental assumptions of our cognitive paradigm, 
Nietzsche proposes a world, which is always changing and a notion of truth, 
which is always perspectival. In other words, instead of our traditional 
correspondence theory of truth, Nietzsche puts forward a perspectival theory of 
knowledge, namely “Perspectivism.”  
 Simply put, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is the claim that what we call true 
is a perspectival interpretation; accordingly, there is no absolute truth. There may 
be other simple definitions for the concept, yet this definition, in my opinion, is 
what Nietzsche really means by perspectivism, of course, in its simplest form. 
The idea of perspectivism is the core of Nietzsche’s epistemology and his denial 
of truth. Hence, it may not be wrong to call his epistemology as perspectival 
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epistemology, as Ruediger H. Grimm, Steven D. Hales and Rex Welshon did.250 
This epistemology is mainly based on Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, 
which portrays the world not as the world of being, but becoming. 
 Let us, now, explore Nietzsche’s perspectivism through his rejections of 
the elemental categories and assumptions of our cognitive paradigm. However, 
before going to into the details of these rejections, I want to briefly present 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism in relation with his notion of the world as becoming 
and interpretation. 
3.1 The World as Becoming 
Nietzsche considers the world as becoming and rejects the traditional 
metaphysical conception of reality as consisting of changeless beings. As his 
doctrine of the will to power suggests, the world is not a stable and unchanging 
unity, rather it is in a constant flux, resulting from the power struggles of the 
quanta of power, which are simply wills to power. In short, Nietzsche replaces 
the “world of being” of the traditional Western metaphysics with the “world of 
becoming.” This replacement leads to the core of his epistemology, namely 
perspectivism.  
 According to Nietzsche, the concept of being and the stable world are 
nothing but illusions. Because, in the world of power quanta, which is constantly 
in the process of becoming, there is no being, and to suppose that there are 
unchanging beings, or to regard the world as an ordered and stable unity, is 
nothing but an illusion created by us to preserve ourselves in this chaotic world. 
“[I]n a world there is no being,” says Nietzsche, “a certain calculable world of 
identical cases first be created by illusion: a tempo in which observation and 
comparison are possible, etc.”251 That is, in order to prosper, we as humans have 
imposed such a world order on the chaotic world of power quanta: “Because we 
have to stable in our beliefs if we are to prosper, we have made the ‘real’ world a 
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world not of change and becoming, but one of being.”252 After this imposition, 
the world had become knowable and predictable for us; the world of chaos had 
become a world of order with laws attainable by us. In other words, it becomes 
easier for us to live in this world of becoming; as Nietzsche puts it “[t]he 
doctrine of being, of things, of all sorts of fixed unities is a hundred times easier 
than the doctrine of becoming, of development.”253 Furthermore, since this 
illusory world representation is proven to be successful in maintaining our 
existence, we regard it as the real world; that is, the fiction that we created at the 
end becomes real or a reality for us. Hence, the conception of the world as an 
ordered and stable place to live in safely, which is calculable and formulatable 
for us, is an illusory world; this is “a trimmed and simplified world on which our 
practical instincts have worked,” and “[i]t suits us perfectly: we live in it, we can 
live in it—proof of its truth for us.”254 Let us examine the dynamic structure of 
the Nietzschean world of becoming, to see why our conception of the stable 
world is an illusion for Nietzsche. 
 As we know, the world, for Nietzsche, is will to power; everything that 
exists is either a quantum or a quanta of will to power. These power quanta are 
constantly in a struggle with each other for gaining more power. In order to 
extend their power collectively, they may constitute power constellations, in 
which, while they strive for furthering their power individually, they also strive 
for furthering the power of the constellation as a whole. Although these power 
constellations can be regarded as a unity of power quanta, this unity is not a 
homogenous one. Because every quantum of power still searches after gaining 
more power in and through this unity. In other words, although they constitute a 
unity for increasing their power collectively, every power quantum struggles 
with every other quantum for gaining more power. This constant lust for power 
is what they are; that is, these power quanta are primordially will to power. 
Hence, the world is constructed out of such dynamic power quanta, which are 
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connected in relation of power struggle. Every power quantum is determined 
through this power struggle. “Every quantum of power is designated by the 
effect it produces and that which it resists.”255  
 Thus, the constellations of these power quanta are not homogenous; a 
power constellation, as a unity of power quanta, is an organization similar to a 
human community or a political federation. “All unity is unity only as 
organization and co-operation—just as a human community is a unity—as 
opposed to an atomistic anarchy, as a pattern of domination that signifies a unity 
but it is not a unity.”256 Furthermore, a quantum of power or a constellation 
could increase its power only at the expense of others; it increases its power by 
assimilating, dominating and appropriating others. However, this does not mean 
that assimilated or incorporated power quantum ceases to exist; it is still a power 
quantum, and still searches for the ways to increase its power. Yet, in this 
encounter, both power centers change; their power increases or decreases. “It is a 
question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new 
arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of 
them . . . the essential thing is that the factions in struggle emerge with different 
quanta of power.”257 The power struggle among the power centers does not stop 
at some level of power configuration; there is no point of equilibrium. The 
struggle continues forever. This struggle gives the world a dynamic character. 
The world or reality constructed out of such power centers is in a constant flux; 
hence, the world is not a world of being, but of becoming. 
 In this dynamic world of power centers, every power quantum is 
determined by its relations with every other quantum of power. Therefore, each 
one of these power quanta is experienced by every other differently; i.e., a power 
quantum may appear to be more powerful for one power quanta while for 
another one it appears to be weak. Hence, there is no a constant and unchanging 
reality which is experienced as the same by every power center. That is, every 
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power center experiences the world differently in relation to its degree of power; 
since there is a constant struggle for power among these power centers, the world 
constantly changes, which means that the relations among power centers also 
change, and as we know that a power center is determined through its relations 
with every other power center, it changes, too. For Nietzsche, the reality is the 
totality of the actions and reactions of individual power centers on every other 
center in their struggle for power; “the ‘world’ is only a word for the totality of 
these actions. Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction of 
every individual part toward the whole.”258  
 According to Nietzsche, what we say about this ever-changing and 
dynamic world is necessarily false; that is, “The character of the world in a state 
of becoming as incapable of formulation, as ‘false,’ as ‘self-contradictory.’”259 
What we say or think about the world immediately becomes false, since there is 
no stable order in the world to allow us to adequately comprehend and articulate 
the way in which it is. We do not have any adequate means of expression or 
conceptual scheme to comprehend and express this world of constant change. 
Hence, our knowledge of the world is necessarily “false,” not in the sense that 
there is a stable and unchanging world as the object of our knowledge and we 
have failed to comprehend it. Rather, it is in the sense that what we say or think 
about the world presupposes a true world, which is stable and unchanging, and 
this presupposition falsifies the world of becoming. What we as power centers do 
is to impose a regularity and order upon this chaotic world of becoming in order 
to increase our power. “Not ‘to know’ but to schematize—to impose upon chaos 
as much regularity and form as our practical needs require.”260 
 The world or reality is not something changeless, and it is not a stable 
and ordered unity; it is a chaos, created by the struggles of power centers. Every 
power center tries to construct a world beneficial for its well-being out of this 
chaotic world, and since every power center is different from each other, every 
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one of them experiences the world differently; hence, their construction of the 
world also differs from others. In short, every power center interprets the world 
from the perspective in which it can increase its power by dominating or 
assimilating others. Through interpretation, power centers construct a world, in 
which they could increase their power by dominating and assimilating the others. 
Actually, as Nietzsche says “interpretation is itself a means of becoming master 
of something.”261 The concept of interpretation is another important constituent 
of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, let us, now, explore it. 
3.2 Interpretation 
As we see, for Nietzsche, our conception of the world, in which we could 
manage to survive, is an illusion created by us; it is our interpretation of the 
fluxing and chaotic world. The static and ordered notion of the world is nothing 
but an interpretation made by us from the perspective of preserving and 
increasing our power. Actually, to create a stable and calculable world is a vital 
necessity for organisms. “In order for a particular species to maintain itself and 
increase its power, its conception of reality must comprehend enough of the 
calculable and constant for it to base a scheme of behaviour on it.”262 In this 
sense, interpretation becomes a way of mastering others. That is, as highly 
complex forms of will to power, or power center, we human beings arrange and 
organize the world according to the requirements of increasing our power. 
Hence, as Nietzsche says, “[i]t is our needs that interpret the world.”263 However, 
ignoring this fact, we treat this illusion as the reality, or the state in which the 
world is. We base all of our beliefs and values on this illusory world conception, 
insofar as it works, or satisfy our needs, which are the products of our striving 
for more power. Nietzsche’s perspectivism aims at showing us the illusory 
character of our conception of the world and destructing our cognitive and 
axiological paradigms grounded on this illusion.  
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 As this illusory conception of the world facilitates our survival and 
prosperity, it becomes real for us. We try to understand and comprehend this 
world, ignoring, even forgetting, its illusory or interpretative character. Our 
cognitive apparatus operates within the limits of this world. Hence, our 
knowledge and beliefs are about this limited and illusory world. Everything that 
we regard as true is nothing but an illusion in the sense that it is valued according 
to an illusory world. In other words, our knowledge claims are verified with 
regard to the facts of this illusory world; the claims about this illusory world are 
verified by applying again to the facts of this world. This is what Nietzsche 
means when he says the following: “Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but 
what he himself has imported into them: the finding is called science, the 
importing—art, religion, love, pride.”264 Thus, we create an illusory reality out of 
a chaotic world by interpreting it from the perspective of our survival and 
prosperity. Yet, we also cast the facts of this illusory world, which are also 
interpretations, as our criterion of truth. This makes our conception of truth, 
which designates truth as universal and valid in all cases, becomes questionable. 
For this conception of truth is based on an interpretation which, denying the 
ever-changing character of the world, designates a well-ordered and stable world.  
Nietzsche, on this basis, denies truth:  
The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a 
fact but a fable and approximation on the basis of a meager 
sum of observations; it is “in flux,” as something in a state of 
becoming, as falsehood always changing but never getting near 
the truth: for—there is no “truth.”265 
 Nietzsche’s denial of the stable world order and the conception of truth 
based on this order are found on his doctrine of the will to power. Instead of our 
traditional conception of the world as the world of being, Nietzsche offers a 
chaotic world of power quanta, in which process of becoming continues. This 
conception of the world undermines our traditional conception of truth as 
correspondence to facts. That is, in the world of becoming, truth as 
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correspondence does not work, as there is nothing stable in this world for any 
claim or statement to correspond. Therefore, there is no truth; all our truths are 
false and illusory. This means that we require another conception and criterion of 
truth. We will discuss Nietzsche’s notion and denial of truth later, but, for now, 
we can say that as the world is in a state of flux and continuously changing, all of 
our ideas, beliefs, values, etc., are only interpretations of this world, hence their 
truth depends on their contribution to increase our power. That is, if any belief or 
idea enhances my power it is true, otherwise, if it decreases my power, it is false.  
 Well, for Nietzsche the world is an interpretation, yet what does 
Nietzsche mean by interpretation? To what kind of a process does Nietzsche 
refer, when he speaks of interpretation? Let us now focus on the nature of the 
process of interpretation.  
 In its everyday use, the term implies an intellectual or armchair activity. 
However, as we know that, for Nietzsche, everything is will to power and every 
power center tries to increase its power, even at the expense of its life. Therefore, 
Nietzsche’s notion of interpretation could not be a passive process as in the case 
of interpreting books, works of art, etc. Grimm gives us a clue for understanding 
interpretation, in Nietzsche’s sense, by saying that “. . . interpretative process is 
not an ‘armchair adventure,’ nor is it ‘merely’ imaginative. It is to be taken as a 
literal structuring and ordering of the world on the part of the individual.”266 
Then, the interpretation is the process, in which a power center, as a will to 
power, actively shapes, arranges, assimilates and determines the world to create 
the conditions of its preservation and enhancement.  
 The interpretative process is not something peculiar to man; every 
organism, from the most simple to the most complex, interprets the world; “[t]he 
organic process constantly presupposes interpretations.”267 Every organic being 
interprets its neighborhood or surroundings to increase its power, and all its 
organic functions are directed to this end. As we saw earlier, in our discussion of 
Darwinism, Nietzsche sees the construction of an organ not as a question of 
                                               
266 Grimm, p. 70. 
267 WP, §643, p. 342. 
 
99 
adaptation but of interpretation.  That is, an organ is constructed not for helping 
the organism in its adaptation to the environing conditions, but for helping it in 
interpreting those conditions and enhancing its power through interpretation. 
Hence, for Nietzsche, an amoeba’s extends pseudopodia* for increasing its power 
by interpreting its environment. “The will to power can manifest itself only 
against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it—this is the primeval 
tendency of the protoplasm when it extends pseudopodia and feels about.”268 
With pseudopodia, an amoeba interprets and structures its environment; it 
structures its world by distinguishing the edible from inedible entities, or 
organisms.269 Thus, the organic process, in a sense, is a process of interpretation. 
In other words, interpretation is of vital importance for life. As Nietzsche’s 
above quoted note suggests, the organic process maintains itself by continuously 
interpreting its environment.  
 Every interpretation, as a power struggle, results in an increase or 
decrease of power on the part of the power centers, involved in the process. This 
increase or decrease of power implies a change in the environment. That is, 
through the process of interpretation, both the interpreter and the interpreted 
change; one gets more powerful and the other gets weaker. As a result of these 
changes in their degree of power, both parties interpret each other differently; 
their valuations concerning each other changes; hence, a new interpretation is 
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required. Nietzsche explains this circularity of interpretation as follows; “all 
events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing 
and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through 
which any previous ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ are necessarily obscured or even 
obliterated.”270  
 Our usual understanding of the concept suggests that if there is an 
interpretation, then there must be an interpreter. However, Nietzsche rejects the 
notion of an interpreter behind interpretation. Because, for him, this leads us to 
the subject-object distinction.  As we know he rejects the distinction between the 
doer and the deed; there is no a separate entity as the agent of a deed. For him, a 
thing or an entity is totality of what it does, and every existing entity, whether 
organic or inorganic, is will to power; hence, it is the will to power that 
interprets. In other words, interpretation is a form of the will to power: “One may 
not ask: ‘who then interprets?’ for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to 
power, exists (but not as a ‘being’ but as a process, a becoming) as an affect.”271 
Moreover, after such a separation there remains nothing in the world. That is, for 
Nietzsche, everything exists through its activities and relations, and if we think it 
as an entity independent of these activities and relations there remains nothing 
but a fiction: “If I remove all the relationships, all the ‘properties,’ all the 
‘activities,’ of a thing, the thing does not remain over.”272 Therefore, one cannot 
separate doer from the deed, or vice versa.  
 Other than the above presented problems, placing an interpreter behind 
the interpretation leads to understanding Nietzsche’s concept of interpretation as 
a subjective valuation. That is, to contemplate that the world is composed of 
subjects that interprets and the objects that are interpreted, and to understand 
Nietzsche’s concept of interpretation through this world picture may lead one to 
the conclusion that by interpretation Nietzsche means that “everything is 
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subjective.” However, Nietzsche is strongly opposed to such a conclusion, and 
regards it as an interpretation, of course in his own sense.  
“Everything subjective” you say; but even this is interpretation. 
The “subject” is not something given, it is something added 
and invented and projected behind what there is.—Finally, is it 
necessary to posit an interpreter behind the interpretation? 
Even this is invention, hypothesis.273 
 To interpret is to create a reality, in which the organism manages to 
preserve itself and increase its power, out of the chaotic world; it is the process 
of simplifying that chaos. Through interpretation, a power center imposes 
meaning over this chaotic reality. However, imposition of meaning does not 
amount to explaining or attaining knowledge of the reality: “‘Interpretation,’ the 
introduction of meaning—‘not explanation’ (in most cases a new interpretation 
over an old interpretation that has become incomprehensible, that is now itself 
only a sign).”274 The meanings imposed by power centers are fictions, which 
make the world a stable and ordered unity. However, these fictions have nothing 
to do with the chaotic reality in which every power center struggles for power 
with every other center. That is, they create an illusory reality for themselves to 
increase their power. These illusory fictions, as far as they contribute to the 
welfare of the power center, become indispensable for it.  
 According to Nietzsche, most of our beliefs are such fictions or 
falsifications. For example, our belief in causality, subject-object distinction, 
moral values, etc., are such useful fictions, whose utility for us in maintaining 
ourselves and in increasing our power proved. The truth of these beliefs is 
dependent on their utility, not on their correspondence to the reality; if believing 
and constructing our life on them contributes to enhance our power, they are 
true, otherwise they are not. When their utility is proven, our beliefs, although 
they are false or illusions in the sense that they do not correspond to the world or 
reality, become indispensable truths for us. Nietzsche emphasizes the 
indispensability of these fictions when he says that “[t]ruth is the kind of error 
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without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is 
ultimately decisive.”275 
 In sum, interpretation is a continuous process, in which a power center 
tries to organize, assimilate its environment to increase and preserve its power. It 
is a form of will to power, a form in which will to power exerts itself over other 
power centers, therefore it is not something, whose agent is a power center. A 
power center is just this process of interpretation. Through interpretation, a 
power center creates a world beneficial for its prosperity and for the 
enhancement of its power out of a chaotic world of becoming. Hence, in this 
sense, the process of interpretation is the process, in which a well-ordered and 
stable world is illusorily constructed out of the world of becoming by shaping, 
arranging and ordering this chaotic world. Furthermore, if, or when, these 
illusions are proven to be successful in enhancing life and power of interpreting 
power centers, then they become an indispensable part of their life.  
 The construction of the world as becoming and the concept of 
interpretation are keys for better understanding of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. 
There is a strong relation between the world of becoming and concept of 
interpretation. Breaking the traditional conception of the world through 
becoming, Nietzsche makes room for his notion interpretation, which leads to his 
epistemological standpoint, namely perspectivism. Let us, now, try to explore his 
notion perspectivism with these keys in our hands. 
3.3 Perspectivism 
Perspectivism is Nietzsche’s alternative to our traditional concept of 
epistemology. He tries to develop a new understanding of epistemology based on 
his doctrine of the will to power and interpretation. He mentions perspectivism 
as one of his fundamental innovations, and explains this innovation by saying 
“[i]n place of ‘epistemology,’ a perspective theory of affects.”276 Actually, it is 
not so easy to decide whether Nietzsche’s perspectivism is an alternative to our 
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cognitive paradigm or it is an explanation of the way, in which our cognitive 
paradigm is constructed. Because, his criticisms of the most honored and trusted 
assumptions and concepts of our traditional epistemological paradigm seem to be 
aimed at showing their perspectival and interpretative characters. In other words, 
perspectivism could be seen as an alternative way to evaluate our cognitive 
paradigm by showing its hidden origin; i.e., by showing its denial of the ever-
changing character of reality. This uncovering of the veil of the hidden roots of 
our cognitive paradigm also amounts to destroying that paradigm. As at its origin 
this paradigm rejects the notion of the ever-changing reality, which is, for 
Nietzsche, the actual state of the reality, all of its honored and trusted concepts, 
assumptions and truths are illusions; they have nothing to do with the actual 
world. Hence, in this sense, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is both an alternative to 
our cognitive paradigm277 and an explanation of its origin. Let us now have a 
closer look at Nietzsche’s perspectivism under the light of this dual character of 
perspectivism. 
 By the doctrine of perspectivism, Nietzsche aims at destroying our 
cognitive paradigm, based on a stable and knowable world order, which includes 
such traditional concepts and distinctions as subject and object, apparent and real 
world, causality, thing-in-itself, logic, etc. Nietzsche always rejected these 
concepts and distinctions of the traditional Western metaphysics. Perspectivism, 
thus, is Nietzsche’s attempt to destroy this metaphysics by undermining its 
epistemological and ontological foundations. However, there is no clear 
definition or explanation of perspectivism in Nietzsche’s neither published nor 
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unpublished books and notes. Besides, there are only a few occurrences of the 
word perspectivism. The most clear definition of perspectivism is the well 
known passage from Genealogy of Morals: 
[L]et us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual 
fiction that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless 
knowing subject”; let us guard against the snares of such 
contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” “absolute spirituality,” 
“knowledge in itself”: these always demand that we should 
think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in 
no particular direction, in which the active interpreting forces, 
through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are 
supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an 
absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, 
only a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to 
speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can 
use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” 
of this thing, our “objectivity,” be. But to eliminate the will 
together, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were 
capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate the 
intellect?278 
 As these words make it clear, Nietzsche accuses of traditional Western 
epistemological paradigm of adopting a God’s eye perspective towards the 
world. It tries to understand the world through a static perspective, which 
includes the denial of the active perspective setting and interpreting forces, i.e., 
will to power. To adopt such a perspective toward the world, for Nietzsche, is 
absurdity and nonsense, because it requires a knowing subject, which is so pure 
that there is no inherent aim in its cognitive efforts to know or to understand the 
world. The subject of knowledge, thus purified from all aims, wills, pains, etc., 
looks toward the world with an eye like that of God, to whom the world is in a 
determined order. For Nietzsche, both such a subject and a world is nonsense, 
because both of them are will to power, which has an essential aim of increasing 
its power. In other words, the knowing subject, as will to power or power center, 
actively interprets the world from the perspective of its own growth, and the 
world is a chaos consisting of such power centers, and as such it is always in a 
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constant flux. Therefore, every power center sees and knows the world through 
its perspective.  
 Actually, for a power center the world is nothing but the totality of the 
interpretations made by it through its perspective adopted towards the every 
other power center. “Every center of force adopts a perspective toward the entire 
remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of 
resistance.”279 For Nietzsche, as we saw earlier, the world and reality are nothing 
but the totality of these perspectives, or valuations, actions, resistance, etc. 
Because of this, Nietzsche claims that we could have only a perspectival 
knowledge about a thing. That is, when we ask the question “what is that?” we 
are actually asking the question “what is that for me?” Because, as Nietzsche 
puts it, before a thing or a fact have become the object of the question “what is 
that?” “[t]here are no ‘facts-in-themselves,’ for a sense must always be projected 
into them before there can be ‘facts.’”280 Only then, a thing or a fact appears for 
us as a thing or a fact, which could bear a meaning for us. In other words, 
somehow, a thing, a fact, etc., must become a something for us to question its 
meaning; in short, it must be something affecting us in our struggle for power. 
What we actually do when we ask “what is that?” is that we are interpreting it 
from our perspective of increasing our power; what it could be for me in my 
struggle for power, or how it could affect my struggle. Thus, our initial question 
becomes ‘what is that for me?’; or as Nietzsche says “[a]t bottom of it there 
always lies ‘what is that for me?’ (for us, for all that lives, etc.)”281 Since that 
fact or something we are questioning is also a will to power, or a power center, 
as we are, it too questions us through the same perspectival interpretation 
process. Hence, the world is nothing but the totality of these interpretations; it is 
determined by the perspectival interpretations of each power center adopted 
towards the entire remainder. Then, a thing is also the totality of the 
interpretations made by all other power centers through their own perspective 
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about it. Nietzsche says that “[a] thing would be defined once all creatures had 
asked ‘what is that?’ and had answered their question. Supposing one single 
creature, with its own relationships and perspectives for all things, were missing, 
then the thing would not yet be ‘defined.’”282 Therefore, the world is the product 
of actively interpreting power centers, which are interconnected with each other 
by the power struggle. In such a world, every power center determines and is 
determined by every other power center. However, since in their struggle for 
power, they continuously change, i.e., one’s power may increase or decrease 
through this struggle, interpretations and perspectives also change. That is, every 
change in the degree of power of a power center results in a change in its 
perspective towards the remainder of the world, which requires new 
interpretations. Since the world is a limited amount of force, and any power 
increase can occur at the expense of others’ power, any change affects the 
relations among all power centers, which brings the character of constant flux 
into the world. Thus, the world and our perspectival interpretations concerning it 
are always changing, and neither the world nor our interpretations can be true in 
the sense that there is a correspondence between the two.  
 According to Nietzsche, every increase of power is an overcoming of 
narrower interpretations, and this overcoming enlarges the perspective or the 
horizon of the power centers. If an interpretation of the world is proven to be 
successful, then the power of the interpreting power center increases; actually, 
this increase is the condition of the success of the interpretation. This increase 
changes the perspective, or viewpoint, of the power center, and from its new 
perspective it interprets the world again. This new interpretation is more 
comprehensive than the previous one; it overcomes the older and narrower 
interpretation, and opens up new perspectives and horizons. Every power 
increase brings such a re-interpretation of the world and the overcoming of old 
interpretations. Nietzsche presents this interpretation process as the idea which 
permeates his writings: “every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of 
narrower interpretations . . . every strengthening and increase of power opens up 
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new perspectives and means believing in new horizons—this idea permeates my 
writings.”283  
 Consequently, the stable and changeless conception of the world, on 
which the Western metaphysics and epistemology depends, is only an 
interpretation made from the perspective of preservation and enhancement. This 
perspectival interpretation falsifies the world; that is, it creates a fictitious world 
by imposing an order upon the chaotic world of power quanta. Because of its 
utility and success in preservation and enhancement of mankind, this 
interpretation of the world has become an unchanging and universal truth. Upon 
this truth other useful falsifications are constructed, i.e., logic, causality, subject-
object and apparent-real world distinctions. According to Nietzsche, these are 
only perspectival interpretations, or falsifications, of the world, and nothing else. 
To make Nietzsche’s point more clear, I will briefly examine his attacks on these 
subsequent falsifications. However, before proceeding on these falsifications, I 
will analyze the relation between Nietzsche’s perspectivism and relativism. 
Because, if perspectivism is accepted as a version of relativism, then the 
Nietzschean claim that the concepts and distinctions, on which the Western 
epistemological paradigm is depended, are only perspectival falsifications 
becomes meaningless. 
3.4 Nietzsche’s Perspectivism and Relativism 
Perspectivism, at first sight, gives the impression of relativism. However, this 
impression changes as soon as we take into consideration some of the main 
claims of Nietzsche’s perspectivism; i.e., his denial of objective reality, truth as 
correspondence, subject-object distinction, etc.  
 It should be noted that Nietzsche’s view is not that there is an objective 
reality or world, and every power center sees or knows this reality from its own 
perspective. This would amount to relativism, which is simply the view that a 
belief or a judgment about the world may be true for an individual or a group 
while it is false for some other individuals or groups. Nietzsche is aware of the 
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danger of the possibility of confusing his perspectivism with relativism. Hence, 
he plainly draws the difference between his perspectivism and relativism in the 
following passage, where he discusses the perspectival character of the apparent 
world: “The perspective therefore decides the character of ‘appearance’! As if a 
world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective! By doing that 
one would deduct relativity.”284 It seems very clear that Nietzsche regards his 
perspectivism as different from the relativism. Yet, this quoted passage may not 
be sufficient to ensure that perspectivism is not a kind of relativism; therefore, 
we should investigate and present the differences between them. 
 Relativist position holds that there is an objective reality and our 
judgments are about this reality, and our judgments about it may be different, 
even conflicting, because of the differences in our cultural, psychological, social, 
and even genetic backgrounds; hence all of these different judgments are equally 
true. That is, for relativistic position, there is an objective reality out there and 
we know or see that reality from our point of view. Yet, there is also an absolute 
viewpoint from which that reality could be seen as it is, as independent of all the 
viewpoints of the subjects. This absolute viewpoint is not attainable, because if it 
were attainable, then the relativistic claim would fail. In other words, if that point 
is attainable then we have a criterion for evaluating the truth-value of the 
judgments; i.e., we have criterion for saying that a judgment is true or false 
compared with the judgment made from that absolute viewpoint. Therefore, 
relativistic position depends on the beliefs that there is an objective reality and 
that there is an absolute viewpoint, although it is unattainable, from which this 
reality could be known.285 
 This unattainable, yet, at least, imaginarily existing, point makes the 
relativist claim that all judgments are relatively true; i.e., true from the standpoint 
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of the subject making that judgment about the objective reality.  Hence, for 
relativism, all of our judgments are always equal; they are relatively true, 
compared with the judgment made from the absolute viewpoint. Relativism does 
not make a differentiation, or gradation, among our judgments; none of our 
judgments has a privileged status. However, for Nietzsche, some interpretations, 
which diminish or deny life, i.e., the Christian interpretation of the world, are 
bad and some others, which enhances and affirms life, i.e., his own 
perspectivism, are good. This is one of the two crucial differences that Babich 
sees between relativism and Nietzsche’s perspectivism. She puts this difference 
in the following way: 
Rather than the perspectival claim that there is no truth, which 
given perspectivalist standard always entails that some non-
truths (interpretations) are better than others (art, illusion, 
deception, and delusion), the implicit claim of relativism is that 
there is a truth above all positions to which no particular 
position has any privileged claim.286 
 However, in Nietzsche’s perspectivism, there is no objective reality; i.e., 
there are no static entities or events in the world, on which we may have 
conflicting or differing judgments. As the agent of the judgment, the subject 
continuously interprets every entity in its environment; the subject is also 
interpreted by those, which it interprets.  This continuous process of 
interpretation brings a continuous change on the both sides of the process: that is, 
in the process of interpretation both the interpreter and the interpreted are in a 
state of continuous change. It is this constant change that results in the conflicts 
and differences among the judgments of different individuals or groups. In other 
words, it is not the different cultural backgrounds of the interpreters that cause 
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the differences among their judgments about the world, yet it is constant change 
that occurs on the parts of both the judge and the judged. 
 The second crucial point of difference between the relativism and 
perspectivism of Nietzsche is the irrationalism in his declaration that there are no 
facts but only interpretations: “facts is precisely what there is not, only 
interpretations.”287 This declaration leads to a self-contradiction on the part of 
Nietzsche; if there is no fact then is it a fact that there is no fact? Or, in the most 
known version of this self-contradiction, if there is no truth then this denial of 
truth is either true, in which case there is at least one truth that ‘there is no truth’, 
and this leads a deadly self-contradiction, or false, in which case there is nothing 
special about the claim to take it seriously. Then, the truth of Nietzsche’s claim 
implies, at the same time, its falseness; as soon as it is accepted as true, it 
becomes false. This self-contradiction is the very point on which most of the 
criticisms of Nietzsche’s perspectivism is based.288 However, Nietzsche is well 
aware of this contradiction, and he happily accepts and affirms this self-
contradiction.  
The wisest man would be the one richest in contradictions, who 
has, as it were, antennae for all types of men—as well as his 
great moments of grand harmony—a rare accident even in 
us!289  
The subjective compulsion no to contradict here is a biological 
compulsion  . . . Not being able to contradict is proof of an 
incapacity, not for “truth.”290 
We are unable to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: 
this is a subjective empirical law, not the expression of any 
“necessity” but only of an inability.291 
 Contradiction, actually, means being in conflict, or rejecting the 
traditional and other established ways of thinking. Behind Nietzsche’s praising 
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of contradiction, there lies his rejection of rational, logical thought. Contradiction 
is a deficiency for those who assume a stable and unchanging world order. On 
the other hand, for those who contemplate the world as a chaos it is a virtue and 
richness of thought. Therefore, Nietzsche’s claim that “there is no fact but only 
interpretations” or that “there is no truth” is a deficient, or a bad and ill-
constituted way of thinking for those who clings to rational, or logical, thought 
as the correct way of thinking. However, Nietzsche rejects logic and logical 
thought, as they presuppose a static and well-ordered reality. Moreover, 
Nietzsche’s denial of truth and the truth of this denial seem to be consistent with 
each other. Nietzsche denies the existence of absolute and unchanging truths; 
yet, if we remember his criterion of truth, we can speak of truths as long as they 
increase our power. If any belief, accepted as true, starts to decrease our power it 
becomes false; or any belief increasing my power is true for me, whereas, at the 
same time, for another individual that belief, decreasing his or her power, may be 
false. In short, as Nietzsche’s criterion for truth does not include the principle of 
non-contradiction, to judge his perspectivism and his denial truth in terms of that 
principle is not a good way of evaluation. Because, for example, a statement or a 
belief, according to Nietzsche’s criterion of truth, may be both true and false at 
the same time for different individuals, even, it may also be true at one time and 
false at another time for the same individual. Therefore, the claim that 
Nietzsche’s denial of truth is a self-contradiction does not diminish its 
significance and importance.  
 On the other hand, relativism assumes rational thought; that is, the 
relativist position believes that there is an objective reality out there, and this 
reality could be known from an absolute point. This absolute point is not 
attainable, or achievable by individuals, yet this secures the existence of truth in 
the correspondence sense. In other words, relativism does not deny the existence 
of an well-ordered and unchanging world, and believes that, at least in principle, 
this world could be seen and known as it is from a point of view that does not 
intervened by the human conditions of existence, i.e., cultural backgrounds, 
desires, etc. Hence, relativism, in opposition to perspectivism, designates a 
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rational world-view, in which truth, at least in principle, could be attainable. Yet, 
these differences do not prevent some scholars to accuse Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism as being a relativist view. One of the interesting claims of 
relativism concerning Nietzsche’s perspectivism comes from Peter Poellner. 
 Poellner claims that because of the doctrine of the will to power 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism could not escape from the charge of being a version of 
relativism. Poellner’s claim does not seem to be based on a good analysis of the 
doctrine of the will to power. According to him, Nietzsche appeals to the 
doctrine of the will to power for analyzing the objective reality. This analysis, for 
Poellner, is based on “the representational contents and the interests (desires, 
values) of ‘subjects.’”292 Yet, this understanding of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the 
will to power is unacceptable. Because Nietzsche is against the notion of the 
objective reality and the notion of a knowing subject; we will see the details of 
his rejection of these two notions in the remainder of this chapter. Poellner, 
taking Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power as proposing an objective reality 
and a knowing subject, goes on to say that there may be subjects of knowledge 
with different interests, who experience the objective world so different from 
each other that everyone of them lives in different worlds. In other words, for 
Poellner, Nietzsche’s doctrine allows us to say that every individual, having 
different interests, experiences the world differently from every other individual 
so that we may say that every individual lives in a unique world of his own. 
Therefore, according to Poellner, some judgments concerning the objective 
reality might be true for some such subjects yet false for others. However, 
Poellner avers that the individual, to whom we refer when we speak of 
relativism, is the human subject of everyday discourse. That is, by the term 
individual we refer to independent subjects that experience the world as we 
experience it; i.e., as affected by the same spatio-temporal objects in a similar 
way, in which we are affected. This definition of the individual, for Poellner, 
prevents us from saying that most of the judgments concerning objective reality 
may be true for some individuals and false for some others. This means that our 
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judgments about the objective world have the same truth-values insofar as we are 
ordinary, or normal, human beings. Thus, for Poellner, even if we accept 
Nietzsche’s construction of the world as will to power, the situation does not 
change concerning our judgments about the objective world. “If and in so far as 
this is what we mean by ‘individual’, it is obviously not the case, even on 
Nietzschean premises, that ‘many judgments about objective reality may be true 
for one individual and false for another.’”293 Hence concerning the objective 
reality there could not arise relativism, even if it is constructed out of Nietzsche’s 
will to power. Accepting this conclusion, Poellner changes the direction of his 
questioning about the relativism inherent in Nietzsche’s perspectivism, and starts 
to question Nietzsche’s construction of the subject of perspectivism.  
 As we have seen, relativism about the objective world is dismissed by 
Poellner, on the condition that individuals are normal human beings and there is 
an objective reality out there independent of the judging individuals, even if this 
reality is constructed out of dynamic power quanta. However, when we turn to 
Nietzsche’s construction of the subject and his explanations of subject’s 
operations, there arises certain problems: either Nietzsche’s perspectivism is a 
kind of relativism or what he claims through perspectivism is false. If 
perspectivism is true, then Nietzsche’s explanation of how individuals perceive 
the world, or how their perspectival construction of the world take place, may be 
false for them from their own perspective. In Poellner’s words, Nietzsche’s “own 
construal of the modus operandi of those other subjects may actually be false 
from their point of view or perspective.”294 Actually, for Poellner, it is 
impossible for a subject, who has the degree of self-awareness required for 
expressing this awareness in clear judgments, to accept Nietzsche’s analysis of 
his or her perception and construction of the world from his or her own 
perspective unless the subject in question alters his or her character so that 
Nietzsche’s analysis appears to be true. However, even if this is the case, i.e., 
Nietzsche’s analysis is true, Poellner claims, it is not a clear explanation. For 
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Poellner, because Nietzsche’s explanation depends upon the subjective and 
inaccessible states, what Nietzsche says about those states is only a mystical 
fable. That is, as these states are subjective and inaccessible, therefore they 
cannot be further analyzed in behaviorist and physicalist terms. Consequently, “it 
is simply mysterious what could be meant by saying that these perspectival 
states, qua perspectival states, have a certain specific character without this 
character being recognizable from within the perspective in question.”295 From 
this argumentation, Poellner concludes that either Nietzsche’s explanation of the 
perspectives of other subjects is relatively true or it is false. That is, the only 
possibility for saving Nietzsche’s perspectivism from falling into the relativism 
is to claim that perspectivism is false. 
 However, as I have stated above, Poellner’s argument is completely 
dependent on a misleading analysis of Nietzsche’s construction of the world as 
will to power. Poellner’s claim is based on a distinction between the object and 
the subject. Yet, Nietzsche ceaselessly rejects this distinction, and claims that 
everything is will to power. Actually, Poellner is well aware of this fact, yet this 
awareness does not prevent his consciously ignoring it by claiming that 
Nietzsche’s application of the perspectivism to the subjective states is wrong. He 
says  
it is one thing to maintain that what counts as a real object is 
dependent on the interest and values of the subject(s) to whom 
it is, as he puts it, of ‘concern’; it is quite another thing to say 
that the character of another’s subjective states—whose 
existence one recognizes—is logically dependent in this 
manner on an external interpreter’s interpretive stance.296 
 What Poellner doing here is nothing but to show his strong fidelity to the 
subject object distinction. That is, he could not accept Nietzsche’s denial of the 
distinction. He still clings to the distinction when he tries to reject Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism and his denial of the distinction. At the root of his objection to 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism, especially in the domain of human individuals, there 
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lies the belief that, at least, the cognitive states, or subjective states, are different 
from the nature of those entities that we call as real objects. In other words, for 
Poellner, the nature of the real objects and the nature of the human individuals 
are different, and the doctrine of the will to power and perspectivism does not 
work in explaining the nature of human individual. Poellner, thus, gives to the 
human individual and to the processes or states that take place in that individual 
a special position compared with the real objects. This shows us Poellner’s 
strong belief that there must be some difference between the subject and object, 
and his rejection of Nietzsche’s denial of the distinction between the two 
depends merely on this belief. I think rejecting someone’s thought simply by 
saying that “I believe that it is wrong” or by saying “there must be distinction 
between the subject and the object, for I believe that distinction” is not a good 
way of refuting a thought. Babich regards such attempts at criticizing Nietzsche 
as spoiling the game by changing the rules. She says that “[w]hen one plays by 
the enemy’s rule (Nietzsche’s perspectivalism) one cannot of a sudden change 
the rules (to a nonperspectival order of articulate expression) in order to claim a 
triumph.”297 Actually, most of the criticisms of Nietzsche’s thoughts suffer from 
such sudden change of the rules. Poellner’s claim too commits a sudden change 
of the rules. Furthermore, such approaches as Poellner’s make it difficult, if not 
impossible, to catch Nietzsche’s point. That is, because of this belief, Poellner 
misses the crucial and subtle points of Nietzsche’s thought.  
 As Poellner accepts and as we frequently see, Nietzsche does not make a 
distinction between the subject and the object. For him, there is only will to 
power and nothing else. Nietzsche’s construction of the world as the world of 
becoming, as the world of the dynamic power quanta, continuously struggling 
for more power, is the root of his perspectivism. Trying to analyze his 
perspectivism by ignoring its root leads us to the conclusions that have nothing 
to do with Nietzsche’s perspectivism. That is, if you ignore Nietzsche’s 
construction of the world as will to power and try to analyze his perspectivism 
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through the concepts and definitions of another world construction, which is 
rejected by that very world construction of Nietzsche, then you could neither 
understand what perspectivism means nor how important and original it is.  
 For Nietzsche, there are no subjective states as Poellner assumes. Firstly, 
there are no subjects at all. Secondly, those supposed subjective inner states are 
also phenomenal as the outer states are, and the nature of the inner states and the 
inner world are not different from the nature of the external world. “I maintain 
the phenomenality of the inner world, too” says Nietzsche, and adds that “[t]he 
‘apparent inner world’ is governed by just the same forms and procedures as the 
‘outer’ world.”298 For Nietzsche, there is nothing special about the inner world 
and inner states; they are phenomenal and they are subjected to the same 
procedures as the outer world. Thus, there are no two distinct realms of 
existence, whose conditions are different, and, hence, in which perspectivism 
may mean two different things. Moreover, the natural condition of all entities is 
the struggle for power; everything, including what we may mean by the term 
subject, is will to power and in a constant struggle with others for increasing its 
power. There is no entity that is not involved in power struggle, and it is 
impossible speak of the existence of an entity that is motionless. As Nietzsche 
says “[l]ife is will to power”299 and “[h]ow can anything dead ‘be’?”300 Every 
entity, in the power struggle, determines both itself and the other party or parties 
involved in that struggle. Hence, every entity knows each other through the 
power struggle; that is “[t]he feeling of strength, of struggle, of resistance 
convinces us that there is something that is here being resisted.”301 This process 
does not include any mental, subjective, or perspectival state of the opponent 
power center. Thus, Poellner’s claim about perspective knowing of those 
subjective states is not included in Nietzsche’s perspectivism as Poellner 
interprets it. That is, subjective states of a subject do not depend on the 
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perspective of an external interpreter. What we perceive and interpret from our 
perspective is not the subject’s inner states, but the movements of that subject, 
i.e., his or her resistance to us. However, it is our habit, or belief in causality, to 
infer from a movement of a subject that there occurs some kind of internal 
activity as the cause of that movement. “[w]herever we see or divine movement 
in a body,” says Nietzsche, “we learn to conclude that there is a subjective, 
invisible life appertaining to it. Movement is symbolism for the eye; it indicates 
that something has been felt, willed, thought.”302 Thus, there is no point in 
attributing a perspective understanding of the inner states of the subject to 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism: there exist neither subject nor subjective inner states. 
These points will become clear when we examine Nietzsche’s rejection of the 
subject-object distinction in the following parts of this chapter. To conclude our 
discussion of Poellner’s claim of relativity of Nietzsche’s perspectivism, 
especially concerning inner states of the other human subjects, we can say that 
his argument cannot doom Nietzsche to relativism. 
 As we have seen, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is not a version of relativism. 
This opens the way for Nietzsche to accuse the epistemological roots of the 
Western metaphysics as being perspectival falsifications. That is, if 
perspectivism is a version of relativism then the claims of perspectivism, 
relativism, and Western metaphysics becomes equally true, in which case there 
remains no way to refute neither of them; yet, as it is not a kind of relativism, it 
has the power of distinguishing a bad perspectival interpretation from the good 
one. Let us now turn to Nietzsche’s attacks on those perspectival falsifications— 
i.e., logic, causality, subject-object and apparent-real world distinctions—of 
Western metaphysics.  
3.5 Logic 
Logic is one of the most important perspectival interpretations, or falsifications, 
of the world, which, because of its utility, has become the judge, who evaluates 
and determines truth and value of our beliefs and knowledge. Any thought, 
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belief, idea or statement that cannot pass the test of the logic is not allowed to 
enter into the domain of glorious human knowledge. That is, any idea, not 
certified by logic and its rules is dismissed as not being coherent with the already 
acquired and proved to be beneficial for the preservation and the enhancement of 
mankind. For Nietzsche, our ideas are only interpretations of the world made by 
us from the perspective of our preservation and enhancement. Every one of us, as 
a highly complex power center, interprets the world and has ideas about the 
world according to his or her perspectives. Logic, then, appears as the tool for 
creating a stable world order from this chaos of ideas by eliminating our 
incoherent ideas about the world and reality. As Nietzsche puts it, there was 
“[o]riginally a chaos of ideas. The ideas that were consistent with one another 
remained, the greater number perished—and are perishing.”303  
 Logic and its rules are the mechanism, or the process, through which the 
consistency of our ideas are judged. We use the fundamental rules or principles 
of logic, e.g., principles of identity and non-contradiction, in creating the stable 
and consistent life-world for us. Nietzsche regards these principles as the 
“regulative articles of faith.”304 These regulative principles and laws do not come 
from experience; they are independent of experience, and thus, they are “forms 
of pure knowledge” or a priori truths. “The basic laws of logic, the law of 
identity and the law of contradiction, are forms of pure knowledge, because they 
precede all experience.”305 These a priori truths, or the basic laws of logic, as 
they are free from the influences of the changing world, are purely formal and 
general; therefore, they are regarded as universally valid. This means that these a 
priori universal laws are applied to all cases in judging our experiences. Yet, this 
universal applicability of the laws of logic assumes a world of being, in which 
there are identical cases. That is, as Grimm says, in order for rules of logic to 
work “there must exist identical objects, identical cases and events to which the 
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procedures of logic can apply.”306 For Nietzsche, however, there are neither 
identical objects, nor cases, nor events. As we know, for him, the world is in a 
constant flux, which excludes identity of things in time. Thus, logic depends on a 
false assumption that the world is a stable unity in which there are identical 
entities and events. According to Nietzsche, this assumption is the condition of 
logic and logical thought. 
Logic is bound to the condition: assume there are identical 
cases. In fact, to make possible logical thinking and inferences, 
this condition must first be treated fictitously as fulfilled. That 
is: the will to logical truth can be carried through only after a 
fundamental falsification of all events is assumed. From which 
it follows that a drive rules here that is capable of employing 
both means, firstly falsification, then the implementation of its 
own point of view: logic does not spring from will to truth.307 
 Nietzsche argues that we falsify the world through falsifying its chaotic 
and changing character, and then we impose a stable and well-ordered character 
to the world in accordance with our own perspective of preserving our existence. 
In other words, logic does not stem from our desire to gain the knowledge of the 
world, but from our desire to preserve ourselves. Hence, at the origin of logic 
and the logical thinking, there lies the interest of self-preservation. As Nietzsche 
says, what we aim by using logic is “[n]ot ‘to know’ but to schematize—to 
impose upon chaos as much regularity and form as our practical needs 
require.”308 Therefore, logic and the logical thought are the processes, or tools, 
for creating a simplified and predictable world in order to facilitate human 
existence in the chaotic world. Yet, this simple, predictable and calculable world 
is achieved at the expense of the falsification, or the denial, of the world in which 
we live; that is, we deny the world of becoming, in which predictions and 
calculations do not work, and create an illusory world, which is the most suitable 
for our needs in maintaining our existence.  
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 Prediction and calculability, for Nietzsche, require equal and similar 
cases, events and objects. As these similarities and equalities do not exist in the 
world, they are artificially created by us. We create categories and try to fit every 
object, event or case into these categories ignoring, or overlooking, their 
changing characters. Actually, as Nietzsche points out, this equalization and 
categorization process is necessary in the process of the development of logic 
and rational thinking.  
In the formation of reason, logic, the categories, it was need 
that was authoritative: the need, not to “know,” but subsume, to 
schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation—
(The development of reason is adjustment, invention, with the 
aim of making similar, equal—the same process that every 
sense impression goes through!) No pre-existing “idea” was 
here at work, but the utilitarian fact that only when we see 
things coarsely and made equal do they become calculable and 
usable to us.309 
 Thus, at the origin of logic and logical thought, there lies our practical 
needs, which require that the world be calculable and predictable, and logic and 
the logical thought help us to construct a stable world order, by providing us with 
principles and categories that organize the objects and events in the world into a 
coherent and harmonious unity. However, logic could not create that well-
ordered world only through its rules and principles, our sense organs also 
contribute to the creation of this world by coarsely treating the world. In other 
words, we sense the world very cursorily and ignore its dynamic and changing 
character to create that stable world order. This cursory view of the world 
enables us to put different objects and events under the same category. 
Moreover, this coarse comprehension of the world as an ordered unity, logic and 
the categories of reason contribute to our survival by availing for us a quick 
understanding of the world. According to Nietzsche, “[t]he inventive force that 
invented categories labored in the service of our needs, namely of our need for 
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security, for quick understanding on the basis of signs and sounds, for means of 
abbreviation.”310 
 Through logic and logical thinking, we impose sameness and regularity 
to the world, which enables us to take the control of it; this enables us to 
dominate and exploit the world in accordance with our practical needs. However, 
there is no sameness or regularity in the world, what we have is a chaotic and 
ever-changing world of dynamic power quanta. In spite of this fact, our need to 
preserve ourselves compels us to create a calculable and predictable world, 
because we could not survive in a world which is not stable and predictable. As 
Nietzsche puts it, this imposition of regularity and sameness, the creation of a 
stable world order, is necessary for life: “Life is founded upon the premise of a 
belief in enduring and regularly occurring things; the more powerful life is, the 
wider must be the knowable world to which we, as it were, attribute being. 
Logicizing, systematizing as expedients of life.”311  
 The creation of the calculable and predictable world order through logic 
and logical thinking is a falsification and simplification of the world. That is, we 
make the world regular and predictable one through simplifying it by eliminating 
and overlooking its aspects, which do not fit into our logical categories, and 
through this simplification of the reality we falsify that reality and create an 
illusion. This illusory worldview facilitates our survival and preservation, we 
regard this illusory world order as the ultimate and the correct way of viewing 
the world. We justify this illusory order by its utility, and if it is proven that this 
world view is beneficial in preserving our existence, then this illusion becomes a 
truth for us. However, this is not the case for Nietzsche; that is, the utility of this 
illusion cannot be the proof of its truth. According to him, as a morality tested 
and developed through time becomes a law after it is proved to be useful by long 
experience, and its values are regarded as venerable and unassailable, without 
questioning its origin and development; in the same way, logic and the categories 
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of reason, because of their utility in the preservation of man, become ultimate 
truths.  
Exactly the same thing could have happened with the 
categories of reason: they could have prevailed, after much 
groping and fumbling, through their relative utility—There 
came a point when one collected them together, raised them to 
consciousness as a whole—and when one commanded them, 
i.e., when they had the effect of a command—From then on, 
they counted as a priori, as beyond experience, as irrefutable. 
And yet perhaps they represent nothing more than the 
expediency of a certain race and species—their utility alone is 
their “truth.”312 
 The forgetting of the origin and the development of the stable and well-
ordered world view prevents us to see its relation with our experience and the 
experiential world, and it becomes a priori truth. We forget that we have 
imposed sameness and regularity on the world, and behave as if there is really a 
regular world and we have discovered the regularities in that world. What we 
have done through logic is to show that there is a regularity in the world 
independent of us and our practical needs by proving that there is a 
correspondence between the principles of logic and the objects and the events in 
the world; hence, the world is a logical unity. However, for Nietzsche, it was we 
who made the world logical. That is, before applying logic to world and our 
judgments about it, we impose the postulates of logic to world, and find out that 
the world is consistent with postulates of the logic. Hence, the world as the 
regular and stable unity is only a perspectival interpretation, or falsification, 
made by us to secure our existence in the chaotic world.  
Our subjective compulsion to believe in logic only reveals that, 
long before logic itself entered our consciousness, we did 
nothing but introduce its postulates into events: now we 
discover them in events—we can no longer do otherwise—and 
imagine that this compulsion guarantees something connected 
with “truth.” It is we who created the “thing,” the “identical 
thing,” subject, attribute, activity, object, substance, form, after 
we had long pursued the process of making identical, coarse 
                                               
312 WP, §514, p. 278. 
 
123 
and simple. The world seems logical to us because we have 
made it logical.313 
 Let us now examine Nietzsche’s attack on the principle of contradiction, 
which, for Aristotle, is the certain of all principles on which the all other 
principles rests,314 to show that logic and principles of it are only our products; 
i.e., our interpretations. Nietzsche begins to analyze the principle to find out 
what presuppositions lie at the bottom of it. According to him, this principle 
could be based on two different presuppositions. The first one is that the 
principle implies that there is an objective reality, such that we know that 
attributing it opposite qualities causes a contradiction. This means that we 
already know something about the reality, or being. That is, we know that an 
object could not carry contrary attributes before postulating the principle of 
contradiction. This implies that the principle on which all other principles 
depend, which is the most secure of all principles, is not true a priori, it comes 
from our previous knowledge concerning being; hence could not be the most 
certain of all principles. In Nietzsche’s words, this principle seems to be 
asserting “something about actuality, about being, as if one already knew this 
from another source; that is, opposite attributes could not be ascribed to it.”315 
The second possible implication of this principle is that it only gives us the 
advice that we should not ascribe opposite attributes to being. This means that 
we have created the world in which we live from our perspective and logic and 
its rules are designated to ensure this predictable and secure world. In 
Nietzsche’s words, “[i]n that case, logic would be an imperative, not to know the 
true, but to posit and arrange a world that shall be called true by us.”316 From this 
argumentation Nietzsche concludes that the principle of contradiction could not 
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be the criterion of truth, at most it would be “an imperative that which should 
count as true.”317 
 Moreover, in the same passage, Nietzsche examines the principle of self-
identity to show again that logic could not be the criterion of truth. According to 
Nietzsche, the principle of self-identity presupposes that there are unchanging 
beings in the world. In other words, this principle, and of course logic, depends 
on the belief that there are things-in-themselves. Because it is impossible to 
maintain self-identity of a thing in spite of the evidences that experiences gives 
us. That is, we experience that things change through time, yet this fact does not 
prevent us from claiming that things preserve their self identity through time. 
What enables us to make this claim is our belief in thing-in-itself. However, as 
we know that Nietzsche is opposed to the views of the world, which contemplate 
an unchanging world. We further know that, for him, there is no such thing as 
the thing-in-itself. Believing such a concept presupposes that there is an 
unchanging world, which is beyond the experience; that is, such a concept of 
being means that there is a metaphysical, i.e., real world, behind the experiential 
world. Nietzsche, proceeding on his denials of the thing-in-itself, and of the 
metaphysical world, makes a thought experiment concerning the validity and 
meaning of the principle of self-identity. He claims that if there is no being as in-
itself and there is no metaphysical world, then there could not be a self-identical 
thing as “A.” As Nietzsche puts it, 
[s]upposing there were no self-identical “A”, such as is 
presupposed by every proposition of logic (and of 
mathematics), and the “A” were already mere appearance, then 
logic would have a merely apparent world as its condition . . . 
The “thing”—that is the real substratum of “A”; our belief in 
things is the precondition of our belief in logic. The “A” of 
logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction of the thing.318 
 However, the “A,” as self-identical, is our construction and there is 
nothing behind it as substratum, which secures its self-identity through time. 
                                               
317 WP, §516, p. 279. 
318 WP, §516, p. 279. 
 
125 
Therefore, the principle of self-identity, and of course that of contradiction, are 
based on a metaphysical world, which is merely our interpretation of the 
apparent world from the perspective of our preservation. As Nietzsche notes, if 
we ignore this fact and make logic our criterion of truth, then we accept those 
constructions as absolute truths. That is, we ignore, or forget, that logic and the 
logical world are our constructions, and this ignorance leads us to regard these 
constructions as truths. As Nietzsche says, “[i]f we do not grasp this, but make of 
logic a criterion of true being, we are on the way to positing as realities all those 
hypostases: substance, attribute, object, action, etc.; that is, to conceiving a 
metaphysical world, that is, a “real world” (—this, however, is the apparent 
world once more.)”319 Hence, logic and its principles are nothing but keys for 
entering into the stable world constructed by human species to preserve itself. If 
you refuse, or are unable, to use these keys, you will not be able to enter that safe 
world. 
 According to Nietzsche, what lies behind logic and logical thought is the 
belief that we can attain knowledge and that our judgments directed by logic 
could grasp truths. We do not doubt the ability of logic to grasp the being-in-
itself and assert something about it; i.e., it cannot have contradictory attributes at 
the same time. However, for Nietzsche, this is the result of our prejudice that 
sensations give us truths about things. For example, I cannot say that one and the 
same thing is hot and cold at the same time. We judge this statement by 
appealing to the instinctual proof that “I cannot have two opposite sensations at 
the same time.”320 However, this kind of proof, for Nietzsche, is very coarse and 
false. Our sensations, as well as our apparatus of knowledge, are developed in 
accordance with the requirements of our preservation: “All our organs of 
knowledge and our senses are developed only with regard to conditions of 
preservation and growth.”321 Hence, our sensations are limited by conditions of 
our preservation, and do not go beyond this limit. When we place this coarse 
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sensualistic mechanism at the basis of the main principle of logic, namely, 
principle of contradiction, we undermine that principle. Because, there may be 
other properties of an entity that our sense organs could not sense, and those 
properties might be the opposite of those that we could sense. Or, there might, 
even be some qualities that transcend our sense organs’ capabilities, among 
which there might be directly opposite ones. Nietzsche says that “we have senses 
for only a selection of perceptions—those with which we have to concern 
ourselves in order to preserve ourselves.”322 
 The principle of contradiction, for Nietzsche, stems from our confident 
belief that we form concepts that are capable of comprehending beings in their 
essence. However, the process of the formation of the concepts is not so firm. 
Let us look at Nietzsche’s explanation of this process in his “Truth and Lies.” 
There, at the outset, he mentions the formation of language. Simply put, firstly, a 
sensation, or “a nerve stimulus” as Nietzsche calls it, “transferred in to an image: 
first metaphor,” afterwards, this image “is imitated in a sound: second 
metaphor.”323 Hence, what we get through language is only metaphors, not the 
nature or the essence of things. However, Nietzsche says that “we believe that 
we know something about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, 
snow, and flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things—
metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities.”324 This origin of 
language and words is ignored, and used by us as if they correspond to things or 
events in the world. When the words are used for referring not to a single object 
or an event, they become concepts. In other words, “a word becomes a concept 
insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases.”325 
However, this means, for Nietzsche, that concepts do fit similar cases, but these 
cases are never equal; i.e., we refer by the concept “leaf” to all leafs, ignoring the 
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fact that there is no identical with any other leaf. Hence, Nietzsche concludes 
that “[e]very concept arises from the equation of unequal things.”326 The idea of 
concept as designating and comprehending the essence of a thing is only a 
fiction. Our concepts are nothing but metaphorical fictions created through a 
process in which the starting point is our sensual mechanisms, which are 
developed according to the requirements of our survival. This means that the 
world, with which logic is engaged, is created by us out of the chaotic world to 
make that chaotic world a predictable and calculable unity: “In fact, logic (like 
geometry and arithmetic) applies only to fictitious entities that we have created. 
Logic is the attempt to comprehend the actual world by means of a scheme of 
being posited by ourselves; more correctly, to make it formulatable and 
calculable for us.”327 
 Therefore, our belief in logic as the discipline or the way, which leads us 
to correct thinking, is only an illusion based on our world view, in which there 
are similar objects and events that make the world a regular unity. As far as this 
falsification of the world increases our power, Nietzsche will not be against it. 
Yet, as Nietzsche observes, this understanding of the world prevents us from 
engaging or pursuing other ways of comprehending the world. There may be 
other ways of constructing the world that would allow us to increase our power 
more than this understanding of the world allows. In other words, regarding logic 
and logical thinking as the only way of thinking, or regarding them as absolute 
truths, prevents us from reaching a higher level of development and power. 
Moreover, what we have for ensuring that logic and its principles are unchanging 
and absolute truths is only their utility. As we have seen earlier, the 
correspondence between the logical principles and the world is nothing but a 
result of our positing of postulates of the logic on the world before applying 
logic to it; that is, what we see as correspondence is a fiction created by us. The 
only judge that could justify and validate our belief in logic is its utility in our 
preservation. However, as Grimm rightly observes, the fact that logic is useful in 
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our preservation does not guarantee that it is “unchangeably and absolutely true” 
and that it “will continue to be of utility.”328  
 When we regard our useful fictions, which are the results of our 
perspectival interpretations of the world, as ultimate truths, as corresponding to 
the world in which we try to preserve our existence, they would become 
constraints for us to reach a more richer and fuller life. To stick to absolute truths 
is nothing but a symbol of cowardice and weakness, and it belongs to the 
mediocre type of man. Preservation and happiness are the motivating factors 
behind mediocre types’ sticking themselves to absolute truths. They prefer to 
live in a stable and predictable, yet limited and poorer world; they have no 
courage to venture this life to get a more richer and fuller life. They stick strictly 
to logic and logical thought to preserve this happy and poor life. Nietzsche 
names this tendency as “decadence,” and says that 
[d]ecadence betrays itself in this preoccupation with 
“happiness” (i.e., with ‘salvation of the soul,’ i.e., to fell one’s 
condition as danger). The fanaticism of its interest in 
“happiness” indicates the pathological nature of the hidden 
cause: it was a life-or-death interest. To be reasonable or perish 
was the alternative before which they all stood.329 
 Hence, to stick to rational or logical thought is a type of decadence and 
inimical to life. It is inimical, because it impoverishes life; it prevents life from 
reaching higher levels. By accepting our perspectival interpretations as absolute 
truths, we limit our life and world. However, these absolute truths have nothing 
to do with the world; they are only fictions that we impose over it. We should be 
aware of this fact and search for the other ways, or fictions, to enhance our 
powers and lives. In other words, as Nietzsche points out, we should be aware of 
the fact that “[r]ational thought is interpretation according to a scheme that we 
cannot throw off,”330 and venture it to find out other ways of structuring the 
world by employing our creative energies. 
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3.6 Subject-Object Distinction 
One of the main presuppositions of our cognitive paradigm is the distinction 
between subject and object. However, like other presuppositions of our cognitive 
paradigm, Nietzsche sees it as another perspectival falsification of the world. 
According to him, at the basis of the distinction, there lies the separation of the 
doer from the deed, of the actor from the act. As we saw earlier, for Nietzsche, a 
thing cannot be separable from its activities; if we remove all the activities of a 
thing, it ceases to exist. An entity or a thing, for him, is nothing but the totality of 
its activities, and there is nothing purely passive or motionless.  
A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, 
effect—more, it is nothing other than precisely this very 
driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of 
language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that are 
petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as 
conditioned by something that causes effects, by a “subject,” 
can it appear otherwise.331  
 This separation is so strongly rooted in our language that we could not 
comprehend any event without it. To those events, in which we could not see any 
apparent subject, we immediately add a fictitious one to meet that grammatical 
requirement. For example, we say “lightning flashes,” “thunder crushes,” “fire 
burns,” etc. In these statements, the same event stated twice; first as a subject, 
and second as an object; or first as a cause, and second as its effect. Nietzsche 
says that “[t]he popular mind in fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning 
flash, it is the deed of a deed: it posits the same event as first as cause and then 
second time as its effect.”332  
 As Grimm notes, such a separation implies that “an agent or subject 
might be capable of not acting,”333 and this is not acceptable for Nietzsche. 
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Because this implies that there is a neutral substratum that is free of all desires 
and wills behind the actor. Such a conception of subject, as the doctrine of the 
will to power suggests, is nonsense; because it places a metaphysical subject or 
substratum behind every deed, whose existence is not possible in that world 
implied by the doctrine of the will to power. That is, the doctrine makes it 
impossible for some entity, which does not act, move, or change at all, to exist; 
whatever has existence is only an active and dynamic power quantum. Hence, 
subject is a fiction added by us according to the requirements of the grammar of 
our language, in which our metaphysical world conception is strongly rooted. 
Tracy B. Strong emphasizes the similarity between the separation of the subject 
from his acts and the distinction between real and apparent worlds; “separation 
of a person from his acts” is “analogous to the distinction of the ‘real’ and 
‘apparent’ worlds. The actor, if considerable apart from his action, assumes the 
role of the ‘real’ world. The action in question is held to be a conditioned part of 
the actor; the actor acquires permanence which is not allowed to the action.”334 
 This separation has also moral connotations. To separate a person from 
his or her actions means that the person in question could be judged independent 
of his actions. That is, as this separation constructs the subject as a neutral entity 
by removing his or her link with that action, that subject also gains a moral 
independence. Strong says that “[t]he actor is thus reified into an entity which 
has conceptual and potentially moral independence of his acts.”335 Hence, the 
subject is separated from the actual world and placed into a metaphysical one. 
This enables us to judge the subject according to the metaphysical categories that 
are built into our language. This judgment shows us that the subject might have 
acted or behaved differently. That is, separation of action from the subject gives 
way to judge the subject in terms of his or her acts, yet such a judgment implies 
that there is a subject that could have done otherwise. A fiction becomes the 
subject of moral judgment. According to Nietzsche, as in the case of lightning 
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and flash, our morality also separates the actor from his action; “popular morality 
also separates strength from expression of strength, as if there were a neutral 
substratum behind a strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do 
so.”336 This morality takes the subject as responsible for his or her actions, yet 
there is no such entity as the subject; it is only a fiction; “there is no such 
substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is 
merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything.”337 Hence, Nietzsche 
rejects this artificial separation of act from the actor.  
 However, as Grimm indicates, this rejection could only eliminate the 
“subject” part of the fundamental distinction between subject and object. That is, 
“if we accept Nietzsche’s assertion that action and actor (i.e., subject) are 
identical, there still remains the objective half of the distinction which remains, 
apparently, unaffected.”338 In my opinion, this objection is already answered in 
our discussion of Nietzsche’s rejection of the act-actor distinction. As we have 
just seen, there is nothing stable and changeless in the world; every entity exists 
only through its activities. Hence, the notion of an object, which is stable and 
unchanging, i.e., as thing-in-itself, is nonsense. What we call as object is only a 
power quantum or quanta in search of more power. That is, there is no difference 
between subject and object in that they both are power centers, and they both 
interpret and shape each other and their environment in accordance with 
requirements of their needs. Therefore, as Nietzsche indicates, to speak of object 
or objectivity outside this interpretation process, as if there is an entity 
transcending interpretation, is wrong. “That things possess a constitution in 
themselves quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is a quite idle 
hypothesis: it presupposes that interpretation and subjectivity are not essential, 
that a thing freed from all relationships would still be a thing.”339 In other words, 
as Nietzsche’s perspectivism claims, the world is nothing but our interpretations 
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made from the perspective of preserving and enhancing our power. The notions 
of subject and object, as we ordinarily understand, are nothing but our 
interpretations; hence, it is impossible to attribute them any property, and even to 
construct them outside our perspectival interpretations. Therefore, as Nietzsche 
maintains, objectivity could be merely our interpretation of other power centers, 
whose activities could not be perceived by us; that is, we interpret an entity as 
object because of our deficient sensual abilities and, naturally, of our needs. This 
is what Nietzsche means when he claims that objectivity is a degree, or, as 
Grimm says, a subspecies,340 of subjectivity. “[T]he apparent objective character 
of things,” says Nietzsche, “could it not be merely a difference of degree within 
the subjective?—that perhaps that which changes slowly presents itself to us as 
‘objectively’ enduring, being, ‘in-itself’—that the objective is only a false 
conception of a genus and an antithesis within the subjective?”341  
 Hence, objectivity is only an interpretation; it has nothing to with the 
nature of the entities in the world. It is we who create the concepts of subject and 
object; in reality, there are neither subjects nor objects, but only dynamic quanta 
or quantum of power. These two concepts are the results of our desire to create a 
stable and predictable world out of the chaotic world of power quanta.  
 The distinction between subject and object is one of the important 
distinctions in constructing and securing that stable and predictable world. 
Descartes’ cogito is the case, in which we can see the importance of this 
separation in work. This is why Descartes is one of the philosophers harshly 
criticized by Nietzsche. Because Descartes in his arguments concerning the 
cogito commits both the separation of the act from the actor and the distinction 
between subject and object. As we know, Descartes searches for a secure 
foundation to build the edifice of knowledge, and he reaches the conclusion that 
the only piece of knowledge that he could not suspect is the fact that he is 
thinking. From this, he concludes his existence, and declares that famous 
Cartesian argument: “I think, therefore I am.” Through this motto, Descartes 
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separates thinking from the thinker; he, from the existence of thought, concludes 
that there must be an entity, whose essential activity is thinking. This means that 
without an agent, or a subject, there could not be any activity of thinking. For 
Nietzsche, this is nothing but, as we see from the discussions above, the 
seduction of our language, which adds a doer to every deed. Hence, for 
Nietzsche, Descartes’ cogito does not express an indubitable truth, but a “strong 
belief.”  
“There is thinking: therefore there is something that thinks”: 
this is the upshot of all Descartes’ argumentation. But that 
means positing as “true a priori” our belief in the concept of 
substance—that when there is thought there has to be 
something “that thinks” is simply a formulation of our 
grammatical custom that adds a doer to every deed. In short, 
this is not merely the substantiation of a fact but a logical-
metaphysical postulate—Along the lines followed by Descartes 
one does not come upon something absolutely certain but only 
upon the fact of a very strong belief.342 
 Moreover, Descartes’ cogito, for Nietzsche, expresses a tautology. That 
is, when I say that “I think, therefore I am,” what I say is that I have a thought, 
which means that I am thinking, and as a non-existing being I could not think, 
therefore I must exist. In other words, there are thoughts, and this implies the 
occurrence of the activity of thinking, and without an agent that activity could 
not occur, therefore there must be an agent that thinks. As these reconstructions 
of the cogito suggests, we can take it as simply saying that “there is thinking, 
therefore there are thoughts,” which is an obvious tautology. “If one reduces the 
proposition to ‘There is thinking therefore there are thoughts,’” says Nietzsche, 
“one has produced a mere tautology.”343 Since, according to our conceptual 
scheme, there would be no thought without the activity of thinking, and the 
activity of thinking results in thoughts. Hence, cogito is a tautological statement, 
and does not give us, or Descartes, any secure or certain knowledge. According 
to Nietzsche, in the cogito, the question of the reality of thought is not answered; 
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it is taken as real. Hence, in the cogito, the reality of thought is assumed, yet this 
reality, for Nietzsche, is only an apparent, or perspectival reality. However, 
“what Descartes desired was that thought should have, not an apparent reality, 
but a reality in itself.”344 
 The reality of thought is not the only assertion made in Descartes’ cogito. 
There are also other assertions accepted as true without questioning. To 
illustrate, I am the one who thinks, there must be something that thinks, there is a 
causal connection between thought and thinker, there is a conscious ego, and 
“what thinking is” is known by me. These assertions are accepted as true, yet, for 
Nietzsche, it is impossible to prove that they are true. He says the following: 
“When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence ‘I think,’ I find a 
whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
prove.”345 These assertions are the products of our grammar; i.e., for the thinking 
subject, or ego, Nietzsche says “[o]ne infers here according to the grammatical 
habit: ‘thinking is an activity; every activity requires an agent.’”346 Hence, 
Descartes could not reach the immediate certainty as the secure and indubitable 
ground of edifice of knowledge; since his cogito is full of unquestioned and 
unproven assertions resulting from our language and grammar. Nietzsche, 
referring to Descartes’ unquestioning of these assertions, ironically says that “the 
person who says ‘I think, and know that this, at least, is true, actual, and 
certain’—will encounter a smile and two question marks from a philosopher 
nowadays. ‘Sir,’ the philosopher will perhaps give him to understand, ‘it is 
improbable that you are not mistaken; but why insist on the truth?’”347 
 To sum up, the distinction between subject and object, and between act, 
actor, and acted upon, are perspectival fictions created by us. There are no such 
things as subject and object, or actor and acted upon, or a separate entity as 
action. All of these are imposed upon the world by us due to the requirements of 
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our language and its grammar. We create these fictions to simplify and arrange 
the chaotic world of power quanta with the aim of creating a stable and 
predictable world order. Our cognitive apparatus and language are not capable of 
comprehending the world of becoming, but of being. Therefore, we create such 
fictions when we are faced with chaotic reality to make it comprehensible with 
our cognitive apparatus. However, these fictions have nothing to do with the 
reality and truth; they neither represent nor comprehend the reality as it is. As 
Nietzsche says, “[w]e setup a word at the point at which our ignorance begins, at 
which we can see no further, e.g., the word ‘I,’ the word ‘do,’ the word 
‘suffer’:—these are perhaps the horizon of our knowledge, but not ‘truths.’”348  
3.7 Apparent-Real World Distinction 
The distinction between the apparent and the real world is another perspectival 
falsification made by us to ensure our existence in the world of becoming. As we 
can easily guess, for Nietzsche, there is no such a distinction; since the only 
world that we have is the world in which we live. For him, at the root of this 
distinction, there lies the conditions of our survival; as our survival requires a 
stable and predictable world, we create it fictitiously. The world, in which we 
live, is in constant change; there is nothing stable in it. However, as our survival 
requires stability, disdaining this world as being apparent, we posit another 
“real” world, which is stable, controllable and predictable, over and beyond it.  
“The real and the apparent world”—I have traced this 
antithesis back to value relations. We have projected the 
conditions of our preservation as predicated of being in 
general. Because we have to stable in our beliefs if we are to 
prosper, we have made the “real” world a world not of change 
and becoming, but one of being.349 
  The physical world as a world of becoming could not meet the 
requirements of our preservation, i.e., it could not gives us the required stability 
and predictability. If our knowledge of the world, or of anything, is to be useful 
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in our survival, it should be stable, reliable, and universal. That is, our 
preservation requires that we must have the knowledge of the world in which we 
live, yet this knowledge must be valid in everywhere and anytime. Otherwise, if 
our knowledge is provisional and temporary, it could not help us in our survival; 
since it could not be true in another place in another time. However, as our 
senses reveal to us that the physical world is in a constant change, this world 
must be false, or our senses deceive us about it.350 In any case, the physical 
world could not give us those eternal truths, which are essential for our survival. 
That is, the physical world is only for our senses, which deceive us. Therefore, 
the physical world could not be the source of eternal, unchanging, reliable, and 
universal knowledge and truth. It is evident that we have knowledge and truth, 
since we could manage to live. If the physical world is not the source of our 
knowledge, then there must be another source for this knowledge, which 
transcends our senses and the sensual physical world.  
 This source, for Plato, is the world of Ideas, which is a world for reason; 
that is, this world could not be achieved through our senses, but only through 
reason. Another example of such sources is the otherworld of the religions. 
These two worlds, world of ideas and the otherworld, are regarded as the “true” 
realms, and the physical world is degraded to the status of false and deceiving 
one. Plato’s world of Ideas and the otherworld of religions represent the true 
world, in which there is no temporality, no change, no death, no deceiving, etc.; 
that is, these worlds shape, secure, even guarantee, our understanding of the 
physical world. The idea of a real world behind the apparent one makes it 
possible for us to treat the changing reality as stable and unchanging, to conceive 
the world of becoming as the world of being. We ignore the changing character 
of the physical world, which is given to us through the sense, and base our life 
and all of our valuations on the unchanging real world, which is accessible only 
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through reason. Hence, it is the idea of the “real world” that rescues us from the 
chaos and deceptions of the apparent world.   
 Nietzsche regards the real world as a fiction created out of fictitious 
entities. The real world is the world of being, yet, as we know, for Nietzsche, 
there is no such thing as being. However, in order to give an order to the chaotic 
world, we fictitiously create being. By using this fiction, we further create 
another fiction, that is, the real world, in which there is stable and unchanging 
order. However, for Nietzsche, the “real world” is also an apparent world, 
created through simplification, selection, and ordering. It is we who create this 
real world out of the apparent one. “The ‘real world,’” says Nietzsche, “however 
one has hitherto conceives it—it has always been the apparent world once 
again.”351 We create the fictitious real world after the same model of the 
apparent world, which is another perspectival falsification of the world made by 
us; i.e., it is another fictitious world of the lower rank. That is, in order to live we 
create a relatively small, stable and calculable world out of the chaotic world of 
dynamic power quanta, and name it as the apparent world because there is 
change, death, and decay in it; yet, as we could manage to live in it, we apply the 
same concepts, categories, principles in constructing and conceiving the real 
world. However, as George J. Stack warns us, this statement should not be 
understood as saying that “we cannot ‘imagine’ a real world that does not turn 
out to be the (apparent) world we are familiar with in our experience.”352 
Because, then, there remains no need to postulate a real world, in which case the 
apparent and relative stability and calculability of the world could not be secured 
and guaranteed. In other words, our psychological needs compel us to guarantee 
the stability and predictability of the apparent, or physical, world by positing a 
real and true world beyond and behind that world. However, if the real world is 
designated as similar to the apparent world, then it could not be a reliable and 
respectable world. Hence, as Stack states, Nietzsche’s above claim should be 
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understood as saying that “we cannot conceive of a transcendental ‘true world’ 
without doing so in terms of the concepts or categories that we apply to the 
‘phenomenal world’ we experience.”353  
 As we saw earlier, for Nietzsche, it is our needs that interpret the world. 
In the same way, the distinction between the real and the apparent world is a 
perspectival interpretation, according to our psychological needs, i.e., security 
and preservation. In an important note, where he explores the psychological 
dimensions of nihilism, Nietzsche presents the postulation of the real world as a 
psychological need, and how its realization leads to the denial of the real world 
and nihilism. Yet, there, he also shows us that the denial of the real world is very 
difficult, even for the nihilists.  
Given these two insights, that becoming has no goal and that 
underneath all becoming there is no grand unity in which the 
individual could immerse himself completely as in an element 
of supreme value, an escape remains: to pass sentence on this 
whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world 
beyond it, a true world. But as soon as man finds out how he 
has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes 
into being: it includes disbelief in any metaphysical world and 
forbids itself any belief in a true world. Having reached this 
standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the only 
reality, forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to 
afterworlds and false divinities—but cannot endure this world 
though one does not want to deny it.354 
 The real world, whether as philosopher’s metaphysical or religious 
afterworld, emerges from the psychological need for securing the consistency of 
our beliefs and perceptions. It is the only way escaping from the unbearable 
chaos resulting from the ever-changing character of the physical world. Hence, it 
seems implausible to interpret Nietzsche’s claim that real world is also an 
apparent one, as stating that we could not imagine a real world that becomes 
similar to the physical or phenomenal world, in which we live. Because, then we 
could not escape the chaos; we carry it into real world. However, as Stack rightly 
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notes, we use the same cognitive apparatus in understanding or comprehending 
both apparent and real worlds. Thus, what we do by postulating a real world is 
nothing but to create a stable and unchanging world of being and to transfer 
those values, laws, categories, truths, etc., which contribute our survival in the 
chaotic physical world, to the real world by trying to grasp it through them. 
Consequently, the apparent character of the real world does not come from our 
projecting it as such, but from our appealing the same rationality, which makes 
the physical world an apparent one. 
 On the other hand, the apparent world, as we perceive it, is as fictitious as 
the real world. That is, as Nietzsche puts it, “in a world where there is no being, a 
certain calculable world of identical cases must first be created through 
appearance: a tempo at which observation and comparison are possible, etc.”355 
Apparent world is also a perspectival interpretation; we create it by arranging 
and simplifying it through our cognitive apparatus according to our needs. 
Hence, again, it is our needs that interpret the chaotic physical world as an 
ordered and stable unity. However, it should be remembered that this order and 
stability are not pure and firm as that is found in the real world; this is why, the 
real world is needed. Although the apparent world is a fiction, for Nietzsche, it 
belongs to the reality in two senses. First, it is a moment in the process of 
becoming; “‘[a]ppearance’ itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being.”356 
Second, a species of animal requires this fiction for its prosperity; “a particular 
species of animal that can prosper only through a certain relative rightness; 
above all, regularity of its perceptions.”357 However, in the latter case, this does 
not mean that the fiction constructed is a necessary and the only one; every 
power center, every species constructs its fiction according to its needs. As the 
physical world is in a constant flux, it continuously changes; hence, the needs 
and the interpretation of the according to these needs also changes. Therefore, to 
accept a fiction among the many actual and possible ones as the only true one is 
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nothing but to impoverish the world and life. In accordance with Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism, the apparent world is merely an interpretation of the physical 
world; hence could not be accepted as the only way in which the world is; 
“[p]erspective . . . decides the character of ‘appearance’!”358 There is nothing 
except from the fact that this fiction works and meets our needs to prove its truth. 
Yet, we accept this perspectival interpretation of the world as reflecting the 
actual state of the world; that is, we regard this fictitious world as an absolute 
truth.  
 However, the world to which we put the label of “the apparent world,” is 
nothing but the totality of the actions and the reactions of power centers in their 
struggle for power. This struggle determines the character of the world. Hence, 
since the apparent world is a perspectival interpretation of the chaotic world of 
dynamic power centers, and since the process of interpretation is the process of 
simplifying and arranging the world according to our needs, the apparent world 
becomes a simplified and organized view of the chaotic world. That is, the 
apparent world is the totality of the actions of a power center on the others and 
the reactions or resistances it receives from them. Whatever we may sense, 
perceive, or name, as reality is only these actions and reactions of power centers. 
Hence, as Nietzsche claims “[n]o shadow of a right remains to speak here of 
appearance.”359  
 Thus, Nietzsche’s critique of the distinction between the real and the 
apparent world results in the conclusion that such a distinction is nonsense. For, 
there is neither the real world nor the apparent world. The real world is “invented 
by a lie,”360 and the apparent world is an interpretation of the world made from 
the perspective of a species of animal to preserve its existence among the 
dangers of the world of becoming. Neither the real world nor the world of being, 
exists; and the apparent world, although it is simplified and arranged, is the 
physical world, in which we live. The only real, or true, world is this physical 
                                               
358 WP, §567, p. 305. 
359 WP, §567, p. 305. 
360 WP, §461, p. 254. 
 
141 
world, and as Nietzsche claims, the reasons for denying it as apparent one prove 
its reality; “[t]he reasons for which ‘this’ world has been characterized as 
‘apparent’ are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of 
reality is absolutely indemonstrable”361; hence, “[t]he antithesis of the apparent 
world and the true world is reduced to the antithesis ‘world’ and ‘nothing.’”362 In 
other words, its being a changing and deceptive world are the reasons for 
claiming that the physical world is an apparent world, yet, for Nietzsche, since 
there is not a stable and unchanging world behind this world and we do not have 
any evidence for the existence of it. This means that we base our judgment 
concerning the apparent character of the physical world on our sense experience, 
but there is no such sense evidence for the existence of the real world that we 
place behind the apparent world. Thus, the changing and deceptive character of 
the world given to us through our sense organs becomes the proof of its reality. 
Furthermore, since there is no such evidence for the existence of the real world, 
the antithesis of true world and apparent world becomes the antithesis of 
“physical world” and “nothing.”  
 As we have seen from the above discussions of the distinction between 
the real and apparent world, for Nietzsche, this distinction is superficial and there 
are no two separate worlds, but only the one in which we live. According to 
Nietzsche, postulating such a distinction means denial of life. Because, through 
this distinction the life-world is devalued as apparent, and the real world honored 
as the world of absolute truths and values. As Nietzsche points out, the term 
“real world” already implies that “this world is untruthful, deceptive, dishonest, 
inauthentic, inessential—and consequently also not a world adapted to our needs 
(—inadvisable to adapt oneself to it; better to resist it).”363 As the apparent world 
is “untruthful,” “deceptive,” “dishonest,” “inauthentic,” it can be neither the 
cause nor the home of the absolute truths and the highest values. Plato’s placing 
of Good as the highest value and the highest object of knowledge is an example 
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of the transference of the values and truths to the real world; “the good is the 
highest form of knowledge and . . . everything else is just or useful only in 
relation to it . . . without it no other knowledge and no other possession will be 
worth anything.”364 However, for Nietzsche, all judgments are value judgments; 
i.e., judgment is interpretation in terms of the preservation and enhancement of 
the judging individual. Hence, all judgments, all interpretations, as values, are 
actually vital values. To place vital values beyond this world, to put them into 
the world of dead entities and concepts, i.e., into the world of being, means 
denying and diminishing life. As such, the vital values are regarded as coming 
from the world of being, where there is no living entity; hence, the relation 
between the life and the vital values are corrupted. Instead of creating new values 
according to changing structure of the dynamic and chaotic world, we live with 
absolute values that are already defined. According to Nietzsche, the history of 
philosophy is the place where we can see this hostility to life. “The history of 
philosophy is a secret raging against the preconditions of life, against the value 
feelings of life, against partisanship in favor of life. Philosophers never hesitated 
to affirm a world provided it contradicted this world and furnished them with a 
pretext for speaking ill of this world.”365 
 According to Nietzsche, what leads philosophers to condemn this world 
as unreal and postulate another true world is morality as the supreme value. They 
believe that truth must also be moral; i.e., it should not be deceptive, inauthentic, 
etc.; “the true world must also be a truthful world, one that does not deceive us, 
does not make fools of us: to believe in it is virtually to be compelled to believe 
in it.”366 Hence, a strict relation between truth and morality is drawn: if 
something should be accepted as true it must also be truthful, and vice versa. 
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This further implies that values must be eternal and unchanging; since change 
and becoming contradict truth, then they also contradict value. In other words, 
this strict relation between truth and morality means that the moral values are 
transferred to the unchanging and eternal real world. As Grimm says, “[j]ust as 
truth must be unchanging if it is to be valid . . . so must value be unchanging if it 
is to be genuinely valuable.”367 Hence, the real world is regarded as valuable and 
the physical world denied as invaluable. That is, the physical world, as changing 
and unstable one, is deceptive; hence, it is neither true nor valuable. Thus, the 
distinction between the real and the apparent world is not only an ontological 
distinction, but also, maybe mainly, an axiological distinction. In a way, absolute 
values become a criterion of truth; or, a necessary quality that any truth, or any 
being, must have in order to be accepted as true. This is, for Nietzsche, one of 
the worst outcomes of the distinction between the real and apparent world. “The 
worst thing is that,” says Nietzsche, “with the old antithesis ‘apparent’ and ‘true’ 
the correlative value judgment ‘lacking in value’ and ‘absolutely valuable’ has 
developed. The apparent world is not counted as a ‘valuable’ world; appearance 
is supposed to constitute an objection to supreme value. Only a ‘true’ world can 
be valuable in itself.”368 Hence the world, in which we live, is doubly 
condemned; first, as being an unreal, or untrue, or apparent, and second, as being 
invaluable. In both evaluations, the criterion we apply is the real world of being 
and its truths and values. However, this world and all of its truths and values are 
dead, absolute, eternal ones, whereas we live in a world of constant change. 
Therefore, if we judge conditions of our lives with regard to this world and its 
truths and values, those conditions always seem to be false, apparent, and 
immoral. At every moment of our existence, we are faced with a different world; 
we and the rest of the world, as power centers struggling for more power, are 
continuously changing. Hence, to perceive and evaluate this world with the dead 
and stable concepts and values of the world of being amount to freeze this world 
and life.  
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 For Nietzsche, judging life and its conditions according to the eternal and 
unchanging values is the typical characteristics of the weak and decadent types. 
The changing and unpredictable character of the physical world scares and 
horrifies the weak. They treat change as a threat to their life, and, instead of 
welcoming changing world and trying to interpret it so as to increase their 
power, they stick to those interpretations of the world, which, so far, preserved 
their species by denying the changing character of the world. Hence, to judge the 
world according to eternal truths and values, which belong to the world of being, 
is the very forte of the weak and decadent ones. “What kind of man reflects in 
this way?” asks Nietzsche, “[a]n unproductive, suffering kind, a kind weary of 
life.”369 However, a strong and courageous one welcomes this changing world as 
a stimulant to life and increases his power through exploiting the new 
possibilities resulting from the changing character of the world. Instead of 
limiting life and its possibilities through the distinction between real and 
apparent world, the strong ones accept this world and life as it is, and challenge 
all the dangers of the physical world stemming from its chaotic character. As 
Nietzsche says “[a] creature overloaded and playing with force would call 
precisely the affects, irrationality, and change good in a eudaemonistic sense, 
together with their consequences: danger, contrast, perishing, etc.”370 Actually, 
for him, this is the way, perhaps the only one, through which we could exploit 
the physical world for increasing and enhancing our power. Welcoming chaos of 
the world and challenging its dangers are Nietzsche’s advices for us about how 
to live; “the secret of harvesting from existence the greatest fruitfulness and the 
great enjoyment is—to live dangerously!”371 
 Consequently, the distinction between the real and the apparent world is 
only a fiction, a perspectival interpretation of the world. Both the real and the 
apparent world are apparent in the sense that both have nothing to do with the 
world in which we live. That is, there is neither a real nor an apparent world; 
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these notions are produced by us and we have imposed this fiction upon the only 
world that we have. We invented a stable and predictable world out of the 
chaotic world of becoming; firstly, we have created an apparent world by 
interpreting and falsifying the physical world; afterwards, as there are change, 
suffering, death, deception, etc. in this apparent world, we have created a true 
and eternally stable world, into which we have transferred all the things that 
facilitates our preservation in the chaotic physical world. Since this dualistic 
world view facilitated our preservation, we regard it as truth, as reality. Hence, 
ironically, the real world, which is created by a lie, becomes a truthful world that 
does not deceive us. Nietzsche has nothing to say against creating such fictions, 
since it is a necessity for a living entity to maintain its existence. In a fragment, 
which is, according to Kaufmann, a draft of the preface for the new edition of 
The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche says that 
there is only one world, and this is false, cruel, contradictory, 
seductive, without meaning—A world thus constituted is the 
real world. We have need of lies in order to conquer this reality, 
this “truth,” that is, in order to live—that lies are necessary in 
order to live itself is part of the terrifying and questionable 
character of existence.372 
 What Nietzsche rejects is the sublimation and deification of such fictions 
by positing them as eternal and the most valuable truths. Sticking to such truths 
and values is inimical to life and its values. Life is a process of continuous 
interpretation on the part of every power quanta, and the world is the totality of 
these interpretations. Every interpretation is valuation and evaluation of other 
power centers made from the perspective of power increase. Hence, judging, or 
interpreting life in accordance with the values that are eternal and unchanging is 
the sign of a weak will to power. Only weak and coward ones interpret the world 
in such a way, and only they would be willing to accept such a castrated and 
poor world. Thus, the real and apparent world distinction is only a perspectival 
interpretation; in reality there is no such distinction; there are no such distinct 
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worlds as real and apparent; we have only one world, and it is the one, in which 
we live and it is the one which create by our actions as active power centers. 
3.8 Causality 
Causality is the last major perspectival interpretation, or falsification, of the 
world that will be investigated in this chapter. For Nietzsche, causality is one of 
the main concepts that we use for establishing a stable and predictable world 
order. By the help of causality, we remove instability and irregularity from the 
world; we either deny the existence of those irregular events and entities or we 
make them look regular by inventing other fictitious events and entities to 
embrace them in the causal chain. Hence, it has a very crucial function in 
constructing a world that would preserve and maintain our existence. However, 
causality is rejected by Nietzsche as being a fiction created by us; as a 
perspectival interpretation.  
 Before going into details of Nietzsche’s denial of the existence of 
causality in the world, I want to present his thoughts concerning the origin of the 
notion of causality in connection with the subject-object distinction. Because, in 
my opinion, this will help us to understand Nietzsche’s view that causality is a 
perspectival interpretation.  
 According to Nietzsche, at the basis of our belief in causality, there lies 
our belief in the subject-object distinction. This belief, as we have seen in our 
discussion of Nietzsche’s denial of the subject-object distinction, comes from our 
separation of doer from deed, which leads us to further separation of an event 
into the doer, the deed, and the object. This separation implies that every event, 
as an effect, presupposes an agent, or a subject, as its cause; that is, without an 
active agent there would be no events. Hence, when we try to understand an 
event, we apply these distinctions and try to define the subject, the object and the 
act of the event. As soon as we discern these components of the event, we 
attribute action or deed to the subject as its intentional activity so that the effect 
becomes a result of subject’s intention. This understanding of events and the 
world, as in the case of other perspectival falsifications, becomes an absolute 
truth for us, since it works and helps us in preservation. Therefore, we believe 
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that there is causal necessity in the world, and we believe also that if we find out 
the necessary causal relations in the occurrence of an event then we completely 
comprehend the event. This belief leads us to apply this pattern to every event 
whether it is physical or mental.  
 However, from where do we acquire the notion of causality? As 
Nietzsche notes, we could not acquire it from experience; at most, experience 
provides us with a sequence of events that seem to follow each other. Yet, we 
cannot experience the necessity that we find in the notion of causality. That is, 
experience could not give the necessary relation between the cause and effect; 
experience could not give us the knowledge that when the event x occurs it is 
necessarily followed by the event y. According to Nietzsche, we derive this 
necessary causal relation from our inner experience. We, as intentional and 
willing subjects, believe that the movements of our bodies are results of our will; 
that is, I interpret the movement of my arms in the following way: I willed to 
move my arm then my arm has moved. This fact, as in the case of Descartes’ 
cogito, seems to us as an obvious fact; as a fact which I could not doubt. As 
Nietzsche says, “[w]e believed ourselves to be causal in the act of willing: we 
thought that here at least we caught causality in the act.”373 Hence, we do not 
doubt that there is a causal relation between our will and our acts and thoughts. 
Believing the truth of this inner causality we observe in our inner world, 
although we never experience it in the outer world we apply this causality. In 
other words, “[w]e have absolutely no experience of a cause; psychologically 
considered, we derive the entire concept from the conviction that we are causes, 
namely, that the arm moves.”374 However, for Nietzsche, this is an error based on 
the above mentioned erroneous distinction between the doer and the deed; “[w]e 
separate ourselves, the doers, from the deed, and we make use of this pattern 
everywhere—we seek a doer for every event.”375 This shows us how strongly the 
fundamental assumptions of the Western metaphysics, i.e., logic, the distinction 
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between subject-object and that between real and apparent world, and causality, 
are connected with each other, and how Nietzsche’s critique or denial of one of 
them is necessarily involves the denial and the critique of the others. Nietzsche, 
by showing the perspectival, and also the provisional, character of these 
assumptions, undermines Western metaphysics.  
 Nietzsche’s placing of the origin of causality in the subject, as 
constructed out of the distinctions of subject-object and doer-deed, is completely 
in accord with his perspectivism. In the sense that there is no causality either in 
the physical outer world or in the inner world of the subject, yet it is the subject, 
as a power center, that imposes causality on both worlds. That is, the subject 
interprets the world as being a causally related unity, in which case the world 
becomes a livable place; i.e., predictable, calculable, etc. Hence, as in the case 
that we need to construct a stable and predictable world, the notion of causality is 
another perspectival interpretation of the world.  
 Nietzsche sees the notion of causality as the way to secure that the world 
is a familiar place. When we are faced with events and entities that are strange 
and unfamiliar, we feel scared and try to make them familiar. As Nietzsche 
states, our first respond in such situations is to get rid of them by explaining their 
causes in terms of familiar and known concepts or entities. “With the unknown, 
one is confronted with danger, discomfort, and care; the first instinct is to abolish 
these painful states. First principle: any explanation is better than none.”376 In 
such a condition of distress, he notes, we are not concerned with the truth of our 
explanation, but its utility for life; we try to get rid of such painful states by 
choosing that explanation which worked well before and which would give the 
quickest relief without considering its truth concerning the actual state of the 
world. Therefore, relief from conditions of distress and pain, or pleasure in 
general, becomes our criterion for truth. Hence, our search for causality in the 
physical world is “conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of fear.”377 On 
this ground, Nietzsche rejects Kant’s view of causality as a category (of relation). 
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Kant, agreeing with Hume, believes that experience cannot give us the notion of 
causality; yet, departing from Hume, he claims that causality is one of those a 
priori categories of our understanding, which make experience possible.378 For 
him, causality, as well as space and time, are the conditions or the possibilities of 
experience. In the “Second Analogy” of his Critique of Pure Reason, for 
example, Kant presents this crucial role of the causality in the following way: 
“Experience itself—in other words, empirical knowledge of appearances—is 
thus possible only in so far as we subject the succession of appearances, and 
therefore all alteration, to the law of causality; and, as likewise follows, the 
appearances, as objects of experience, are themselves possible only in 
conformity with the law.”379 However, for Nietzsche, there is no such an a priori 
category of understanding, and all of our categories of reason are mere 
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Oxford University Press, 2006, (Section 4, Part I), p. 24) Relations of ideas are analytical 
concepts or truths, and it is impossible to claim the validity of their opposite without falling into a 
deep contradiction. However, in the case of matters of fact, since the only way to demonstrate 
their truth is to appeal experience and observation, and their opposite could be claimed or thought 
without contradiction. Hence, for Hume, the law of causality, which is a matter of fact, could not 
be demonstrated or proved by appealing these two methods; neither by “the mere operation of 
thought” nor by the experience. That is, it is not possible to demonstrate the truth or falsity of the 
law of causality through these methods. So far, Kant agrees with Hume, yet, he claims that there 
is another, third, way of proof; that is, transcendental proof. Such proofs depend on the 
possibility of experience. That is, for Kant, to prove the existence of causality, in this method, we 
must show that causality is required for the possibility of our experience of the world. Simply 
put, according to Kant, if there is no law of causality operative in the world of phenomena, or 
appearances, then there is no way to secure the objective validity of my perceptions that 
sequentially follow one another. These successive perceptions, or the sequential structure of my 
perceptions, might be illusions, in which case we could not speak of empirical knowledge. “Thus 
the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) according to which the subsequent event, 
that which happens, is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by something preceding 
in conformity with a rule—in other words, the relation of cause to effect—is the condition of the 
objective validity of our empirical judgments, in respect of the series of perceptions, and so of 
their empirical truth; that is to say, it is the condition of experience.” (Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, B247, p. 227.)  
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perspectival interpretations; they are invented by us to preserve ourselves by 
providing us with a quick understanding of the world. “The inventive force that 
invented categories,” says Nietzsche, “labored in the service of our needs, 
namely of our need for security, for quick understanding on the basis of signs 
and sounds, for means of abbreviation:—‘substance,’ ‘subject,’ ‘object,’ ‘being,’ 
‘becoming’ have nothing to do with metaphysical truths.”380 Hence, the category 
of causality is nothing but another illusion that facilitates life, and thinking of the 
world as constituting a causal connected unity is nothing but to render what is 
unfamiliar and terrifying.  
There is no such thing as a sense of causality, as Kant thinks. 
One is surprised, one is disturbed, one desires something 
familiar to hold on to—As soon as we are shown something 
old in the new, we are calmed. The supposed instinct for 
causality is only fear of the unfamiliar and the attempt to 
discover something familiar in it—a search, not for causes, but 
for the familiar.381 
 Nietzsche, rejecting Kant’s notion of causality as what makes experience 
possible, claims that what we sense is nothing but a series of events following 
each other; there is nothing of necessity in those series that compels events to 
follow each other in a regular way. According to Nietzsche, “[f]rom the fact that 
something ensues regularly and ensues calculably, it does not follow that it 
ensues necessarily.”382 Since, as we know, the world is the totality of the power 
struggles among the power centers, and every power center is determined 
through this struggle. This determination is not the result of obeying a law, but 
the result of the struggle. As Nietzsche puts it  
[t]he unalterable sequence of certain phenomena demonstrates 
no “law” but a power relationship between two or more forces. 
To say “But this relation itself remains constant” is to say no 
more than “One and the same force cannot also be another 
force.”—It is a question, not of succession, but of 
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interpretation, a process in which the individual successive 
moments are not related to one another as cause effect—383 
 Hence, the necessity involved in the law of causality is only a fiction; that 
is, “[n]ecessity is not a fact but an interpretation.”384 Thus, Kant’s positing of the 
causality as an a priori category of understanding is nothing but an 
interpretation, which aims at ensuring that the physical or the outer world is an 
ordered and predictable unity. However, as the above quotations suggests, if we 
could speak of the law of causality, then we could speak of it only as an a 
posteriori concept, not as an a priori concept, or a category of understanding. 
That is, we attain the concept of causality only after we have perceived events 
and entities in the physical world. We perceive the events in the physical world, 
which seem so chaotic to maintain our existence, and construct a well-ordered 
and predictable world by interpreting those events through causality and other 
useful fictions. Furthermore, when the utility of causality is proven, we regard it 
as an a priori category. Hence, causality, as well as other useful fictions, 
becomes an indispensable part of our cognitive mechanism.  
[T]he categories of reason: they could have prevailed, after 
much groping and fumbling, through their relative utility—
There came a point when one collected them together, raised 
them to consciousness as a whole—and when one commanded 
them, i.e., when they had the effect of a command—From then 
on, they counted as a priori, as beyond experience, as 
irrefutable. And yet perhaps they represent nothing more than 
the expediency of a certain race and species—their utility alone 
is their “truth”—385 
 Therefore, causality becomes a paradigmatic explanatory tool, and we 
believe that we explain an event when we succeed in situating it in a causal 
sequence. However, for Nietzsche, to analyze an event in terms of causality does 
not provide us with the explanation of the event, but with a mere description of 
it. First of all, in order for us to apply causality as an explanatory principle we 
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should conceive the events as events in themselves. That is, to discern the cause 
and the effect in an event, it should be completed. Only after the event is 
completed and we see the result, or the effect, we could find the cause of that 
event by reversing the time. Cause, which comes first in the order of cause-effect 
relation, is produced by us according to the effect we experience. “In fact,” says 
Nietzsche, “we invent all causes after the schema of the effect: the latter is 
known to us—Conversely, we are not in a position to predict of any thing what it 
will ‘effect.’”386 Without seeing the effect we could not speak of the cause, or as 
Nietzsche puts it, “[b]efore the effect one believes in different causes than one 
does afterward.”387 Hence, applying causality as an explanatory principle 
requires that the event should be present to us as an event-in-itself; that is, event 
should be completed. However, such an event is only possible in the world of 
being, not of becoming; in a world where becoming reigns, there, we could never 
see a completed event. As we know, for Nietzsche, the world, in which we live, 
is the world of becoming, or the world of dynamic power quanta, thus, in this 
world, there is no point of time, in which we could speak of a completed event 
without falsifying that world. “Cause and effect,” says Nietzsche, “such a duality 
probably never exists; in truth we are confronted by a continuum out of which 
we isolate a couple of pieces, just as we perceive motion only as isolated points 
and then infer it without actually seeing it.”388 Then, what we do by causal 
interpretations could never be an explanation of the event; at most, it could be a 
description of the event in terms of the imaginary but familiar things and entities. 
Nietzsche says the following concerning the possibility of explanation through 
causality: “. . . how could we possibly explain anything? We operate only with 
things that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, 
divisible space.”389 Therefore, causality appears as another fiction which 
complements our illusionary world view by providing us with a law that secures 
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our world of being and the changes that occur in it. In other words, we create a 
stable and predictable world through applying logic, subject-object and apparent-
real world distinctions, and other subsequent concepts following them; yet, 
although we believe in the stability of this world, there appear changes in this 
world; thus, to secure the stability of this illusory world, these changes are 
presented as occurring in accordance with a law, namely the law of causality.  
 Consequently, for Nietzsche, all of our eternal and honorable truths, 
beliefs, and values, including causality, logic, subject-object and apparent-real 
world distinctions, are perspectival illusions and nothing more; they are only our 
“human, all too human,” interpretations of the world, and they have no value 
other than their value for our survival. Through his perspectivism, Nietzsche tries 
to show the provisional character of our truths. As we have seen, his 
perspectivism is based on his doctrine of the will to power. That is, 
perspectivism could be seen as the explanation of the way in which a power 
quantum or center perceives and understands the world and its environment. We 
know that, to Nietzsche, every existing entity in the world is simply will to 
power, and as wills to power they search ceaselessly after power. Therefore, 
every power center, whether as a quantum or a constellation, struggles with 
every other power center for power, even to the extent of self-sacrifice. As we 
have seen earlier, according to Nietzsche, self-preservation is a side-effect of this 
power struggle, not its aim.390  
 The concept of power struggle is very important for Nietzsche and his 
philosophy. Since the world is nothing but the totality of the power struggle of 
the power centers. Through this struggle every power quanta determines each 
other reciprocally. Actually, this determination process is interpretation. That is, 
each power center involves in the power struggle and interprets each other 
through its own perspective; interpretation is a process of actively shaping, 
structuring, determining and assimilating the environing conditions and the 
world to create the conditions of preservation and power enhancement. If a 
power center’s interpretation of the world results in an increase in its power it is 
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a good (true) interpretation, otherwise it is a bad (false) interpretation. In both 
cases, there appears a change in the environment, hence a new interpretation is 
required. Thus the process of interpretation lasts forever. For Nietzsche, every 
power center lusts for power, it is this lust for power that determines the nature 
and direction of its interpretations. This lust for power is the perspective that 
guides the interpretation process. Hence, all power centers, including us humans 
as complex power centers, interpret, i.e., shape, structure, determine and 
assimilate, the world through this perspective.  
 This is the core of Nietzsche’s perspectivism; we, human beings, are 
power centers and our honored and the strongly believed truths and values are 
only the ways through which we structure the world according to requirements 
of our preservation and enhancement, yet we stick to them and take them as 
eternal truths. Hence, one interpretation of the world, among the countless 
possible ones, accepted as the only true interpretation of the world, for 
Nietzsche, becomes an insurmountable obstacle to the further development and 
enhancement of our life. Those fundamental assumptions of the Western 
metaphysics, such as, logic, causality, and apparent-real world and subject-object 
distinctions, are such perspectival interpretations.  
 According to Nietzsche, all of these fundamental assumptions and other 
subsequent assumptions following them are based on a stable and predictable 
world order. That is, their validity, or reality is dependent upon the existence of 
an unchanging and well-ordered world structure. On the other hand, such a stable 
world order is possible only on the condition that these assumptions must be 
valid, or real. Hence, there appears a vicious circle: in order to prove that the 
world in which we live is stable and predictable it must be shown that the entities 
and events in this world behave or act in accordance with the rules and laws 
derived from those fundamental assumptions; yet, to prove that these rules and 
laws are real, or they really exist, it must be shown that the world is stable and 
predictable. Since assuming the stability of the world provides us with conditions 
of our survival, we do not recognize or bother about the circularity of such 
reasoning, or the implications of the stability of the world assumption and our 
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cognitive mechanisms for maintaining this stable world understanding. Put 
differently, our conception of the world as stable and predictable and our 
cognitive mechanisms and tools are interdependent fictions and there is no way 
to prove either of them without appealing to the other, but such a proof leads to a 
vicious circle, and thus these fictions could not be accepted as corresponding to 
the nature of the world. According to Nietzsche, one may claim that they are true 
since they work and preserve our existence in the world; yet, for him, 
preservation of man could not be accepted as a proof. Hence, what we have is 
nothing but an illusory stable world and fictitious laws and rules that supports 
and works within this world.  
 Nietzsche is not against such fictions; he admits the necessity of creating 
such fictions for the preservation and enhancement of any species or any 
individual. However, he is against sticking to such fictions. Since the world is in 
a ceaseless flux, it presents us with infinite opportunities for our preservation and 
enhancement. To exploit these opportunities, we must be aware of the 
provisional character of our truths and beliefs, and we must also be open to new 
interpretations of the world. Otherwise, if we accept an interpretation as eternally 
true, and base our life on it, then we could not exploit other opportunities 
presented by the world. Thus, we live an impoverished life, even without 
noticing other possibilities of life. It is this consequence of the stable world view 
that Nietzsche harshly criticized. For him, it is the weak ones who defend and 
accept such a world view as the reality, since believing it maintains their 
existence; yet a richer and fuller life, or increasing power, requires risking one’s 
life. Consequently, we can say that Nietzsche’s perspectivism should not be 
understood as a mere epistemological theory. It makes new ways of conceiving 






TRUTH AND CORRESPONDENCE THEORY 
 
 
In the preceding two chapters, we have explored the fundamentals of Nietzsche’s 
epistemology: his construction of the world as becoming through the doctrine of 
will to power and his perspectivism. We have gained an insight into his general 
criticism of our traditional conceptualization of the world as the world of being 
and our traditional metaphysical assumptions about this world. Now, it is time to 
proceed to Nietzsche’s notion of truth, which is the most controversial part of his 
epistemology; it is controversial, since, in his writings there are conflicting 
passages concerning the value and the existence of truth. Although, throughout 
preceding chapters, we have dealt briefly with this concept, we have not 
thoroughly explored it. What does Nietzsche mean by truth? Does his conception 
of truth fall under one of the traditional or widely accepted categories of truth; 
i.e., correspondence, coherence, or pragmatic theories of truth? These questions 
are the most frequently discussed questions among the contemporary Nietzsche 
scholars.391 Now, let us try to answer these questions under the light of the 
preceding presentation of his perspectivism. 
4.1 Nietzsche’s Concept of Truth  
Nietzsche’s thoughts about truth seem so conflicting that anyone skimming 
through his writings may easily conclude that his philosophy is a philosophy of 
hopeless contradictions. It is easy to find many passages in which he seems to 
accept and praise truth, whereas it is also very easy to find passages in which he 
seems to deny and despise truth. To illustrate, he praises truth by saying that  
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their attention to the philosophy of Nietzsche.  
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[a]t every step one has to wrestle for truth; one has had to 
surrender for it almost everything to which the heart, to which 
our love, our trust in life, cling otherwise. That requires 
greatness of soul: the service of truth is the hardest service.392 
. . . our treasure is where the beehives of our knowledge are.393 
Furthermore, Nietzsche praises those who  
have trained themselves to sacrifice all desirability to truth, 
every truth, even plain, harsh, ugly, repellent, unchristian, 
immoral truth.—For such truths do exist.394 
 On the other hand, one may easily find lots of passages in which 
Nietzsche denies the possibility of attaining truth, and also in which he demises 
the concept truth. To illustrate,  
Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions . . .395  
We simply lack any organ for knowledge, for “truth”; we 
“know” (or believe or imagine) just as much may be useful in 
the interest of the human herd, the species . . .396 
Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life 
could not live.397 
What are man’s truths ultimately? Merely his irrefutable 
errors.398 
“Truth”: this, according to my way of thinking, does not 
necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but in the most 
fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation 
to one another.399 
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 As it is clear from the above quotations, Nietzsche may appear to be in a 
very deep contradiction on the issues of truth and knowledge.  It is this 
seemingly obvious, prima facie, contradiction that gives rise to various 
incompatible and conflicting interpretations concerning the Nietzsche’s views 
about truth and knowledge. According to Clark, at the basis of these conflicting 
interpretations there lie the Nietzsche scholars’ approaches to the contradiction in 
Nietzsche’s thoughts about truth. She mentions that there are two possible 
approaches to this contradiction; one is to deny the existence of it and try to 
show that it is merely an apparent contradiction; and the other alternative is to 
accept the existence of the contradiction and to argue that we could learn 
something about truth from it.400 If I am to choose one of them as my position, I 
would choose the first one without hesitation. Since, in my opinion, there is no 
contradiction in Nietzsche’s views concerning truth. 
 We have already seen some of the controversial aspects of Nietzsche’s 
notion of truth in our discussion of his perspectivism; especially, the self-
contradiction stemming from his denial of truth; if his claim that there is no truth 
is true, then, there is at least one truth.401 However, we have also seen that when 
we evaluate his denial of truth in accordance not with our traditional conception 
of truth, which is based on a static world-view, but with his criterion of truth, 
which depends on the dynamic world of power quanta, the accusation of self-
contradiction becomes meaningless. Remember that Nietzsche’s criterion for 
truth was the enhancement of power: if any belief or idea enhances my power it 
is true, otherwise it is false. Such a view of truth does not involve the concept of 
                                               
400 See, Clark, p. 4. Clark names the first group of interpretations as traditional and the second 
group as non-traditional. She further divides these groups into subgroups in accordance with the 
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concentrate on this division. Focusing on the traditional and nontraditional division and 
proceeding upon this division is strategically not suitable for my purposes. In my opinion, 
proceeding with the attributed theories of truth, or dividing the interpretations in accordance with 
the truth theories is much more beneficial than Clark’s division. Because, when put together 
under the title of the attributed truth theories, the contrast between the traditional and 
nontraditional interpretations becomes much more clear. For a more detailed grouping of the 
scholars according to the theories they attributed to Nietzsche, see Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: 
Naturalism and Interpretation, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 28-29, n. 17. 
401 See, Chapter 3.4. 
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contradiction and absolute truth, since a belief might both be true and false at the 
same time for different individuals. Furthermore, truth or falsity of a belief might 
also change in the course of time; i.e., a belief that enhanced my power in the 
past might be in contradiction with the one that enhances my power now. As we 
have already dealt with this issue,402 I will proceed with the contradictions 
resulting from his affirmative and negative statements regarding truth. 
 In his affirmative statements about truth, Nietzsche refers to the truth in 
accordance with his criterion of truth. Through his criterion of truth, Nietzsche 
emphasizes the provisional character of truth. That is, all of our beliefs and ideas 
must be taken as true in so far as they enhance our power. This means that there 
are no absolute truths that would enhance our power and life eternally. Since the 
world of power quanta is dynamic and an ever-changing one, truths concerning it 
must be dynamic too. As we have seen in our discussion of perspectivism and 
interpretation, every change in the world requires new and fresh interpretations, 
and every new interpretation means a change in the world.403 Therefore, clinging 
to the traditional conception of truth, which regards truth as absolute and 
correspondence to the reality, is not favorable with regard to enhancement of 
power. As Nietzsche says, “[i]n a world that is essentially false, truthfulness 
would be an antinatural tendency.”404 Since, such a tendency degrades life; it 
prevents us from becoming aware of, and exploiting, the infinite possibilities of 
the world. 
 On the other hand, what Nietzsche praises in those statements concerning 
truth is the perspectival truth; i.e., one that does not demand correspondence, and 
is not absolute. This conception of truth requires that one must have the courage 
of denying the formerly useful truths, i.e., that preserved and enhanced our lives, 
for the sake of further enhancement of power. Such a denial or abandonment 
means to risk one’s life. Yet, for Nietzsche, this task is too hard even for the 
most courageous ones, since it is an ever-continuing one. Thus, he avers that 
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“[e]ven the most courageous among us only rarely has the courage for that which 
he really knows.”405 Truths that are praised by him in those affirmative 
statements are fully compatible with his doctrine of the will to power and his 
perspectival epistemology. The following passage, in which Nietzsche makes a 
reckoning of his life at his fourties, strikingly expresses his thoughts concerning 
the above mentioned risking life for the sake of knowledge and truth: 
In media vita [in mid-life].—No, life has not disappointed me. 
On the contrary, I find it truer, more desirable and mysterious 
every year—ever since the day when the great liberator came 
to me: the idea that life could be an experiment of the seeker 
for knowledge—and not a duty, not a calamity, not trickery.—
And knowledge itself: let it be something else for others; for 
example, a bed to rest on, or the way to such a bed, or a 
diversion, or a form of leisure—for me, it is a world of dangers 
and victories in which heroic feelings, too, find places to dance 
and play. “Life as a means to knowledge”—with this principle 
in one’s heart one can live not only boldly but even gaily, and 
laugh gaily, too. And who knows how to laugh anyway and 
live well if he does not first know a good deal about war and 
victory?406 
 There is no reason to claim that Nietzsche’s views concerning truths are 
contradictory, for he sometimes seems to be praising truth whereas sometimes he 
seems to be rejecting it as nonsense. As we have just seen, when he praises or 
speaks affirmatively about truth he refers to the truth, which is compatible with 
his doctrine of the will to power and perspectivism. On the other hand, when 
Nietzsche speaks in a negative manner about truth, he always refers to the 
traditional conception of truth, namely, correspondence theory of truth, which 
regards truth as the correspondence to the facts, and which takes truths as 
absolute.  
   Nietzsche’s rejection of the absolute truth and the correspondence as the 
criterion of truth could be regarded as the natural consequence of his doctrine of 
will to power. That is, absolute truth and correspondence requires a world that is 
stable and changeless. Otherwise, in a world that is continuously changing, we 
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could not speak of absolute truth and correspondence of our beliefs, ideas, or 
propositions to the facts, or to the world. As we have seen, for Nietzsche, the 
world is a chaos resulting from the power struggle among the power centers. 
Hence, in the Nietzschean world of power quanta, correspondence as criterion of 
truth does not work; yet, if we still insist on applying it as a criterion of truth, we 
could never find a truth. Since, as we have seen while discussing perspectivism, 
our conception of the world as a stable and predictable unity is an illusion for 
Nietzsche, our truths judged by the criterion of correspondence, which is based 
on this stable world view, are also illusions and errors. This is what Nietzsche 
means when he denies our truths. Hence, the contradiction stemming from 
Nietzsche’s affirmative and negative statements concerning truth becomes an 
apparent one. 
 After this brief explanation concerning the contradictions in Nietzsche’s 
use of the concept of truth, I want to emphasize another important aspect of 
Nietzsche’s notion of truth. Our traditional conception of truth is, as we have 
often noted, based on the stable world view, in which there are beings. Such a 
notion of truth assumes that truth is out there in the world of being, and our task 
is to discover it. However, for Nietzsche, as there is nothing stable in the world, 
as every power center determines, and is also determined by every other power 
center through power struggle, there is no such a truth in the world that is waiting 
to be found out; rather, in such a world, for Nietzsche, truth appears as 
something that is created by power centers in their struggle with each other.  
“Truth” is . . . not something there, that might be found or 
discovered—but that must be created and that gives a name to 
process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no 
end—introducing truth, as a process in infinitum, an active 
determining—not a becoming-conscious of something that is in 
itself firm and determined. It is a word for the “will to 
power.”407 
 What is presented here is simply the perspectivism is at work. That is, if 
we remember that every power center constructs its world by interpreting, i.e., 
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assimilating, structuring, shaping, and imposing meaning, from the perspective 
of power increase, then, as the above passage suggests, through this process of 
interpretation, a power center also creates its own truth. Hence, perspectivism, or 
the perspectival interpretation, becomes the process of truth creation. This means 
that, since in the process of interpretation every power center determines and is 
determined by every other power center, every power center mutually 
determines, and hence becomes, every other’s truth. However, since every power 
center is quantitatively different from each other, i.e., the degree of power of 
every power center is different, and since there are active and passive power 
centers, therefore, active and powerful centers are the ones who are most 
influential in this process of truth creation. These active power centers are those 
who would sacrifice their lives for the sake of power, for the sake of increasing 
their power. Because of this, for Nietzsche, truths created by these active power 
centers are more valuable than the passive ones; yet since the active and 
courageous ones only rarely appear and disappear soon, truth and values of the 
passive, weak, mediocre and cowards prevail.408 Nietzsche expresses his 
preference as follows:  
Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself 
has imported into them: the finding is called science, the 
importing—art, religion, love, pride. Even this should be a 
piece of childishness, one should carry on with both and be 
well disposed toward both—some should find; others—we 
others!—should import!409 
 Consequently, as we have seen, Nietzsche’s notion of truth is very 
different from our traditional notion of truth. This difference is the result of his 
construction of the world as becoming. This construction, leads him to reject the 
existence of absolute truths, and to declare that our truths are provisional. 
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Related with his construction of the world, Nietzsche rejects correspondence as a 
criterion of truth, and pronounces the enhancement of power, or the feeling of 
power as his criterion of truth. Another fundamental difference, again stemming 
from his notion of the world of becoming, is his view that truth not as something 
to be discovered, but as something to be actively created. These differences, in 
my opinion, mean the total destruction of our traditional cognitive paradigm, of 
our perception of the world and ourselves, and of our axiological systems based 
upon those truths accredited by our traditional understanding of the world. 
 However, most of Nietzsche scholars treat him as if there are no such 
differences, and try to categorize him by attributing a truth theory to his 
perspectivism. It seems to me that behind such attempts there is the aim of 
humanizing the Übermensch. Sticking a label over Nietzsche’s philosophy is 
nothing but to judge his thoughts through what is ceaselessly rejected in his 
writings. To use the metaphor that Nietzsche uses in describing the way how our 
thinking process occurs, it is nothing but putting Nietzsche’s thoughts to 
Procrustes’ bed;410 “In our thought,” says Nietzsche, “the essential future is 
fitting new material into old schemas (=Procrustes’ bed), making equal what is 
new.”411  
 Let us, now, keeping these peculiarities and differences of Nietzsche’s 
understanding of truth in our minds, investigate firstly his critique of the 
correspondence theory of truth, than, into the claims of those scholars who 
attribute correspondence theory of truth to his perspectivism.     
                                               
410 Procrustes, “also called Polypemon, Damastes, or Procoptas,   in Greek legend, a robber 
dwelling somewhere in Attica—in some versions, in the neighbourhood of Eleusis. His father 
was said to be Poseidon. Procrustes had an iron bed (or, according to some accounts, two beds) 
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he cut off the legs to make the body fit the bed's length. In either event the victim died. 
Ultimately Procrustes was slain by his own method at the hands of the young Attic hero Theseus, 
who as a young man went about slaying robbers and monsters that pervaded the countryside. The 
“bed of Procrustes,” or “Procrustean bed,” has become proverbial for arbitrarily—and perhaps 
ruthlessly—forcing someone or something to fit into an unnatural scheme or pattern. 
(“Procrustes,” In Encyclopædia Britannica, accessed December 25, 2006, from Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online: http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9061475). 
411 WP, §499, p. 273. 
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4.2 Nietzsche and Correspondence Theory of Truth 
The correspondence theory of truth is not a recently developed theory; it is the 
oldest truth theory that has been so far. It is usually traced back to Plato and 
Aristotle. It is Aristotle’s following definition of truth which makes him the 
father of the correspondence theory of truth: “To say of what is that it is not, or 
of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is 
not that it is not, is true.”412 The basic claim of the correspondence theory is that 
“‘truth is correspondence with the facts’ or ‘truth is agreement with reality.’”413 
That is, what we say, believe, or think is true on the condition that it corresponds 
to the external world. Such a correspondence requires a stable world order, 
which means that correspondence theory works only in the world of being, not of 
becoming. However, as we have seen, Nietzsche’s world is that of becoming and 
excludes correspondence. Nietzsche’s main critique of correspondence proceeds 
on this ground, and we have already touched upon this issue in Chapter 3. 
However, it is not the only critique that Nietzsche directed to the correspondence 
theory; he further criticizes this theory for its self-contradictory nature.  
 The correspondence theory of truth requires that there must be 
correspondence between our thoughts and the reality out there. However, this 
criterion of truth assumes that we are able to compare our thoughts and the 
external reality from the outside. In other words, to determine the degree of 
correspondence between a thought, a belief, or an idea and a fact in the external 
world there must be a transcendent vantage point from which our belief, or our 
cognitive act and the external fact, or the content of our cognition, which is 
supposed to correspond, could be seen as they are in themselves. This means that 
we do not need to apply correspondence as a criterion of truth, since we have 
direct access to the external world as it is in itself. Hence, we could attain true 
knowledge of the fact, and this knowledge transcends the correspondence as a 
criterion; i.e., we need no to employ correspondence as a criterion for evaluating 
                                               
412 Aristotle, Metaphysics, (Book IV, Chapter 7), p. 122. 
413 Richard L. Kirkham, “Truth, Correspondence Theory of,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge, 1998. 
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truth of our knowledge since it is obviously true. We could only have our human 
perspective to determine the degree of correspondence; hence, whether such a 
vantage exists or not, we could not access to it. Even if we suppose that we may 
have access to that vantage, as Nietzsche’s perspectivism implies, we always 
look from our perspective, which means that we fall into an infinite regress. That 
is to say, in that case, we would be appealing to our own perspective to 
determine the adequacy of the correspondence between our perspective and the 
world. Yet, as we appeal to our perspective to determine if our perspective 
corresponds to the world, we should again determine the degree of 
correspondence between our second perspective and the correspondence between 
our first perspective and the world, and so on. Consequently, correspondence 
could not be verified by applying to itself as criterion. Nietzsche’s critique of the 
intellect’s capacity to criticize itself carries the same tone: “. . . is it likely that a 
tool is able to criticize its own fitness?”414 asks Nietzsche, and answers in the 
following way: 
The intellect cannot criticize itself, simply because it cannot be 
compared with other species of intellect and because its 
capacity to know would be revealed only in the presence of 
“true reality,” i.e., because in order to criticize the intellect we 
should have to be a higher being with “absolute knowledge.” 
This presupposes that, distinct from every perspective kind of 
outlook or sensual-spiritual appropriation, something exists, an 
“in-itself.”—But the psychological derivation of the belief in 
things forbids us to speak of “things-in-themselves.”415 
 Nietzsche’s criterion of truth does not fall into such a regressive 
circularity. Because it could be applied to itself without contradicting, or 
violating, the very thing it proclaims. That is, unlike the criterion of 
                                               
414 WP, §410, p. 221. 
415 WP, §473, p. 263. Nietzsche’s critique of Kant for his investigation into the nature of 
knowledge without questioning its existence in Critique of Pure Reason follows this line of 
reasoning. Consider the following: “The proton pseudos [First falsehood or original error]: how 
is the fact of knowledge possible? is knowledge a fact at all? what is knowledge? If we do not 
know what knowledge is, we cannot possibly answer the question whether there is knowledge.—
Very well! But if I do not already ‘know’ whether there is knowledge, whether there can be 
knowledge, I cannot reasonably put the question ‘what is knowledge?’ Kant believes in the fact 




correspondence, his criterion of the increase in the feeling of power could be 
determined without appealing to anything, i.e., to a vantage, outside the power 
center. In order to test whether a belief of mine increases or decreases my feeling 
of power I do not need to test my feelings by, or with regard to, an external 
measure. Further, Nietzsche’s criterion is compatible with his dynamic world 
view, as our truths are interpretations they change according to the changes 
occurring in the world, and as such continue to increase our power. However, if 
we insist on using the correspondence theory of truth in this world of becoming, 
we could never find a truth; in such a situation what we regard as truths, which 
are verified by the correspondence criterion, would be mere illusions. This is 
what Nietzsche means when calls our truths as illusions. 
4.2.1 Is the Correspondence Theory of Truth Inherent in Nietzsche’s 
Perspectivism? 
Correspondence theory of truth is the most common label used for Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism. It is very interesting to see again that Nietzsche is accused of 
having the very thing which he ceaselessly rejected or opposed, as in the case of 
Heidegger’s and Richardson’s claims about a Nietzschean metaphysics.416 The 
tendency to attribute a truth theory to Nietzsche, actually, seems to have been 
increasing after analytical philosophy had dominated the academic philosophy 
throughout the world. This domination of analytical philosophy resulted in the 
(almost) total rejection and degradation of the continental philosophy and the 
philosophers belonging to that tradition.417 Under the influence of analytical 
tradition, which requires clarity and well-formed arguments as the criteria of 
                                               
416 See, Chapters 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.  
417 Since analytical philosophy, imitating sciences, aims at certainty and clarity in its analyses, 
whereas continental philosophy tends to make the problems, which it inquires, more complicated 
through its openness to sustained inquiry. That is, analytical philosophy either solves or dissolves 
the problems, which it analyzes, yet, continental philosophy inquires the problems again and 
again, without reaching a certain and clear answer or solution. Because of this, analytical 
philosophy and continental philosophy seem to be opposed to each other. For an interesting 
viewpoint concerning the relation between analytical and continental philosophy, see Babette E. 
Babich, “On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, 
Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy,” in A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and 
Continental Philosophy, ed. C. G. Prado, New York: Humanity Books, 2003, pp. 63-103 
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doing good philosophy, contemporary Nietzsche scholars started to investigate 
into his philosophy employing logical, or linguistic, analysis. Regarding truth as 
a matter simply of language and of meaning, these scholars concentrated only 
upon only those parts of Nietzsche’s conception of truth that are linguistically 
analyzable. That is, most of the original and critical parts of his philosophy 
remain outside of the concerns of the analytically oriented scholars, who seem to 
have misunderstood Nietzsche. As Babich rightly notes, “analytic philosophers 
typically take only as much as they can ‘stand’ from Nietzsche, not puzzling over 
but instead (this is the analytic tactic) dismissing the rest as unsupportable . . . to 
test Nietzsche’s philosophy, not only his own complicated terms, but on the 
standards of logical exigence or the received discourses of the day leaves 
Nietzsche lacking.”418 In my opinion, this tendency to take only those parts 
which could be handled within the boundaries of analytical philosophy is the 
reason why they attribute a truth theory to Nietzsche.  
 Furthermore, it is very interesting to see that the number of the 
analytically oriented scholars, who have been dealing with Nietzsche increases. 
It is interesting because Nietzsche maybe the most difficult philosopher to be 
studied with the tools of analytical philosophy; since his thoughts are not so clear 
and distinct to apply logical or linguistic analysis; Nietzsche rejects language’s 
capacity to express any truth, or reality, because of the metaphysics inherent in it, 
rejects logic and its principles as a tool for finding truth, praises contradictions as 
the implication of the richness of thoughts, etc. One possible answer to this 
concern of analytic philosophers with Nietzsche maybe the following 
observation of Kaufmann: “it is plain how often professors have dealt with 
Nietzsche because he was fashionable and the students were reading him. But 
most professors also want to be respectable. In the United States, beginning in 
the 1960s, that meant assimilating Nietzsche to analytic philosophy, while in 
                                               
418 Babich, “On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy,” p. 83. Babich’s article, not only 
elaborates the differences between the approaches of the analytic and the continental traditions to 
philosophical issues, but also to the reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially his 
conception of truth, by the analytic tradition and the influence of this reception over the 
continental tradition’s reception of Nietzsche. 
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Germany it meant for a long time being Kantian.”419 Whether this observation is 
true or not, it is clear that, among analytic philosophers—Maudemarie Clark, 
Robert Nola, John Richardson, Bernd Magnus, Arthur C. Danto, Brian Leiter, 
and Richard Schacht, to name some of them—there has been a tendency towards 
Nietzsche’s philosophy. Moreover, it is also clear that most of the analytical 
philosophers dealing with Nietzsche attributed a truth theory to Nietzsche: Clark 
and Richardson attributed correspondence theory, Nola both correspondence and 
pragmatic theories, Danto pragmatic theory. 420  
 I want to concentrate upon Clark’s attribution of correspondence theory 
of truth in the remainder of this chapter. There are various reasons for my 
focusing on Clark’s attribution; first, our present context is the correspondence 
theory of truth; second, she proposes arguments against other competing 
theories, i.e., pragmatic and coherence theories; third, Clark’s study is referred to 
as an example of good scholarly work on Nietzsche. Now, let us see the details 
of Clark’s construction of Nietzsche as a correspondence theorist. 
4.2.2 Clark and Convention T: Correspondence, Pragmatic, and Coherence 
Theories of Truth 
Before going into details of Maudemarie Clark’s argumentation that she used in 
her attribution of correspondence theory of truth to Nietzsche, I would like to 
emphasize that there is no reference to any of Nietzsche’s published or 
unpublished works in his argumentation. Her argumentation proceeds completely 
through the discussions of analytic philosophers concerning truth theories, not 
through Nietzsche’s views concerning truth. This tendency is, in my opinion, an 
example of above presented observation of Babich regarding the approaches of 
analytic scholars to Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
                                               
419 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber: Discovering the Mind, Vol. 2, New 
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1991, p. 165. See also, my discussion of Leiter’s “Memorandum” 
in Chapter 2.4. 
420 See, Clark, Chapter 2, pp. 29-61; Richardson, pp. 223-257; Robert Nola, “Nietzsche’s Theory 
of Truth and Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XLVII, No. 4, 1987, pp. 
525-61; Danto, pp. 50-81.  
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 Clark’s strategy is basically presenting the correspondence theory of truth 
as the only theory that is suitable for securing our truths by the help of “Tarski’s 
Convention T,” and eliminating other theories by using her “principle of 
equivalence” derived from Convention T.  However, such an analysis has 
nothing to do with Nietzsche’s conception of truth. Nietzsche’s truth is not a 
matter for linguistic or logical analysis; his truth comes directly from life, and it 
must be judged from the point of view of life. As Nietzsche says “[l]ife is no 
argument.”421 Hence, for my part, trying to understand and judge Nietzsche’s 
notion of truth through the methods of analytic philosophical tradition, at least in 
the way that current Nietzsche scholars have used, results in either missing or 
misunderstanding Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
 Maudemarie Clark, at the outset, divides correspondence theory of truth 
into two versions; one is the metaphysical version and the other one is the 
common sense version. Following Hilary Putnam, Clark names the metaphysical 
version of the correspondence theory as metaphysical realism. For Clark, 
metaphysical realism is “the doctrine that reality is something-in-itself, that its 
nature is determinately constituted independently of us”; on the other hand, there 
are common sense version of the correspondence theory. Clark calls this as 
minimal correspondence theory, is that “which combines the equivalence 
principle with common sense or ontological realism.”422 After this division, 
Clark asserts that Nietzsche rejects or denies the former, and accepts the latter 
one; that is, for her, Nietzsche’s truth theory is the common sense version of 
correspondence theory.423 This division opens the way for her to proceed on 
purely analytical grounds. 
 Clark’s attribution of correspondence theory to Nietzsche heavily 
depends upon her conviction that the equivalence principle derived from Tarski’s 
                                               
421 GS, §121, p. 177. 
422 Clark, pp. 40-41. 
423 This division could be seen as the application of the analytic tactic, which is defined by 
Babich as the elimination of those parts of the issue under consideration that exceed the limits of 
the analytical philosophy, and focusing on the remainder of it. (See, the quotation on p. 163.) 
That is, here, Clark eliminates the metaphysical implications beforehand to provide herself a 
sterile space to carry on her analytical operation on Nietzsche’s perspectivism. 
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Convention T is our surest intuition about truth. Anil Gupta summarizes the 
convention as follows: 
Criterion T lays down two conditions that a materially 
adequate definition of truth must meet. The second, and less 
important, condition is that the definition should imply that 
only sentences are true. Tarski imposes this condition because 
he takes truth to be a predicate of sentences. The first, and 
more important, condition is that the definition should imply all 
the ‘T-biconditionals’, that is, all sentences of the form  
(T) ‘’ is a true sentence (of English) iff. 
Thus, Criterion T requires that a definition of truth (for 
English) should imply, for example, the famous T-
biconditional, 
‘Snow is white’ is a true sentence (of English) iff snow is 
white.424 
 There is also another requirement that Clark does not mention in her 
presentation of Tarski’s Convention T. That is, truth must be defined in a 
metalanguage; otherwise, if it is defined in an ordinary language, it leads directly 
to the ‘liar paradox.’425 Being aware of the danger of falling into the liar paradox, 
Clark defines her equivalence principle as follows:  
The equivalence principle tells us that we can state the 
conditions under which any sentence is true in a particular 
language by simply removing the quotation marks from the 
sentence, or . . . by providing in the metalanguage an 
interpretation of the sentence from which we have removed the 
quotation marks.426 
                                               
424 Anil Gupta, “Tarski’s definition of truth,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 
1.0, London and New York: Routledge, 1998. For a critique of Tarski’s ‘Convention T,’ see John 
Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1990, ch. 8 (pp. 260-90). 
425 (This Paradox is said to be first formulated by Eubulides of Miletus, who lived around BC. 4th 
Century.) Consider the following sentence ‘(S): Sentence (S) is not true.’ Then, applying the 
‘Convention T,’ we get the following: ‘Sentence (S) is a true sentence iff sentence (S) is not 
true.’ Here, we have a paradox: sentence (S) says that sentence (S) is not true, yet if the sentence 
is not true then the sentence (S) true by the ‘Convention T,’ which means that the sentence (S) is 
false. 
426 Clark, p. 32. 
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 The application of this equivalence principle, thus, lead us to accept that 
the sentence “snow is white” is true in English iff snow is white, and the 
sentence “the Sun is located at the center of our galaxy” is true iff the Sun is 
located at the center of our galaxy. According to Clark, such equivalences, in 
accordance with the equivalence principle, are trivially true for everyone who 
has the knowledge of that language in which the sentence is uttered. 
Additionally, she claims that it is impossible for anyone who denies the truth of 
the sentences complying with the equivalence principle to share our concept of 
truth. Clark’s strong faithfulness to the equivalence principle leads her to 
conclude that it is the equivalence principle that governs the ordinary use of 
“true.” This means that discarding this “evident” fact about the concept of truth 
we cannot make any consistent claim about something; “Nietzsche cannot make 
any claims at all unless he would admit to considering them true in our ordinary 
sense,”427 that is, in accordance with the equivalence principle.  
 However, as Nietzsche argues in TL, such a claim is nothing but to say 
that the criterion of truth is constructed, or established by the society, and any 
statement or belief could be true if it is compatible, or stated according to, this 
established truth criterion. According to Nietzsche, the need for preserving his 
existence against the threat of other individuals, and the need for living socially, 
leads an individual to dissimulation for creating a peace treaty, namely language. 
Through this treaty, the criterion of truth is established; that is, truth is defined in 
accordance with the compatibility to this peace treaty. 
[H]e needs to make peace and strives accordingly to banish 
from his world at least the most flagrant bellum omni contra 
omnes [war of each against all]. This peace treaty brings in its 
wake something which appears to be the first step toward 
acquiring that puzzling truth drive: to wit, that which shall 
count as “truth” from now on is established. That is to say, a 
uniformly valid and binding designation is invented for things, 
and this legislation of language likewise establishes the first 
laws of truth. For the contrast between truth and lie arises here 
for the first time. The liar is a person who uses the valid 
                                               
427 Clark, p. 33. 
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designations, the words, in order to make something which is 
unreal appear to be real.428 
 Therefore, Clark’s application of Convention T and her equivalence 
principle, as the above quotation suggests, rests upon the language as a peace 
treaty. Hence, by applying these two, Clark could only secure the use of the 
words and concepts according to established rules of language, and not according 
to their correspondence to the reality. That is, Clark demands that Nietzsche must 
use the language in accordance with the accepted rules, otherwise what he says 
could not be counted as true. This means that Clark compels Nietzsche to express 
his thoughts according to the old and established rules, whose roots lie in 
assumptions that are continuously refuted by him. Actually, Nietzsche 
necessarily used this language, yet he broke its rules to express his ideas which 
could not be expressible otherwise. As Grimm rightly notes, what “Nietzsche 
seeks to express through language is something which that language is ultimately 
incapable of expressing,” yet he “has only inappropriate linguistic resources 
available to him, and this means that he is forced to formulate his ideas within an 
inauthentic framework.”429 Essentially, most of Nietzsche’s thoughts, which are 
perceived by us as contradictory and nonsense, seems so since we still expect 
from him to speak in the language that we are happily and trustfully using. We 
accept without questioning that “in language . . . [we] have possessed knowledge 
of the world,”430 yet, as Nietzsche says, “[e]very word is a prejudice.”431 Being 
aware of this fact, Nietzsche uses the language in an extraordinary way, he plays 
with the language to make it elastic enough to express his unconventional 
thoughts. Therefore, Clark’s argumentation designated to portray Nietzsche as 
correspondence theorist, in my opinion, fails; even her approach leads her to 
misunderstand almost all of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
                                               
428 TL, p. 81. 
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430 HAH, vol. I, §11, p. 16. 
431 HAH, vol. II, part 2, “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” §55, p. 323. 
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 Clark uses this strategy not only for attributing the common sense version 
of correspondence theory to Nietzsche, but also for rejecting other competing 
truth theories for showing that there is no other suitable theory to attribute to 
him. Clark tries to eliminate pragmatic and coherence theories by using her 
argument based on the equivalence principle.  
 Clark tries to refute Danto’s claim that Nietzsche has a pragmatic theory 
of truth. According to Danto, Nietzsche’s criterion of truth shows us that he 
proposes a pragmatic theory of truth. Danto translates Nietzsche’s criterion of 
truth, which states that “The criterion of truth resides in the enhancement of the 
feeling of power”432 like the following: “p is true and q is false if p works and q 
does not.”433 Although, at first sight, Danto’s claim seems to be true, in my 
opinion, it has nothing to do with what Nietzsche wants to express with his 
criterion of truth. Danto, as most of the scholars (maybe, only the analytically 
oriented ones), misses, ignores, or misunderstands, Nietzsche’s doctrine of will 
to power. For, Danto’s claim would be valid, or true, only on the condition that if 
will to power is an attribute of a power center. However, as we have seen, will to 
power is what a power center, or entity is; it is not an external attribute or 
something attained later. Hence, for Nietzsche, power increase amounts to 
creation of truth through perspectival interpretation; interpretation is the process 
of actively shaping and assimilating the environment, or the world. If this 
shaping increases my power, then my interpretation is true; otherwise it is false. 
This interpretation process is not a duty imposed upon a power center from 
outside, and this process is endless. Let us remember that, for Nietzsche there is 
no distinction between the deed and the doer; this means that the power center is 
the very thing it does, i.e., interpretation, will to power, truth, etc. Furthermore, 
as we have already seen, power increase is more essential than self-preservation 
for a power center, it does not hesitate to risk its existence to increase the degree 
of power, which it is; for, it is simply just this lust for power. Without self-
preservation, I think, we could not speak of pragmatism; that is, if a power center 
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risks its existence for increasing its power, then the pragmatic or utilitarian 
consequences of a possible power increase could not be motivating factor behind 
its struggle for power. It is just this possible power increase that a power center 
seeks, not its consequences. Hence, to claim that Nietzsche has a pragmatic 
theory of truth, or that his criterion of truth is the pragmatic consequences of a 
belief, is nonsensical.  
 However, Clark’s refutation of the pragmatic theory of truth proceeds not 
from Nietzsche’s thoughts, but from her famous equivalence principle.434 In my 
opinion, this shows us that she is not concerned with Nietzsche’s thoughts, and 
that what she is trying to do is to show that she has a contemporary version of 
Procrustes’ bed to deal with the unconventional philosophers and their thoughts.  
 Clark, contented with the equivalence principle, makes a very strange 
claim that to say that Nietzsche uses pragmatic theory of truth when he speaks 
about truth, or he defines truth in terms of pragmatic consequences, “does not 
give us a new theory of truth, a new account of what we are doing when we 
picked out certain beliefs as true (or, of what the beliefs so picked out supposed 
to have in common),” on the contrary, it throws away the concept of truth (of 
course, determined by the equivalence principle); that is, it “proposes that we use 
‘true’ or ‘wahr’ in a different way than do speakers of standard English or 
German.”435 Because of this, according to Clark, it is not possible to attribute a 
pragmatic theory of truth to Nietzsche, which amounts to claiming that he uses 
true or truth in a way other than the ordinary use; yet, for her, there is no reason 
for Nietzsche to reject our ordinary use of truth. Hence, it is impossible to 
attribute Nietzsche a truth theory other than correspondence without making him 
the victim of Clark’s mortal claim that “unless Nietzsche has a reason to reject 
our ordinary use of ‘true’,” evidently, for her, he does not have, “his new use 
would seem to reflect only an arbitrary linguistic decision of no philosophical 
                                               
434 See, note 161 on page 56, for Babich’s critique of this tendency of analytic Nietzsche 
scholars. 
435 Clark, p. 33.  
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interest.”436 Clark believes that if a theory of truth is to be attributed to Nietzsche 
it should be compatible with the equivalence principle; hence, the pragmatic 
theory of truth could not be attributed to Nietzsche because of its incompatibility 
with the principle. However, as I have tried to explain above, Clark misses 
Nietzsche’s point wholly, since Nietzsche has a very important reason to use the 
word truth in a way other than the ordinary use; that is, he has a very 
unconventional concept of truth in his mind, yet the only tool available for 
expressing it is the established language. 
 Clark turns to the other competing theory of truth: the coherence theory. 
This theory, Clark says, seems to be the most suitable candidate for being 
Nietzsche’s theory of truth; since the coherence theory of truth which sees truth 
in the relation among beliefs or representations, not between our beliefs and the 
world. However, for her, the coherence theory of truth has nothing to say about 
the relation between the sentences or beliefs and the world. Because of this, 
Clark argues that there arises the problem of justification of our beliefs. That is, 
the coherence among our beliefs does not guarantee or justify their truth in the 
correspondence sense, and this justification, for Clark, is a requisite for 
coherence theory to be legitimate theory of truth.  
 Clark starts to test if the correspondence between our beliefs and the 
world could provide such a justification for coherence theory. Accepting that in 
some cases we could justify our beliefs simply by looking the world, she denies 
correspondence as a general justification of our beliefs in the scope of coherence 
theory of truth. First of all, Clark argues, simply by observing we could not 
justify our beliefs, because observations also require other kinds of explanations. 
For example, the justification of our belief that “it is raining,” for Clark, cannot 
be justified by looking at the window. “We would, for instance, need a different 
explanation for our observation of falling water if we believed the sky was 
completely clear.”437 Hence, for her, we cannot gain access to reality unmediated 
by our other beliefs by applying sense experience in justifying our beliefs. 
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Quoting Quine, she concludes that “our statements about the external world face 
the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body,”438 
and sense experience justifies a belief “indirectly through considerations of 
equilibrium [coherence] affecting the field [the system of beliefs] as a whole.”439 
Clark follows this view arguing that there is no other way than to apply our 
beliefs in justifying our beliefs, by the help of Davidson’s claim that “nothing 
can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.”440 In other 
words, according to coherence theory, we judge a belief by its coherence with 
our other accepted beliefs.  
 Clark continues her discussion against the coherence theory by trying to 
show the responses of the coherence theorists when she wants to inject the 
correspondence theory inside the coherence theory. She claims that, for example, 
it is possible for a coherence theorist to accept the view for which coherence is 
the criterion of truth while correspondence is the nature of truth. For Clark, a 
coherence theorist may respond to such a claim by saying that the criterion of 
truth for coherence theory is consistency and coherence among our beliefs, and it 
does not guarantee the correspondence between our beliefs and the external 
world. Therefore, it is unnecessary to impose a correspondence criterion on the 
coherence theory of truth. One of the coherent theorists, who gives such a 
response, is Brand Blanshard; he says that the fact that our beliefs cohere does 
nothing to “prove that anything precisely corresponding to them exists ‘out 
there.’”441  
 Against this conclusive response of the coherence theorists, Clark 
considers Nicholas Rescher’s claim that the coherence theorists must accept 
“certainly not the premise of the correspondence theory that truth means 
correspondence to fact, but merely its consequence, that truths must correspond 
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to the facts.”442 Clark maintains, in response to this claim, that coherence 
theorists may deny that there is a distinct realm in which there are facts, distinct 
entities, supposed to correspond to the beliefs. That is, they may deny the 
existence of a distinct fact of snowing which is supposed to correspond to the 
sentence “it is snowing,” even if they accept the equivalence principle. 
 Facing such a problem, Clark tries to save the correspondence theory 
with the help of John L. Austin’s arguments for the defense of the 
correspondence theory of truth. Austin argues that it is almost impossible to deny 
the assertion that a statement is true if it corresponds to the facts. Yet, for him, it 
may be misleading in two different ways according to our understanding of the 
term “fact.” First way, we may take fact as being an alternative way of 
expressing “true statement.” If we follow this way, we are lead to the coherence 
theory of truth, which for Austin, failed “to appreciate the trite but the central 
point that truth is a matter of the relationship between words and world.”443 For 
Austin, a fact is a state of affairs in the world, and as such it is completely 
different from the true statements about it. By a statement we describe a state of 
affairs which makes that statement true. This means that statements become true 
when the state of affairs is the one which they describe: “I can only describe the 
situation in which it is true to say that I am feeling sick by saying that it is one in 
which I am feeling sick (or experiencing sensations of nausea): yet between 
stating, however truly, that I am feeling sick and feeling sick there is a great gulf 
fixed.”444 On the other hand, in the second way, we accept that for every true 
statement there is only one peculiar corresponding fact; that is, there is one to 
one correspondence between true statements and facts. If we follow this second 
way, we get a highly overpopulated world with linguistic duplicates. That is, 
then there should be corresponding true statements for every single fact, whether 
it is positive or negative or highly specific or highly general. In Austin’s words, 
                                               
442 Nicholas Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 
28. Quoted by Clark, p. 35. 
443 John L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, 2d ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 123. 
Quoted by Clark, p. 36. 
444 Austin, p. 123-24. 
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“we populate the world with the linguistic Doppelgänger (and grossly 
overpopulate it—every nugget of ‘positive’ fact overlaid by a massive 
concentration of ‘negative’ facts, every tiny detailed fact larded with generous 
general facts, and so on).”445 
 However, as Clark pointed out, there arises another problem. The 
problem is formulated by Davidson. He claims that if a statement corresponds to 
any fact, then it corresponds to every fact. This claim is known as the Great Fact 
argument, and goes as follows; a true statement cannot be said to be 
corresponding to something very different by the replacement of co-referring 
singular terms, or by the replacement of logically equivalent sentences, therefore, 
if any true statements correspond to any fact, then they all corresponds to the 
same thing, to the Great Fact. Clarks illustrates this argument in the following 
way: 
[C]onsider the statement that New York is east of Chicago. 
This obviously corresponds to the fact that New York is east of 
Chicago. But it also seems to correspond to the fact that 
Chicago is west of New York, and therefore to the fact that 
Chicago is west of Detroit and Detroit is west of New York as 
well as the fact that Chicago is west of the largest city in the 
United States. . . .they all correspond to the same facts, to the 
“Great Fact.”446 
 Clark, to avoid both the linguistic Doppelgänger and the Great Fact, 
claims that the statements about facts do not select distinct entities to which 
truths could correspond, yet they constitute another way of talking about truths. 
That is, when we talk about facts, we are talking not about an entity in the world, 
but about what is true about the world. For Clark, this does not prevent us from 
claiming that true beliefs are those corresponding to the world or reality. 
Because, for her, “there are entities ontologically distinct from true beliefs,” and 
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“what these distinct entities are like (what is true of them, what predicates they 
satisfy) determines whether or not our beliefs are true.”447 
 As the final step, for her construction of Nietzsche as a correspondence 
theorist, Clark tries to cut the last branch to which coherence theory clings; 
namely subjective idealism. She takes Berkeley’s idealism, which says that to be 
is to perceive or to be perceived as typical subjective idealism. For her, the 
contemporary version of this idealism lies in Derrida’s claim that “there is 
nothing outside the text,”448 which means, for Clark, there is only representation. 
According to Clark, subjective idealism supports the coherence theory of truth in 
that if there is only representation or text and nothing beyond, then there is 
nothing for them to correspond. Yet, for her, such a subjectivism could be 
rejected on the ground of common sense realism which claims basically that 
there is an external world out there independently of us, and it is knowable. On 
this ground, Clark claims that common sense realism is actually the equivalence 
principle. That is, if the world exists independently and our beliefs are about it, 
then our beliefs can be true only if they correspond to it. In such a world, then, 
“it is raining” corresponds to the world iff it is raining. As a result of her whole 
argumentation, Clark concludes that unless Nietzsche commits himself to 
subjective realism there is no reason for him to reject correspondence theory of 
truth on the side of coherence theory. However, as she notes, it is evident from 
Nietzsche’s writings that he rejects every kind of idealism.449 Therefore, Clark 
concludes that “if he is consistent, then, Nietzsche must accept a correspondence 
conception of truth.”450 
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 Here, again, as in the case of her refutation of the pragmatic theory of 
truth, Clark does not refer to Nietzsche’s texts. Her discussion gives us no idea 
about Nietzsche’s attitude toward the coherence theory. Clark’s arguments 
against pragmatic and coherence theories might be good examples of analytical 
reasoning; they may show us her success in using analytical methods, but they 
have nothing to do with her attribution of correspondence theory to Nietzsche. 
Let us try to find out what would be Nietzsche’s response to coherence theory. 
First of all, judging a belief through established system of beliefs is unacceptable 
for Nietzsche on the ground that the idea of an established system of beliefs 
presupposes both that there is a static and stable set of beliefs and that there is a 
stable and unchanging world. In other words, requiring that a belief must cohere 
with other previously acquired beliefs for counting it as true means that there is a 
stable set of beliefs that were accepted to be true and if the newly acquired belief 
is consistent with the members of this set it becomes a truth, or a true belief. 
Further, such a set of beliefs implies the existence of the belief concerning the 
stability of the world or reality out there apart from the question of 
correspondence. That is, since our beliefs are of this world in which we live and 
since we construct a stable set of beliefs out of them, this set necessarily includes 
a belief in the stability of the world, it does not matter whether this belief 
corresponds to the world or not; otherwise, we cannot speak of judging a belief 
by applying our previously gained beliefs. These two implications of coherence 
theory, as we know, are rejected and criticized by Nietzsche. Belief in the 
existence of a stable world and the belief in the truth of our beliefs concerning 
this world are, actually, what Nietzsche rejects by his perspectivism. Moreover, 
coherence theory evokes philosophical systems, to which Nietzsche evidently 
opposes. The set of beliefs used by coherence theorist is actually a system; that is 
to say, those beliefs belonging to that set of beliefs are so systematically 
connected with each other that one belief is validated by, and validates every 
other belief. Therefore, there appears a systematically connected unity, into 
which no belief that does not meet the requirements of this system could not 
enter. Furthermore, when we consider Nietzsche’s criterion of truth and his 
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doctrine of the will to power, it becomes evident that any belief that is validated 
through our set of beliefs might decrease our power and becomes false whereas 
another belief that is invalidated, or not confirmed, might increase our power and 
becomes true. Consequently, coherence theory could not be attributable to 
Nietzsche, who says “I mistrust all systematizers and I avoid them. The will to a 
system is a lack of integrity.”451 
 As I have noted, at the beginning of this section, Clark does not refer to 
Nietzsche’s works. She does not even discuss possible responses of Nietzsche to 
correspondence, pragmatic or coherence theories. She only argues for her 
conviction that the correspondence theory is the only possible truth theory. Since 
it is the only possible theory, therefore, Nietzsche’s truth theory must be the 
correspondence theory. However, such an argumentation has nothing to do with 
Nietzsche’s notion of truth. Clark, instead of referring to Nietzsche’s views, i.e., 
will to power and perspectivism, builds her argument purely on linguistic and 
conceptual analysis. However, as we briefly mentioned earlier in our discussion, 
for Nietzsche, language is a peace treaty among the members of a society; hence 
it is our product, and thus, it is a bit of naiveté to expect from language to give us 
truth. Let us conclude this chapter by concentrating on Nietzsche’s discussion of 
the relation between language and truth that he presented in his TL. 
4.2.3 Truth and Language in a Non-analytic Sense 
TL is one of the most interesting and the most important texts of Nietzsche. Yet, 
deliberately, he did not publish this text in his life time; he even seems to have 
tried to keep it secret.452 But it is not clear why he chose not to publish the text. 
What makes this text interesting and important is that Nietzsche’s metaphoric 
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use of language is at its height, and his insights both into the relation between 
truth and language and into the genesis of the will to truth are very remarkable.  
 Nietzsche starts with an allegoric story, in which he describe the vanity of 
man being proud of his intellect and power of knowing. For him, the human 
intellect looks miserable, shadowy, transient, aimless and arbitrary within nature. 
Since “[t]here were eternities during which it did not exist. And when it is all 
over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened. For this intellect has 
no additional mission which would lead it beyond human life.”453 However, we 
feel that the intellect and the power of knowing elevate us above all the creatures 
in the universe. Yet, they are so important only for their possessors, for us. As 
Nietzsche notes, “[t]here is nothing so reprehensible and unimportant in nature 
that it would not immediately swell up like a balloon at the slightest puff of this 
power of knowing.”454 We boast about our power of knowing as if it makes us 
the most valuable creature in the universe. However, this pride concerning our 
intellect and power of knowing is the product of our intellect, and prevents us 
from seeing the fact that the intellect is a tool for survival. Hence, the intellect 
preserves us by deceiving us about the value of our existence. That is, the 
intellect, preventing us from seeing that it is given to us only for our survival not 
for knowing, survives us; it deceives us about itself. Nietzsche explains this 
deceptive character of the intellect as the following: 
It is remarkable that this was brought about by the intellect, 
which was certainly allotted to these most unfortunate, delicate, 
and ephemeral beings merely as a device for detaining them a 
minute within existence. For without this addition they would 
have every reason to flee this existence as quickly as Lessing’s 
son. The pride connected with knowing and sensing lies like a 
blinding fog over the eyes and senses of men, thus deceiving 
them concerning the value of existence. For this pride contains 
within itself the most flattering estimation of the value of 
knowing. Deception is the most general effect of such pride, 
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but even its most particular effects contain within themselves 
something of the same deceitful character.455 
 Moreover, the intellect preserves weak individuals by unfolding its power 
in dissimulation. Since, the weak have no power for waging war for existence. 
For Nietzsche, this dissimulation reaches its peak in man, which is the weakest 
creature of nature. Dissimulation becomes almost the only rule among man so 
that “there is almost nothing which is less comprehensible than how an honest 
and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them.”456 If our condition of 
existence is dissimulation, and if our intellect deceives us about its nature, and if 
it is also a tool for dissimulation, then, how did we get this drive for truth in us?  
 For Nietzsche, this drive for truth comes from language, or it is rooted in 
our language. As we have already seen,457 for Nietzsche, language is a peace 
treaty among the individuals who want to live as a society from boredom and 
necessity. That is, individuals, who want to live together, make a peace treaty 
among each other. The very first thing that they do after making the treaty is to 
construct a common language that makes communication possible among them; 
hence, truth is determined. “That is to say, a uniformly valid and binding 
designation is invented for things, and this legislation of language likewise 
establishes the first laws of truth.”458 Thus, the line between truth and lie is 
drawn; the person who uses language, or designations properly is truthful, and 
the person, who uses language improperly is a liar. Lying is, therefore, breaking 
the rules of the society, which threatens the peace prevailing in that society. 
Because of this potential peace breaking character of lying, liars, who lie in a 
selfish and harmful manner are excluded from the society. Nietzsche argues that 
what is shunned by excluding liars from the society is the harmful consequences 
of lying rather than fraud. According to Nietzsche, a similar tendency is 
operative in man’s wanting truth; that is, when man wants truth it is not the pure 
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knowledge, or the truth-in-itself, but useful consequences of truth which 
facilitate his preservation. As Nietzsche puts it, one “desires the pleasant and 
life-preserving consequences of truth. He is indifferent toward pure knowledge 
which has no consequences; towards those truths which are possibly harmful and 
destructive he is even hostilely inclined.”459 Hence, for Nietzsche, the origin of 
the drive for truth lies in that peace treaty established through the language, and 
this drive is directed not to truth-in-itself, but to those life-preserving and 
pleasant truths. Furthermore, our truths are nothing more than the descriptions of 
the facts by using the proper designations in the language. This means that our 
truth already presupposes coherence as the criterion of truth; that is, if we use 
language properly, or in accordance with its established rules, all our 
propositions, sentences, or statements will necessarily cohere with each other.  
 Nietzsche further investigates the formation process of the designations 
of language, i.e., words and concepts, to show that there is no relation between 
these designations and the entities which we suppose to exist. In other words, 
these designations do not correctly and firmly represent the entities. Otherwise, 
the root of the language would be truth, not the peace treaty among the members 
of the society. In which case, we could not speak of any qualities of any entity or 
thing, since qualities are given to us through our sensations, which are 
subjective, or peculiar to every individual. In Nietzsche’s words, “[i]f truth alone 
had been the deciding factor in the genesis of language, and if the standpoint of 
certainty had been decisive for designations, then how could we still dare to say 
‘the stone is hard,’ as if ‘hard’ were something otherwise familiar to us, and not 
merely a totally subjective stimulation!”460 Other than the subjective character of 
qualitative words, Nietzsche refers to the multiplicity of languages spoken all 
over the world as another example that shows us that it is not truth, which lies at 
the genesis of language and it is not the standpoint of certainty which is decisive 
for the linguistic designations. He argues that if truth and certainty had had such 
roles in the formation of language and its designations, then there would be only 
                                               
459 TL, p. 81. 
460 TL, pp. 81-82. 
 
185 
one language. That is, “[t]he various languages placed side by side show that 
with words it is never a question of truth, never a question of adequate 
expression; otherwise, there would not be so many languages.”461 What is 
expressed through language is, for Nietzsche, our relations with things through 
metaphors. That is, our words are just metaphors and they only express the 
relation between us and things, not the things in their actual existence. In the 
formation of words, according to Nietzsche, there appear two metaphors; in the 
first metaphor, a nerve stimulus is converted into an image, and, in the second, 
this image is imitated with a sound; a word is the metaphor of a metaphor. 
Nietzsche draws an analogy: a deaf man, after seeing Chladni’s sound figures462 
and realizing that these figures are caused by the vibrations of the string, claims 
that he knows what a sound is, or what is meant by the word sound. “It is this 
way with all of us concerning language: we believe that we know something 
about the things themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; 
and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for things—metaphors which 
correspond in no way to the original entities.”463 Moreover, a word, or metaphor, 
becomes a concept when it is applied cases similar to the one in which it is 
created. However, for Nietzsche, applying a word to other similar cases is 
nothing but equalization of unequal things. For example, when I apply the word 
leaf to refer to all of the similar things, it becomes a concept; yet it is impossible 
to find two leaves that are identical. According to Nietzsche, this implies the 
existence of an independently existing leaf apart from the leaves that exist in 
nature. That is, this implies that there exists a leaf form according to which every 
other leave is shaped. Since there is no such thing as the leaf form in the world, 
or nature, Nietzsche names the concept of leaf as qualitas occulta.464 Thus, our 
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concepts are nothing but occult qualities created by us through eliminating 
individual differences among entities. Nietzsche says the following: 
We know nothing about an essential quality called “honesty”; 
but we do know of countless individualized and consequently 
unequal actions which we equate by omitting the aspects in 
which they are unequal and which we now designate as “honest 
actions.” Finally, we formulate from them a qualitas occulta 
which has the name “honesty.”465 
 Thus, our concepts in no way correspond to the external world; they are 
only tools created by us, for dealing with the chaotic world of becoming; for 
classifying, categorizing, etc. Then, if our language is nothing but a peace treaty, 
our words are metaphors, and our concepts are occult qualities, what is truth? 
Here is Nietzsche’s answer: 
What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, 
and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations 
which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, 
transferred, and embellished, and, which, after long usage, 
seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are 
illusions which we have forgotten are illusions: they are 
metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained 
of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and 
are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.466 
 Hence, linguistic analysis could give us nothing concerning truth, but 
only whether the given sentence or proposition is constructed out of the usual 
metaphors in accordance with fixed rules of the language; in other words, it 
determines whether the given statement is a truth or a lie. Actually, as far as our 
traditional notion of truth and of language are concerned, what is counted as true 
is also a lie but said according to the rules. That is, statements could never 
correspond to entities or facts in the outer world; hence they could not express 
truth in the correspondence sense; but we behave as if our statements correspond 
to the world and are capable of expressing the truth of this correspondence. 
However, as Nietzsche indicates, we accept these lies as truths belonging to 
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nature or reality, since we forgot their genesis; we forgot that language, its 
designations. This forgetting results in our complete dependence on truth and 
language; on the belief that there is truth independent of us, we have the ability 
to find out and grasp it, and our language is capable of expressing it in an 
adequate way. Yet, for Nietzsche, all of this cognitive story and its characters are 
our products. Nietzsche, comparing our cognitive construction of the world with 
the bee’s construction of beehive, observes that “whereas the bee builds with 
wax that he gathers from nature, man builds with the far more delicate 
conceptual material which he first has to manufacture from himself.”467 Hence, 
our truths are anthropomorphic in the sense that what we search is already 
created and placed into the world by us. That is, to use Nietzsche’s example, we 
define what a mammal is, and when we see an animal, let us say a camel, say 
that camel is a mammal. For Nietzsche, this is a truth but in a limited and 
anthropomorphic sense, since it is not a truth independent of us; “it is a 
thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point which would 
be ‘true in itself’ or really and universally valid apart from man.”468 In nature, 
there are no such divisions among entities and creatures according to their 
qualities, forms, etc.; it is we who impose these divisions over nature. However, 
according to Nietzsche, the entities we name and divide are given not as 
something in themselves, but as metaphors created by us, yet, forgetting this fact, 
we take them as existing independently of us. Hence, when we define what a 
mammal is, and seeing a camel, say that it is a mammal, this does not mean that 
such a division or a species really exists in the world; it is a truth, but only for us, 
not for other creatures or entities; since language and its rules, concepts, 
definitions, and divisions are all created by us as metaphors, and they could in no 
way correspond, or adequately express, the external world.  
 Consequently, analyzing Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning truth as if it is 
a matter of language is, firstly, not a fair way of investigation as far as the above 
presented genealogy of our language and of our will to truth is concerned; 
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secondly, anyone who tries to understand Nietzsche’s philosophy through such 
analysis would miss all the original and important aspects of it; even some of 
them misses the very crucial point that Nietzsche is a philosopher.469 If we 
remember Clark’s argumentation, it was heavily dependent upon the discussion 
concerning the truth theories and proceeds through linguistic and logical 
analysis. However, Nietzsche’s above presented view concerning the genesis and 
nature of our language and truth makes such argumentation inapplicable to 
Nietzsche’s notion of truth. Since her beloved Convention T and the principle of 
equivalence are the products of the Western culture; they are controlling 
mechanisms concerning the use of language. All words and concepts, although 
they were formerly vivid and living metaphors, have been imposed fixed 
meanings and their use have been determined by rules. What Clark does by 
applying equivalence principle is nothing but to test whether Nietzsche’s use of 
concepts breaks those rules. However, the result of this test, affirmative or 
negative, could not give us anything concerning truth in the sense of any of the 
traditional truth theories; since the character of language is metaphorical and it 
stems from the need for a peace treaty among the individuals for their 
preservation. 
 Furthermore, for the same reasons, it also becomes impossible to attribute 
a truth theory to Nietzsche’s perspectivism; since, as in the case of the judgment 
that camel is a mammal, we define truth and the criterion of truth. Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism does not presuppose any truth theory that falls under any one of 
our major truth theories; neither correspondence, nor coherence, nor pragmatic. 
His conception of the world as will to power, as becoming, as chaos, as 
continuous power struggle, completely conflicts with our conception of the 
world as changeless and stable world of being, on which our conception of truth 
depends. His perspectivism is complete denial of our epistemology based on the 
knowing subject and the passive object; through perspectivism he destroys our 
cognitive paradigm and its subsequent assumptions and tools; such as, causality, 
logic, subject object distinction, etc. In short, through the doctrine of will to 
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power and perspectivism, Nietzsche wanted to show that our pride concerning 
our truths and knowledge about the world and their value is in vain; since all are 
our products and they have nothing to do with actual existence of the world; we 
have created a world through lies or illusions, and are living in it; yet, this does 
not prove that this world corresponds to the actual world. However, as this world 
construction helps us in surviving, it becomes a truth for us; we accept it as 
expressing the world as it is. For Nietzsche, this construction of the world is only 
an interpretation of the actual world among the infinite possible interpretations. 
Hence, sticking to this interpretation is nothing but to diminish the possibilities 
for a richer and fuller life. Because of this, Nietzsche attacked all our absolute 
truths and cognitive mechanisms and assumptions that lead to absolute truths. 
Disregarding this aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy is another common error 
among the scholars who attribute a truth theory to him. What Nietzsche wants is 
to eliminate absolute truths while truth theories prescribe how to produce 
absolute truths.  
 Nietzsche is opposed to correspondence theory of truth because of its 
implication of a stable and unchanging world, which brings about distinctions 
between subject-object and apparent-real world; because of its presupposition 
that the subject could have a direct access to the world, without any interference 
coming from his perceptual mechanisms or other sources; and because of its 
dependence on the language’s ability to express the world as it is. However, one 
may still insist that Nietzsche’s account of language in TL, presupposes 
correspondence theory of truth. Such a claim, in my opinion, could be made by 
someone who did not understand what Nietzsche is trying to explain there. That 
is, Nietzsche’s aim was not to present his thoughts concerning the ideal language 
in his mind, rather his aim was to debunk language as a means to truth. He tried 
to show that the genesis of our language was a peace treaty among the members 
of the society and that it was highly metaphorical. Our language, as a peace 
treaty, at its beginning, did not aim at correctly expressing the world, but at 
constructing an order among the members of the society to maintain their 
survival. Words and concepts were designated and the rules for their use were 
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fixed to make this peace treaty possible. The peace treaty is constructed through 
the creation of these designations and the determination of the conditions of their 
use. Yet, the origin of these designations were metaphors, or the metaphorical 
translation of a sense stimulus into an image (first metaphor), and then imitation 
of this image through a sound (second metaphor). This genealogical analysis of 
language shows us that our language has nothing to do with the external reality; 
at most, it could give us a metaphorical representation of the world, which is 
created by us again as a metaphor. Here, a correspondence might appear in the 
sense that our metaphors corresponds to the world created by us, as in the case of 
mammal and camel. We can define something and find entities in the world that 
would correspond to that definition; hence, as Nietzsche rightly notes, this does 
not give us a truth about the world in its actual existence.  
 Furthermore, it maybe claimed that Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to 
power and criterion of truth obviously imply pragmatic theory of truth. However, 
such a claim means that Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power is, or assumes, 
a teleological principle. As we have already seen in our discussion of the relation 
between the doctrine of the will to power and Darwinism, will to power is not a 
teleological principle; a claim of teleology means that striving for power is 
something external to the power quantum; that the power center and the striving 
for power are distinct entities, that the striving for power is an attribute of the 
power center. As we know, Nietzsche evidently rejects the separation of the doer 
from the deed; that is, for him, a thing, an entity, or a power center is just what it 
does. Since, for him, everything is will to power and as will to power everything 
strives for power; thus everything is striving for power. There is no such a thing 
as striving for power as a separate entity, or as an attributable quality. There 
appears another problem in attributing a pragmatic theory of truth to Nietzsche. 
For him, a power center is nothing but striving for power, in its struggle for 
power it risks its preservation and existence. Pragmatically it must not be 
acceptable to pursue something at the expense of self-preservation. In other 
words, will to power exceeds the limits of pragmatism.  
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 As for the coherence theory of truth, since it assumes a static world and a 
system of beliefs, it could not be Nietzsche’s theory of truth. Coherence theory 
may be related to the concept of language as presented by Nietzsche in TL. That 
is, coherence is similar to the requirements of a treaty for determining what 
should count as true. If a statement or a belief coheres with our established 
beliefs then it is true, otherwise it is false. However, an established system of 
beliefs implies the existence of a static and unchanging world, whether it 
corresponds to the actual world or not. The system remains unchanging as a 
reference in judging newly acquired beliefs, otherwise it could not use it as a 
reference. Nietzsche is opposed to all systems; since, for him, clinging to a 
system closes the door to those beliefs which, although conflicting with our 
system of beliefs, could increase our feeling of power. Thus, coherence theory 
cannot be Nietzsche’s truth theory.  
 If neither correspondence, nor pragmatic, nor coherence theories of truth 
can be attributed to Nietzsche, then, what is his truth theory? Or is it necessary to 
attribute a truth theory to him? I believe that Nietzsche does not assume a truth 
theory in his perspectivism. What he tried to do with perspectivism is to heal our 
obsession with truth and its value. Through his perspectivism, Nietzsche shows 
us that our truths have nothing to do with our conception of truth as absolute and 
eternal; they are simply interpretations, and thus, illusions in the sense that they 
correspond to nothing, and that they could not give us the reality as it is in itself. 
None of the presuppositions concerning causality, ego, consciousness, laws of 
nature, etc., on which our knowledge and truth depends exist, we simply create 
them to preserve our existence in the chaotic world of becoming. Although these 
presuppositions might have contributed to furthering our power, when they 
become absolute truths, for Nietzsche, they start to prevent further increase of 
our power. Hence, blaming us for our weakness and cowardice, he tries to show 
us that for the sake of our preservation we are living a life, which is poor, insipid 
and worthless. Of course, in his attempt to show all of these life negating effects 
of our absolute truths, he deals with the concept of truth, yet, as Ken Gemes 
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rightly observes,470 his aim is not to provide us with another set of absolute truths 





                                               
470 “Nietzsche is ultimately not interested in (theories of) truth. This is not to say that Nietzsche is 
not acutely concerned with the role that the concept and rhetoric of truth had played within 
various cultures. By the same token an interest in the role the concept of witches played in 17th 
century English culture need not betoken any interest or belief in witches.” (Ken Gemes, 
“Nietzsche’s Critique of Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 52, No. 1, 









What I have tried to do is to show that those controversies among certain 
scholars concerning Nietzsche’s views on the issues of truth, knowledge, and 
epistemology stem from their awkward approach to what Nietzsche is saying. By 
awkward I mean that they try to make Nietzsche’s philosophy understandable, 
bearable, and even safer for the survival of the society, within their sterile and 
clear domain of knowledge by pruning the branches, knots and barks that could 
violate the purity, the esteem, and the beauty of that domain. Hence, what they 
get as Nietzsche, or as his philosophy, becomes something like a puppet at the 
hands of a ventriloquist, who makes the puppet say whatever the master wants. 
Their ignoring of the importance of some of the main concepts, i.e., will to 
power and perspectivism in Nietzsche’s philosophy and the nuances in his use of 
concepts and words, i.e., truth and knowledge, leads them to draw controversial 
and conflicting Nietzsche portraits. Furthermore, trying to place Nietzsche into 
our established edifice of knowledge with our traditional cognitive and 
conceptual tools is not a faithful way of approaching him and his philosophy, 
since what he tries to do is just to destroy, or deconstruct this edifice and the 
tools that are used in its construction. In short, contemporary Nietzsche studies 
tend to become more analytical under the influence of global domination of 
universities and philosophy departments by analytical thought with its pragmatic 
successes, especially in the domain of natural sciences. However, trying to 
understand Nietzsche’s thoughts with the methods of analytical philosophy give 
us nothing about the greatness and the meaning of his thoughts. Nietzsche 
already rejects and refutes the methods and the tools of the analytic philosophy; 
as we have seen, he rejects logic and language as tools for truth. Throughout my 
dissertation I have tried to show how such tendencies and approaches have 
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resulted in a misunderstanding of Nietzsche’s thought by explicating those 
concepts which are ignored or whose content is emptied by the scholars.  
 The most important of these concepts is the doctrine of will to power; I 
believe that almost all of his philosophy is based on this concept. His 
perspectivism is wholly based on the concept of will to power. Therefore, first, I 
have dealt with this concept, and tried to explain it in full detail. Since there are 
not abundant references to this concept in Nietzsche’s published books, I relied 
heavily on his unpublished texts, in which the concept of the will to power is a 
prevalent topic. Although there is an ongoing discussion concerning the 
legitimacy of these texts among Nietzsche scholars, I took them as legitimate as 
published ones; for, the topic of this dissertation makes this necessary. In order 
to achieve a better understanding of the concept, after giving a detailed 
explanation of the concept as presented by Nietzsche in both his published and 
unpublished texts, I have concentrated upon major claims concerning the nature 
of the concept by prominent Nietzsche scholars. In this context, I have dealt 
firstly with the general tendency of seeing the concept as a Darwinian principle, 
and comparing the fundamental characteristic of Nietzsche’s concept of the will 
to power and Darwin’s theory of evolution I have shown that the concept is in no 
way a Darwinian principle. Secondly, I have elaborated the claims that Nietzsche 
is a metaphysician by Heidegger and Richardson. Again, by appealing to 
Nietzsche’s concept of will to power and his construction of the world out of will 
to power, I have tried to show that there are some deficiencies in both 
commentators’ reception of the concept and Nietzsche’s philosophy that lead 
them to make such a claim; hence, I have argued that neither Heidegger’s nor 
Richardson’s claims are strong enough to make Nietzsche a metaphysician. 
 Next, I have started to explore Nietzsche’s perspectivism and its relation 
with the doctrine of will to power. I have firstly presented Nietzsche’s 
conception of the world as becoming through the power struggles of power 
centers with a special emphasis on their relation with each other and on the 
dynamic character of this relation as the source of the continuous change, which 
makes the world a becoming world. Next, I have furthered my investigation of 
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the relation among the power centers on the level of power struggle. My 
investigation has resulted in a comprehensive elaboration of the concept of 
interpretation. According to Nietzsche, power increase occurs through 
interpretation. However, the term interpretation is not used in its ordinary 
meaning. That is, Nietzsche designates interpretation as the process in which a 
power center actively shapes, structures, assimilates, and determines the world 
from the perspective of its power increase. Actually, this is the only relation that 
exists in the world of becoming. Power centers know both the neighboring power 
centers and the world from this perspective. Since there is a continuous change in 
the world, there is no objective reality of which a power center could attain 
absolute knowledge; hence, a power center could know the world from its own 
perspective; referring to this fact, Nietzsche criticizes our understanding of truth 
as its being absolute and universal. Hence, I have explored his critique of 
traditional understanding of truth, which presupposes a stable and ordered world 
through Nietzsche’s critiques of logic, subject-object, apparent-real world 
distinctions, and causality, all of which belongs to the notion of a stable world. In 
the course of these critiques, I have emphasized that Nietzsche refutes the notion 
of a stable world and its subsequent assumptions as being mere illusions; since 
they fail to represent the world in its actual existence. 
 Lastly, I have proceeded to investigate Nietzsche’s notion of truth. First, I 
have tried to do away with the controversies stemming from Nietzsche’s 
contradictory statements concerning truth. I have claimed that in those 
statements, in which Nietzsche praises truth, he refers to perspectival truths; 
whereas, in those statements, in which he rejects, he refers to absolute truths. I 
have noted that Nietzsche’s designation of truth as something created through 
power struggle. For Nietzsche, truth is not something waiting to be discovered, 
but something created through power struggle which occurs through 
interpretation, in which power centers structure and shape the world and their 
environment. Hence, I have maintained that Nietzsche’s understanding of truth is 
very different from our traditional understanding of truth, so it is impossible to 
ascribe a theory of truth to Nietzsche. However, among contemporary Nietzsche 
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scholars there is a tendency to put Nietzsche’s perspectivism under one of the 
established truth theories, such as correspondence, pragmatic or coherence 
theories. Since it is the most popular one, I have concentrated upon 
correspondence theory, and discussed it through Clark’s argumentation which 
she put forward in attributing correspondence theory to Nietzsche. Clark’s 
argument for correspondence theory depends on Tarski’s Convention T and the 
equivalence principle derived from it. Using Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of 
language presented in TL, I have shown the inappropriateness of Clark’s 
argumentation; I have also shown that since her rejections of pragmatic and 
coherence theories are based on equivalence principle, they are also 
inappropriate. Furthermore, I have noted that Clark has not referred to any of 
Nietzsche’s texts during her argumentation. This attitude exemplifies the general 
tendency of analytic scholars.  
 Finally, I have claimed that neither of these truth theories could be 
Nietzsche’s truth theory. Since through my studies of Nietzsche’s texts, I have 
noted that his aim is not to offer us a truth theory, but to show that clinging to 
absolute truths is inimical to life in the sense that it prevents us from leading a 
richer and fuller life. This is already evident in his doctrine of will to power, in 
which he conceives of the world as the world of becoming or as the chaotic 
world of power quanta. In such a world, every statement will have become false 
as soon as it is uttered. Since the world is in a constant flux, static concepts are 
inadequate for expressing this dynamic world. This is why Nietzsche calls our 
absolute truths as illusions and forces us to search for another conception and 
criterion of truth. This new conception and criterion of truth is already inherent 
in his doctrine of will to power, which is related to his perspectivism. According 
to this new conception of truth, there is only perspectival seeing and knowing, 
and the criterion is the increase of power. In the world of becoming, in which 
there is a constant change resulting from the power struggles of power centers, 
any power increase could only occur through interpretation. This means, for 
Nietzsche, actively shaping, structuring and assimilating the world. Thus, in this 
world, not every interpretation results in a power increase, but only the better 
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ones do. However, this process of interpretation is not to be understood as a 
subjective process, since there is no subject separated from its activities. That is, 
a thing is simply what it does; there is no distinction between the doer and the 
deed. In short, there is not a subject as interpreter, or an agent of the process of 
interpretation. Furthermore, interpretation is a continuous process; since every 
interpretation brings a change in the world and this changed world needs new 
interpretations. It is not our illusory absolute truths and theories trying to produce 
such truths, but this continuous process of interpretation, enriches our lives. 
 During the preparation of my dissertation, other than the difficulties and 
complexities of the topic, there has been an idea that ceaselessly haunted me; I 
was afraid of being unfaithful to, or distorting Nietzsche’s thoughts. Especially, 
his following call nearly became a nightmare for me: “Hear me! For I am such 
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Nietzsche’nin doğruluk, bilgi, ve epistemoloji konularındaki düşünceleri, uzunca 
bir süre ahlak, Hıristiyanlık, nihilizm, politika, kadınlar, Üstinsan (Übermensch), 
vb. konular hakkındaki düşüncelerinin gölgesinde kalmış olsa da, Nietzsche 
çalışmalarının yeni konuları olmaya başladılar. Nietzsche’nin ikinci gruptaki 
konular hakkındaki düşünceleri üzerine yorumlarda da karşılaştığımız gibi, 
birinci gruptaki konulara ilişkin düşüncelerinin yorumlarında da anlaşmazlıklar 
mevcuttur. Bazıları Nietzsche’nin doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşüncelerinin 
sadece çelişkili aforizmaların bir toplamı olduklarını ve  açık bir şekilde ifade 
edilmemiş düşünceler olduklarını söyleyerek reddederken, bazıları ise, bu 
aforizmalarda bizim doğruluk ve bilgi anlayışımızla ilgili özgün bir şeyler 
olduğunu iddia etmişlerdir. 
 Nietzsche’nin doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşüncelerinin doğası ve 
değeri ile ilgili görüşler arasındaki bu kutuplaşmalar, konu hakkındaki 
incelemeler derinleştirildiğinde daha da artar. Örneğin, ortaya Nachlaß 
(yayımlanmamış yazılar) sorunu çıkar; araştırmalarda Nachlaß göz önünde 
bulundurulmalı mı yoksa bulundurulmamalı mıdır? Çünkü Nietzsche’nin 
doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşüncelerini ortaya koyduğu aforizmaların çoğu 
Nachlaß’ın içerisindedir. Bazı yorumcular Nietzsche bu yazıları yaşarken 
yayımlatmadığı için geçerli kaynak olarak kabul etmezken, diğer bazı 
yorumcular Nietzsche’nin gerçek felsefesinin bu yazılarda olduğunu iddia ederek 
bu yazıları geçerli bir kaynak olarak kabul ederler. 
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 Uygun yazıların kaynak olarak seçilmesi problemi dışında, felsefi 
konulardan kaynaklardan başkaca anlaşmazlıklar da vardır. Örneğin, güç istenci 
öğretisinin metafizik, ereksel (teleological), yada Darwinci bir ilke olarak mı ele 
alınacağı; perspektivizmin bir tür görecilik olup olmadığı; Nietzsche’nin 
doğruluk anlayışının bir doğruluk kuramını imleyip imlemediği, vb. Nietzsche 
yorumcuları arasındaki diğer önemli anlaşmazlık kaynaklarıdırlar. Bunlardan 
dolayıdır ki, Nietzsche’nin doğruluk, bilgi ve epistemoloji hakkındaki 
düşünceleri Nietzsche çalışmalarında yeni sayılabilecek bir araştırma alanı 
olmalarına rağmen, oldukça karmaşık ve tartışmalı bir konu haline gelmiştir; 
öyle ki, neredeyse her yorumcunun kendine ait bir Nietzsche’si var. 
 Bunlara ek olarak, Nietzsche’nin üslubu ve dili kullanışı anlaşmazlıkları 
artıran ve her şeyi daha da karmaşık hale getiren diğer unsurlardır. Nietzsche 
açıkça sunulmuş ve adım adım ilerleyen akıl yürütmeler kullanmaz; aksine, 
düşüncelerini ifade etmek için metaforlar ve aforizmalar kullanır. Dahası, 
Nietzsche sözcükleri ve kavramları bizim alıştığımız şekilde kullanmaz; 
sözcüklerle oynar, dilin belirlenmiş kurallarını bozar. Çünkü, Nietzsche dilin 
doğasında düzenli ve değişmez bir dünya anlayışını varsayan bir metafizik 
olduğuna ve dilin güç mücadelesi nedeniyle her şeyin sürekli bir akış içinde 
olduğu dünya tasarımına dayanan kendi düşüncelerini ifade edemeyeceğine 
inanır. Oysaki, çağdaş Nietzsche yorumcularının çoğu Nietzsche’nin dil 
kullanımındaki bu farklılıkları göz önünde bulundurmazlar. Bundan dolayı da, 
Nietzsche’nin söylemeye çalıştığı şeyleri yanlış anlar ya da yanlış yorumlarlar. 
Diğer bir deyişle, çağdaş Nietzsche yorumcularının tümü olmasa da çoğu analitik 
gelenekten geldikleri ve Nietzsche’nin söylediklerini dilsel ya da mantıksal 
analiz ile anlamaya çalıştıkları için, Nietzsche’nin dil kullanımındaki nüans ve 
inceliklerin felsefesi için olan anlam ve önemini kavramayı başaramazlar. Bu 
başarısızlık yorumcuların Nietzsche’nin tam da sürekli olarak reddettiği şeyleri 
Nietzsche’ye atfetmelerine neden olur; örneğin, metafizik, ereksellik (teleology) 
ve karşılıklılık doğruluk kuramı (correspondence theory of truth). 
 Nietzsche’nin doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşüncelerini inceleyen 
günümüz Nietzsche çalışmalarının bu tartışmalı ve karmaşık durumu çok 
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önemlidir. Ayrıca, Nietzsche gibi açıkça felsefe tarihindeki gelmiş geçmiş en 
analitik olmayan (un-analytical) ya da en analitik karşıtı (anti-analytical) 
filozofunu, analitik gelenekten gelen yorumcuların anlamaya çalıştıklarını 
görmek de oldukça ilginçtir. Bundan dolayı, yukarıda bahsettiğim tartışmaların 
ve karmaşıklıkların çözümüne bir katkıda bulunmasını ümit ederek, 
Nietzsche’nin doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşüncelerini inceleyen bu tezi 
sunuyorum. Bununla birlikte, giriştiğim görevin zorluğunun farkındayım. 
 Detaylara geçmeden önce, incelemem sırasında yaptığım bazı stratejik 
seçimlerden söz etmek istiyorum. Her şeyden önce, güç istencinin Nietzsche’nin 
doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşüncelerini anlamadaki anahtar kavram olduğuna 
inandığım ve Nietzsche’nin bu kavramla ilgili düşüncelerinin çoğu da 
Nachlaß’ta olduğu için, Nachlaß’ın The Will to Power (Güç İstenci) başlığı 
altında yayımlanan bölümünü ana referans kaynağı olarak seçtim. İkinci olarak, 
Nietzsche’nin düşüncelerinin ve temel kavramlarının kökleri konusundaki 
tartışmaların detaylarına girmektense, Nietzsche’nin düşünce ve kavramlarını 
hem yayımlanmış hem de yayımlanmamış eserlerinde ortaya koyduğu şekliyle 
sunmayı tercih ettim, ve sonra da bu düşünce ve kavramların Nietzsche 
yorumcuları tarafından yapılan yorumları incelemeyi ve değerlendirmeyi tercih 
ettim. Son olarak da, çalışmamı Nietzsche’nin doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki 
düşüncelerinin incelendiği, başlıkları “Güç İstenci,” “Perspektivizm,” ve 
“Doğruluk” olmak üzere üç ana bölüme ayırdım. 
 Güç İstenci başlıklı bölümde, Nietzsche’nin güç istenci kavramını 
eserlerinde ortaya konulduğu şekliyle sunmaya çalıştım. Yukarıda da bahsettiğim 
gibi, Nietzsche yorumcuları arasında Nachlaß notlarının ve The Will to Power 
kitabının geçerli kaynaklar olup olamayacağı konusunda bir anlaşmazlık olduğu 
için, bu problemi kısaca özetleyerek başladım. Nachlaß notlarının geçerliliği 
sorunu Nietzsche’nin doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşüncelerini incelerken 
belirleyici bir unsur olarak ortaya çıkıyor; şöyle ki, eğer bu notların meşruiyetini 
reddederseniz, Nietzsche’nin bu konular hakkındaki düşüncelerinin önemli bir 
bölümünü kaçırmış olursunuz. Bu çalışmanın ele aldığı ana sorun Nietzsche’nin 
doğruluk ve bilgi hakkındaki düşünceleri olduğu için, ben Nachlaß notlarının 
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geçerliliğini kabul etmek zorundayım. Bu nedenle, kısaca sorunun doğasından 
bahsedip, bazı önemli ve popüler Nietzsche yorumcularının bu yayımlanmamış 
notlara yaklaşımlarını sundum. 
 Daha sonra, güç istenci öğretisinin kapsamlı bir açıklamasını vermeye 
çalıştım. Çalışmalarım sırasında şunu fark ettim, Nietzsche yorumcuları güç 
istenci kavramını ve bu kavramın Nietzsche’nin felsefesi için olan önemini ya 
anlamıyorlar ya da yanlış anlıyorlar. Bu kavramın önemini anlamadan, 
Nietzsche’nin felsefesindeki ve dil kullanımındaki özgünlüğü ve incelikleri 
kavramak olanaksızdır. Bununla birlikte, ne yayımlanmış ne de yayımlanmamış 
eserlerinde kavramın açık bir tanımını bulamayız; sadece Nietzsche’nin güç 
istenci kavramıyla ne anlatmaya çalıştığına ilişkin bize fikir verebilecek pasajlar 
ve aforizmalar vardır. Diğer bir ifadeyle, kavramın kısa bir tanımını vermek 
yerine, Nietzsche kavramı, dünyanın nasıl hepsi birer güç istenci olan dinamik 
güç ölçülerinden (quanta) meydana geldiğini göstererek açıklamaya çalışır. 
 Nietzsche’ye göre, her şey sadece güç istencidir; yani, var olan her şey, 
ya bir güç ölçüsü ya da bu ölçülerin oluşturduğu bir birlik olan, güç odaklarıdır 
(power center). Her bir güç odağı, bir güç istenci olarak, kendi gücünü artırmaya 
çalışır. Bir güç odağı kendi gücünü artırabilmek için diğer tüm güç odaklarıyla 
sürekli bir mücadele içerisindedir; çünkü, güç artışı sadece diğerlerinin gücü 
pahasına olanaklıdır. Yani, güç artışı diğer güç odaklarının özümsenmesi, mal 
edilmesi, ve egemenlik altına alınması yoluyla gerçekleşir. Bundan dolayı, 
dünyada süre giden bir güç mücadelesi vardır. Nietzsche’ye göre, bu sürekli güç 
mücadelesinin sonucu olarak, dünya sürekli bir akış (flux) içerisindedir; bu güç 
mücadelesi sırasında her bir güç odağı değiştiği, yani gücü azaldığı ya da arttığı 
için, dünya sürekli değişir. Bu nedenle, Nietzsche için dünya varlık dünyası 
(world of being) değil de oluş dünyasıdır (world of becoming). 
 Ayrıca, gücü istemek ya da onun için mücadele etmek güç odaklarının 
dışında kalan bir şey değildir; yani, güç istenci güç odaklarının özsel bir 
özelliğidir. Nietzsche eyleyen ile eylem arasındaki ayrımı reddeder; çünkü bu 
ayrım, Nietzsche’nin reddettiği başka bir ayrıma, özne-nesne ayrımına yol açar. 
Dünya sürekli değişim halinde olduğu için, dünyada sabit ve hareketsiz bir şey 
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var olamaz. Fakat, bir eylemi ya da fiili eyleyen ve eylem olarak ikiye ayırmak 
eylemlerinden bağımsız ve sabit olan bir öznenin var olduğu anlamına gelir. 
Nietzsche’ye göre, böyle bir ayrım olanaksızdır ve bir nesne ne yapıyorsa tam da 
o yatığı şeydir; diğer bir ifadeyle, eylemleri dışında bir nesnenin varlığını 
hissedemeyiz. Güç istenci bu anlamda bir güç odağının özsel bir özelliğidir; bir 
güç odağı yaptığı ya da eylediği şey, yani, güç istenci ya da güç mücadelesidir. 
Güç istenci öğretisinin akılda tutulması gereken diğer bir önemli özelliği de 
budur. 
 Güç mücadeleleri sırasında, güç odakları siyasi federasyonlara benzeyen 
güç birlikleri oluşturabilirler. Bu birlik içerisinde, güç odakları bir yandan 
birbirleriyle birlik içerisinde güçlerini artırmak için güç mücadelesi yürütürken, 
diğer taraftan da birliğin gücünü artırmak için diğer güç odaklarıyla bir güç 
mücadelesi sürdürürler; Nietzsche’ye göre, beden ya da karmaşık bir organizma 
böyle bir güç birliğidir. Güç istenci öğretisi ve Darwinizm arasındaki ilişkiyi 
incelerken de gördüğümüz gibi, Nietzsche organların oluşumunun birlik ya da 
organizmayı oluşturan bireysel güç odaklarının kendi aralarındaki güç 
mücadelesi sonucu gerçekleştiğini iddia eder. Böylelikle, güç mücadelesi her 
yerde ve her zaman bir kesintiye uğramadan ya da kalıcı uzlaşmaya varmadan 
devam eder. Dahası, bir güç odağı, gücünü artırma uğruna, kendi varlığını ve 
korunmasını (preservation) tehlikeye atabilir; yani, Nietzsche için güç artışı 
kendini-korumadan (self-preservation) daha önemlidir; güç istenci öğretisindeki 
Darwin karşıtı bir tema daha. 
 Nietzsche’nin güç istenci öğretisi ile ilgili diğer bir önemli nokta ise, bu 
öğretide, organik ve inorganik nesne ayrımı olmamasıdır. Nietzsche’ye göre, her 
iki tür nesne de güç istencidir ve aralarındaki tek fark oldukları güç miktarı 
arasındaki farktır. Diğer bir deyişle, her bir güç odağı birbirinden oldukları güç 
derecesi ile ayrılırlar. Burada şu nüansa dikkat çekmek istiyorum: “sahip olmak” 
(to have) fiili yerine “olmak” (to be) fiilini kullandım; çünkü, güç sahip 
olacağınız bir şey değildir, çünkü bir nesne tam da o güçtür, ya da bir nesne tam 
da o güç miktarı, ölçüsü ya da derecesidir. Bu nüans öğreti ile ilgili bir çok 
anlaşmazlığın kaynaklandığı önemli bir noktadır. 
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 Öğreti ile ilgili bu ve bunun gibi diğer önemli noktaları tartışarak, 
öğretinin yapısını ortaya koyduktan sonra, Nietzsche yorumcuları arasında 
anlaşmazlıklara yol açan öğretinin yapısı ve doğasıyla ilgili iddiaları ele alarak 
devam ettim. 
 Bazı Nietzsche yorumcuları güç istenci öğretisini Darwinci bir ilke olarak 
kabul ediyorlar. Fakat, böyle bir yaklaşım asıl sorunu kavrayamaz. Çünkü, 
aralarında bazı benzerlikler olmakla beraber, güç istenci öğretisi ile Darwinizm 
arasında bazı temel ve derin bazı farklılıklar vardır. Ayrıca, Nietzsche Darwin ve 
Darwinizmi acımasızca eleştirir; özellikle, Darwinci kavramlar olan uyum 
(adaptation), güçlü olanın hayatta kalması (survival of the fittest), varolma 
mücadelesi (struggle for existence), Darwin’in ahlak hakkındaki düşünceleri, ve 
Darwin’in evrim kuramının özünde bulunan ereksellik Nietzsche’nin eleştirilerin 
ana hedefleridirler. Bu eleştirilere ve güç istenci öğretisine başvurarak, öğretinin 
hiçbir şekilde Darwinci bir ilke olamayacağını göstermeye çalıştım. 
 Daha sonra, öğretinin metafizik bir ilke olduğuna dair iddiaları ele aldım. 
Nietzsche, yine, kendi söylediğinin aksi iddialarla karşı karşıya kalıyor. 
Nietzsche her türlü metafiziği ve metafizik sistemleri durmaksızın eleştirmesine 
ve reddetmesine rağmen, bu durum bazı filozofları ve yorumcuları Nietzsche’nin 
bir metafizikçi ve güç istenci öğretisinin de metafizik bir ilke olduğunu iddia 
etmekten alıkoymaz. Bu metafizik suçlamalarının iki farklı ve karşıt felsefe 
geleneğinden geldiğini görmek oldukça ilginç bir durum; analitik felsefe ve kıta 
felsefesi gelenekleri. Bundan dolayı, bu iki kampın düşüncelerinden bahsetmeye 
kendimi mecbur hissettim. Böylece, Martin Heidegger’i kıta geleneğinin John 
Richardson’ı ise analitik geleneğin temsilcileri olarak seçtim. Aynı gelenekten 
gelen filozof ve düşünürlerin görüşleri arasında bazı temel farklılıklar olabileceği 
ve bu kararımın felsefi bir akıl yürütme için pek de geçerli bir yöntem olarak 
kabul edilemeyeceğinin farkındayım, fakat, yine de, Nietzsche’yi metafizikçi 
olarak bu iki farklı yorumun güç istenci düşüncesini anlamamıza katkıda 
bulunabileceğini düşünüyorum. İki yorumcunun iddialarını incelerken, önce 
onların akıl yürütmelerini sunduktan sonra bu iddia ve akıl yürütmelerin 
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Nietzsche’yi metafizikçi yapmak için yeterince sağlam ve inandırıcı 
olmadıklarını göstermeye çalıştım. 
 Perspektivizm başlıklı bölümde ise, Nietzsche’nin güç istenci öğretisi 
üzerinde temellenen perspektivizmini ele aldım. Nietzsche’nin 
perspektivizmindeki en önemli nokta yorum kavramıdır. Perspektivizm 
doğrularımızın perspektif yorumlardan başka bir şey olmadığını iddia eden bir 
görüş olarak özetlenebilir. Yorum sözcüğü, gündelik kullanımda, zihinsel bir 
eylemi işaret eder. Fakat, Nietzsche için yorum bir güç odağının gücünü 
kullanma ve artırma yoludur. Bir güç odağı, yorum aracılığıyla, dünyayı ve kendi 
çevresini kendi gücünü artıracak şekilde düzenler, şekillendirir, özümser, ve 
belirler; yani, her bir güç odağı dünyayı ve kendi çevresini kendi gücünü artırma 
perspektifinden yorumlar ya da yapılandırır. Bundan dolayıdır ki, Nietzsche 
dünyanın güç odaklarının kendi güçlerini artırma perspektifinden yaptıkları 
yorumların toplamı olduğunu ileri sürer. 
 Her yorum, yorum sürecine dahil olan güç odaklarının güçlerinde bir 
değişime yol açar; diğer bir ifadeyle, yorum gücü artırma perspektifinden 
yapıldığı ve güç artışı sadece diğer güç odaklarının güçlerindeki bir azalma 
pahasına olanaklı olduğu için, güç mücadelesi sürecinde bazı güç odaklarının 
gücü artarken diğerlerininki azalır. Güç odaklarının güç miktarlarında meydana 
gelen bu değişim, dünyada da bir değişim olduğuna işaret eder; bu da dünyanın 
artık yorumun yapıldığı andaki durumunda olmadığı anlamına gelir. Bundan 
dolayı da, dünyanın yeniden yorumlanması gerekir. Dünyaya oluş karakterini 
veren, onu bir oluş dünyası yapan da işte bu kesintisiz yorum sürecidir. 
 Bu dinamik dünya anlayışı doğruluğu olgulara ya da gerçekliğe karşılık 
gelme olarak kabul eden bilişsel paradigmamızı yıkar; karşılıklılık durağan ve 
düzenli bir dünya anlayışını varsayar, fakat, biz şimdi sürekli akış halinde olan 
bir dünyaya sahibiz. Bundan dolayı, bizim dünyanın doğası ile ilgili 
doğrularımız hiçbir şeye karşılık gelemedikleri için birer yanılsama ya da hayal 
haline gelirler. Nietzsche’ye göre bütün doğrularımız sadece birer yorumdurlar, 
daha fazlası değil. Böylece, bu doğruları değişmeyen mutlak doğrular kabul 
etmek gücümüzü artırmamızı engeller. Nietzsche için, bizim bu doğrulara 
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yapışıp kalmamız bir korkaklık ve zayıflık işaretidir; bu mutlak doğruların 
hayatta kalmamızı sağladığını görüp, kendini-korumayı riske etmeyi gerektiren 
güç artırmayı feda ederek bu doğrulara sarılırız. Nietzsche mutlak doğruların 
yaşamı kısırlaştıran, hatta hadım eden, etkilerini görerek, bizi bu türden mutlak 
doğrulara götüren epistemolojik paradigmayı perspektivizm aracılığıyla yok 
etmeye çalışır. 
 Nietzsche perspektivizmini bir yenilik ve epistemolojimize bir alternatif 
olarak sunar. Nietzsche’nin yayımlanmış ya da yayımlanmamış eserlerinde, 
perpektivizmin açık bir tanımını bulamasak da, perspektivizm ile ne anlatmaya 
çalıştığını bu kavramdan bahsettiği pasajlardan anlayabiliriz. Perspektivizmin 
temel iddiasını şöyle özetleyebiliriz: mutlak doğruluk diye bir şey yoktur ve 
doğrularımızın hepsi birer perspektif yorumdur. Aslında, perspektivizm 
Nietzsche’nin dünyayı güç istenci öğretisi ve yorum aracılığıyla bir oluş dünyası 
olarak kurmasının doğrudan bir sonucu gibi görünmektedir. Dünya sürekli bir 
akış içerisinde olduğu için, böyle bir dünyada mutlak doğruya ulaşmanın bir yolu 
yoktur; bundan dolayı da, dünyaya ilişkin doğrularımız sadece gücümüzü artırma 
perspektifinden yaptığımız yorumlardır. Buna ek olarak, doğrularımızı perspektif 
yorumlar olarak gören böyle bir doğruluk anlayışı karşılılıktan başka bir 
doğruluk ölçütü gerektirir. Nietzsche güç istenci öğretisi ile uyumlu bir doğruluk 
ölçütü ileri sürer; güç artışı. Nietzsche’ye göre, eğer bir yorum yorumu yapanın 
gücünü artırıyorsa doğru, aksi durumda ise yanlıştır. Bu nedenle, Nietzsche’nin 
perspektivizmi bizim geleneksel doğruluk anlayışımıza karşıdır ve bu anlayışın 
altını oyar.  
 Perspektivizm göreciliğe benzer gibi görünmektedir. Fakat, Nietzsche’nin 
dünyayı güç istenci olarak kurmasını göz önüne aldığımızda, perspektivizmin 
görecilik ile alakası olmadığı açıkça ortaya çıkar. Görecilik nesnel bir 
gerçekliğin var olduğunu kabul eder ve bu nesnel gerçekliğin hiç kimsenin 
erişemeyeceği bir bakış açısından ulaşılabilir olduğunu iddia eder; bu nedenle, 
görecilik için bu nesnel gerçekliğe ilişkin tüm inançların ve fikirlerin hepsi, 
yanlış olmaları anlamında, eşit derecede doğrudur. Fakat, güç istenci öğretisi 
bizim nesnel gerçekliğin varlığından ve onun bilgisinin ulaşılabilirliğinden söz 
 
212 
etmemizi olanaksız kılar. Ayrıca, Nietzsche’nin perspektivizmi iyi ve kötü 
yorum arasında ayrım yapabilmemize olanak sağlayan bir doğruluk ölçütüne 
sahiptir. Görecilik tartışmasını Peter Poelnner’in Nietzsche’nin 
perspektivizminin bir tür görecilik olduğu iddiası üzerinden derinleştirerek 
sürdürdüm, ve perspektivizmin neden bir tür görecilik olamayacağını yukarıda 
bahsettiğim farklılıklarla birlikte Nietzsche’nin güç istenci öğretisi ve yorum 
kavramlarını kullanarak göstermeye çalıştım. 
 Perspektivizmin daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi için, Nietzsche’nin geleneksel 
epistemolojik paradigmanın mantık, nedensellik, özne-nesne ve gerçek-görünen 
dünya ayrımları gibi temel varsayım ve bileşenlerine perspektivizm temelinde 
getirdiği eleştirileri inceledim. Nietzsche’ye göre bu varsayımlar sadece tahmin 
edilebilir ve hesaplanabilir bir dünya kurabilmek için kullandığımız araçlardır ve 
bunlarda diğer tüm doğrularımız gibi sadece birer yorumdurlar. Böylesi bir 
hesaplanabilir ve tahmin edilebilir dünya, içerisinde yaşadığımız dünyanın 
yanlışlanması ile mümkündür. Demek oluyor ki, içerisinde tahminlerin ve 
hesapların işlemediği oluş dünyasını reddedip bizim varlığımızın devamının 
gerektirdiği koşulları sağlayacak hayali bir dünya yaratıyoruz. Örneğin, 
Nietzsche’ye göre, mantık eşit ve benzer nesne, olay ve durumlar gerektirir. 
Fakat, bu durumlar içerisinde yaşadığımız oluş dünyasında var olmadığı için 
bunları kendimiz yaratırız. Kategoriler yaratırız ve karşılaştığımız her nesne, 
olay ya da durumu tüm farklılıklarını ve değişen karakterlerini görmezden 
gelerek ya da yadsıyarak bu kategorilerin içerisine yerleştirmeye çalışırız. Diğer 
taraftan, Nietzsche mantığın temel ilkelerinden özdeşlik ve çelişmezlik 
ilkelerinin de bizim yarattığımız şeyler olduğunu ileri sürerek bu ilkeleri 
düşüncelerimizin doğruluğunu belirleyen ve deneyimden bağımsız araçlar olarak 
kabul etmemizi eleştirir. Aynı şekilde, nesne-özne ve gerçek-görünen dünya 
ayrımlarını da durağan ve değişmeyen nesneler varsaydığı için reddeder. İlk 
ayrımda, eylemlerinden bağımsız ve değişmeyen bir özne ve edilgin bir şekilde 
varolan bir nesne ortaya çıkar ki, Nietzsche’ye göre eylemeyen, hareket etmeyen 
ya da değişmeyen bir şey var olamaz. İkinci ayrımda ise, yine bir yorum olarak 
kurduğumuz ve Nietzsche’nin ileri sürdüğü oluş dünyasına oranla daha az 
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değişimin yaşandığı görünen dünyanın karşısına değişimin olmadığı bir gerçek 
dünya konulur. Fakat, Nietzsche’ye göre her iki dünya da bizim yorumumuzdan 
başka bir şey değildir; iki dünyayı da biz kurarız. Ayrıca, gerçek dünya diye 
tasarladığımız dünyaya dair hiçbir deneyimimiz yoktur ve sadece içerisinde 
yaşadığımız görünen dünyada deneyimlediğimiz değişimin üzerimizde yarattığı 
korkuyu kırabilmek ve değişimin yaşandığı bu dünyayı sahte bir dünya olarak 
gösterebilmek için kurduğumuz bir dünyadır. Nietzsche’ye göre, nedensellik de 
aynı psikolojik gereksinimlerimizi karşılamak için yarattığımız bir şeydir. 
İçerisinde yaşadığımız dünyada değişim vardır ve bu değişim bir düzene 
bağlamak, onun bir kural içerisinde gerçekleştiğini görmek bu dünyanın bizim 
için bildik ve güvenilir kalmasını sağlar. Bilmediğimiz ve yabancı bir durum ya 
da olayla karşılaştığımızda tedirgin oluruz ve onu tanıdığımız bir şey haline 
getirmeye çalışırız. Nietzsche’ye göre, bu yabancı olay ya da nesneleri bildiğimiz 
kavram ve nesneler aracılığıyla nedensellik kurgusu içerisinde açıkladığımızda 
bu korku ve tedirginlikten kurtuluruz. Sonuçta, bu bildik ve tanıdık kavram ve 
nesneler de zaten bizim daha önce yorumlayarak kurduğumuz şeyler oldukları 
için, bunları kullanarak tanıdık hale getirmeye çalıştığımız şeylerde bizim 
yorumlarımız olacaklardır. Ayrıca, Nietzsche nedenselliğin zamanın tersine 
çevrilmesi sonucu kurulduğunu iddia eder. Sonuç ortaya çıkmadan nedeni ortaya 
koyamayız; sonuç bir kez ortaya çıktıktan sonra, yine tanıdık ve bildik kavram 
ve nesneleri kullanarak geriye doğru nedensellik zincirini kurarız. Nietzsche’nin 
de söylediği gibi, sonuç ortaya çıkmadan önce, sonuç ortaya çıktıktan sonra 
inandığımız nedenlerden farklı nedenlere inanırız. Burada Nietzsche’nin 
eleştirilerini kısaca özetlemeye çalıştım, daha geniş bir inceleme tezin içerisinde 
mevcut, fakat Nietzsche’nin eleştirilerinin genel bir özetini vermek gerekirse, 
tüm bu varsayım ve araçlar tahmin edilebilir ve hesaplanabilir bir dünya 
kurabilmek için yarattığımız şeylerdir ve bunlar dünyanın gerçek yapısı ya da 
varoluşu ile hiçbir alakaları yoktur; hepsi bizim “insanca, pek insanca” 
yorumlarımızdan başka bir şey değildir. 
 Doğruluk başlıklı bölümde ise, Nietzsche’nin doğruluk hakkındaki 
çelişik ifadelerini, doğruluk anlayışını, ve bu doğruluk anlayışının doğruluk 
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kuramlarıyla olan ilişkilerini inceledim. Öncelikle, günümüz Nietzsche 
çalışmalarında yaşanan tartışmaların bir diğer kaynağı olan Nietzsche’nin 
doğruluğa ilişkin çelişik ifadelerini ele aldım. Nietzsche’nin eserlerinde 
doğruluğun varlığına ve değerine ilişkin hem olumlu hem de olumsuz ifadeler 
bulunmaktadır. Bu ifadelerden kaynaklanan çelişkinin görünürde bir çelişki 
olduğunu göstermeye çalıştım. Bunu yaparken de, olumlu ifadelerinde 
Nietzsche’nin kendi doğruluk ölçütüne uygun olarak kullandığını; yani, gelip 
geçici doğrulardan bahsettiğini; olumsuz ifadelerde ise, durağan bir dünya 
düzenini varsayan mutlak doğrulardan bahsettiğini göstermeye çalıştım. 
 Bu görünürde çelişkili durumu açıklığa kavuşturduktan sonra, 
Nietzsche’nin perspektivizminin örtük olarak karşılıklılık, pragmacı ya da 
uygunluk doğruluk kuramlarından birini varsayıp varsaymadığını incelemeye 
başladım. Karşılıklılık doğruluk kuramı günümüz Nietzsche yorumcularının 
sıklıkla atfettikleri kuram olduğu için, bu bölümde yoğunluklu olarak bu kuramla 
ilgilendim. Perspektif doğruluk ile karşılıklılık kuramının belirlediği doğruluk 
arasındaki temel farkları daha belirgin bir şekilde ortaya koyabilmek için 
perspektif doğruluk ve karşılıklılık kuramını kısaca karşılaştırdım. Daha sonra, 
Nietzsche’nin bir doğruluk kuramına sahip olup olmadığını Maudemarie 
Clark’ın Nietzsche’ye karşılıklılık kuramı atfedişini inceleyerek bulmaya 
çalıştım. Clark’ı seçmemin birkaç nedeni var. Birincisi, Clark’ın akıl yürütmesi 
oldukça ilginç ve analitik yorumcuların Nietzsche’yi ele alırken gösterdikleri 
eğilimleri örnekliyor: Clark, Nietzsche’ye karşılıklılık kuramını atfederken 
Nietzsche’nin metinlerine hiçbir gönderme yapmıyor. İkinci olarak ise, birinci ile 
bağlantılı olarak, Clark Nietzsche’yi karşılıklılık kuramına mahkum edebilmek 
için Tarski’nin Convention T diye bilinen anlambilimsel doğruluk kuramını 
(semantic theory of truth) ve bu kuramdan türettiği eşdeğerlik ilkesi gibi 
tamamıyla dilsel analize dayanan yöntemler kullanmasıdır. Üçüncü olarak da, 
Clark’ın Nietzsche’ye karşılıklılık kuramını atfederken kullandığı akıl yürütme 
boyunca eşdeğerlik ilkesini kullanarak pragmacı ve uygunluk gibi diğer rakip 
doğruluk kuramları da elemesidir. Bu ve bunun gibi diğer özellikler, Clark’ın 
akıl yürütmesini araştırmam için verimli bir konu haline getirmiştir. 
 
215 
 Eşdeğerlik ilkesi kısaca şunu iddia eder: bir ifade ancak ve ancak 
söylendiği dil içerisinde doğru bir ifade ise doğrudur. Clark bu ilkeyi kullanarak 
Nietzsche’yi kavramları ve sözcükleri sıradan kullanımlarına uygun bir şekilde 
kullanmaya mahkum etmeye çalışır. Clark’ın dilsel analize dayanan 
uslamlamasının uygulanamaz bir şey olduğunu gösterebilmek için Nietzsche’nin 
“On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” bundan sonra TL olarak 
kullanılacaktır, (“Ahlakdışı Anlamda Doğruluk ve Yalan Üzerine”) isimli 
makalesinde ortaya koyduğu dilin soykütüğüne ilişkin analizini sundum. Bu 
makalede, Nietzsche dilin kökeninde bireyler arasında yapılan bir barış 
antlaşmasının yattığını ve doğru ve yalanın bu antlaşma tarafından belirlendiğini 
iddia eder; bir ifade eğer bu antlaşmanın kurallarına uygun olarak kurulmuşsa 
doğru, aksi takdirde yanlıştır. Bu da bize dilsel analizle bizim sadece verilen 
ifadenin antlaşmanın kurallarına uygun bir şekilde kurulup kurulmadığını 
belirlemekten başka bir şey yapamayacağımızı gösterir. Bu makalede, Nietzsche 
bize kullandığımız sözcük ve kavramların bir zamanlar sadece birer metafor 
olduklarını ve hiçbir şekilde dünyanın gerçekte olduğu biçimine karşılık 
gelemeyeceğini de gösterir. Bunlardan dolayı, Clark’ın uslamlaması Nietzsche’yi 
karşılıklılık kuramcısı yapmaya yetmez. Devamında, Clark’ın pragmacı ve 
uygunluk doğruluk kuramlarını Nietzsche’nin kabullenebileceği kuramlar olarak 
eşdeğerlik ilkesini kullanarak elemesini inceledim. Bunu yaparken de, bu 
kuramlara Nietzsche’nin perspektivizmini kullanarak bu kuramların nasıl 
reddedilebileceğini araştırdım. 
 Son olarak, Nietzsche’nin TL makalesinde ortaya koyduğu dil ve 
doğruluk arasındaki ilişki hakkındaki düşüncelerini daha detaylı inceleyerek, 
Nietzsche’nin bir doğruluk kuramına sahip olup olmadığı sorusunu yanıtlamaya 
çalıştım. Bu sorunun kesin bir şekilde yanıtlanamayacak kadar zor ve karmaşık 
olduğunun farkındayım. Zaten Nietzsche’ye atfedilen doğruluk kuramlarının 
çeşitliliği de bu zorluğu gösterir niteliktedir. Her şeye rağmen, Nietzsche’yi asıl 
ilgilendiren şeyin bize yeni ya da varolan bir doğruluk kuramını sunmaktan çok, 
mutlak doğruların yaşamı olumsuzlayan etkilerini göstermek olduğuna 
inanıyorum. Bu nedenle, Nietzsche’ye bir doğruluk kuramı atfetmek ya da onun 
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ilgilendiği şeyin sadece bize yeni ya da eski doğruluk kuramlarından birini 
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